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Academy of Political Science
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of Columbia University

Myths of Hemispheric, Continental, Regional, and State Unity
WALKER F. CONNOR

The Majority Principle: Calhoun and His Antecedents
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JANOS HORVATH

Reviews

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Myths of Hemispheric, Continental, Regional, and State Unity

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One of the more enduring and consequential myths of human relations is the assumption that groups who dwell on a single land mass share certain common interests and traits because of that territorial contiguity, even though the groups in question may be separated by great distances.[1] An illustration of this phenomenon is offered by the phrase popularly ascribed to United States relations with Latin America in the post-1933 period, "the Good Neighbor Policy." By the term "neighbor," U.S. leaders were obviously implying the existence of a special relationship based upon a concept of relative proximity. Among the neighbors were the so-called "ABC" states of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. Beyond the pale of the neighborhood were such states as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Liberia, and the U.S.S.R. Yet, in navigable distances, each of these states was closer to the United States than was any of the "ABC" group.[2] Con-

[1] For an earlier article concerned with this myth, see Eugene Staley, "The Myth of the Continents," *Foreign Affairs*, XIX (1941), 481-94. Staley's analysis was essentially limited to the Western Hemisphere, and his primary aim was to counter the tendency, prevalent in the period prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, to stress a hemispheric concept of defense at the expense of European ties. For a still earlier reference to the myth as applied to the Western Hemisphere, see William Stevens and Allan Wescott, *A History of Sea Power* (New York, 1920), 2.

[2] The statement is based upon the distance between New York City and the major port of each of the other states. It holds true for both sea and air

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trariwise, Argentina and Brazil were closer to Europe than they were to the "colossus of the north."

In terms of its basic assumption that a special relationship exists among all of the states of the Western Hemisphere due to geography, the Good Neighbor Policy did not represent a departure from earlier attitudes, but rather furnished testimony to the tenacity of a myth which had been prevalent at least since the first stirrings of independence movements in Latin America. Thomas Jefferson, for example, noted in private correspondence in 1811:

> The European nations constitute a separate division of the globe; their localities make them a part of a distinct system; they have a set of interests of their own in which it is our business never to engage ourselves. *America has a hemisphere to itself. It must have its separate system of interests;* which must not be subordinated to those of Europe. *The insulated state in which nature has placed the American continent,* should so far avail that no spark of war kindled in other quarters of the globe should be wafted across the wide oceans which separate us from them and it will be so.[3]

In a similar vein, Henry Clay declared on the floor of the House of Representatives a few years later:

> There cannot be a doubt that Spanish America, once independent, whatever may be the form of governments established in its parts, *these governments will be animated by an American feeling, and guided by an American policy. They will obey the laws of the system of the New World,* of which they will compose a part, in contradistinction to that of Europe.[4]

Both statements predicate a mystical bond arising from an equally mystical proximity. From their sharp differentiation between Europe and all that is European on the one hand, and the

---

travel. To anticipate a possible objection it might be noted that the ports of Chile are closer to New York than they are to United States west-coast ports. Argentina is the farthest from New York, comparing unfavorably in this regard even with Turkey and the UAR.

[3] From a letter to his friend Alexander von Humboldt. Quoted in Dexter Perkins, *A History of the Monroe Doctrine* (Boston, 1963), 22 (emphasis added). It is assumed that the statement can be considered an accurate reflection of Jefferson's convictions, since it was not intended for publication.

[4] Speech of March 24, 1818, cited in *ibid.*, 3-4 (emphasis added).

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New World and all that is "New Worldly" on the other, it is evident that both men had assumed a direct relationship between physical geography and contemporary human affairs. The oceans were viewed as constituting barriers to human relations, and the landed interconnection between the United States and the states to the south was viewed, at least by contrast with the oceans, as constituting a cultural and political bridge.

This same a priori assumption underlay the clarion of "Manifest Destiny," which called upon Americans to conform to Nature's law by making their political-cultural domain coterminous with the land mass. While president, John Q. Adams found "it a settled geographic element that the United States and North America are identical." He was followed by others who pursued the logic of the concept of "natural frontiers" (ocean borders) to its conclusion. In 1845, for example, a congressman from Illinois prophesied on the floor of the House that the Speaker would soon recognize not just the gentleman from Oregon, but the one from Canada, from Cuba, from Mexico, "aye, even the gentleman from Patagonia." And he was supported in his prophesy by Stephen A. Douglas, who made clear, however, that he "did not wish to go beyond the great ocean—beyond the boundaries which the God of nature had marked out."[5]

Although the United States was later to settle for something far less territorially ambitious than the Arctic and the Straits of Magellan, the idea of the hemispheric bond was to remain the ideological nucleus of United States–Latin-American policy. From the espousal of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 to the Alliance for Progress, the United States has steadfastly assumed the existence of special ties between itself and all of Latin America (1) because of their common separation from Eurasia by oceans and (2) because of their landed interconnection. Considering again that the United States and some of the South American states are closer to Europe than they are to each other, how else is to be explained the words of the Monroe Doctrine: "With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers"? Or Secretary of State Olney's 1895 contention that

[5] Frederick Merk, *Manifest Destiny* (New York, 1963), 16, 28.

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"the States of America, South as well as North, *by geographic proximity*, . . . are friends and allies"?[6] Or Theodore Roosevelt's 1904 denial that the United States wanted anything in the Western Hemisphere other than "to see the *neighboring countries* stable, orderly, and prosperous"?[7] Or Franklin Roosevelt's reference to "good neighbors"? Or the official wording of the congressional rationale for the Alliance for Progress: "It is the sense of the Congress that the historic, economic, political, and *geographic* relationships among the American peoples and Republics are unique and of special significance . . ."?[8]

It is evident that this "unique" and "special" relationship is based upon the sharing of a single land-mass, for the United States shares little else with all of the states of Central and South America. Surely not culture, for the United States is a predominantly Anglo-Saxon, English-speaking, Protestant culture while its neighbors to the south are predominantly Latin, Spanish-Portugese-speaking, and Catholic. Economically, some of the states of Central and South America have been important providers of raw materials to the United States, others have been essentially unimportant to the United States economy, and still others, such as Argentina, have been competitive with the United States.

But how important has the fact of sharing a common land-mass actually been? The reality, of course, is that relations with all states south of Mexico have been conducted as though they and the United States were distinct islands. And this is true of the most important relations between Mexico and the United States as well. The "land-bridge" represented by the Isthmus of Panama is, in fact, a barrier (containing mountains and tropical jungle, and not completely crossed by a single north-south highway), which has been bypassed rather than utilized by man in his north-south travels. The major importance of the Isthmus in the relations among the states of the Western Hemisphere has been due to its man-made, east-west severance at Panama, rather than to its north-south con-

[6] Perkins, 149 (emphasis added).

[7] Annual Message from President Roosevelt to the United States Congress, Dec. 6, 1904, in William Williams (ed.), *The Shaping of American Diplomacy* (Chicago, 1956), 530.

[8] Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, Title VI—Alliance for Progress, sec. 251, par. (a) (emphasis added).

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tinuity. Intercourse between the United States and other American states to the south has been conducted primarily by sea or, so far as passenger service in recent years is concerned, by air, but practically not at all by land. Yet, would the United States have been apt to postulate a "unique" and "special" relationship between itself and, say, Argentina, if the two states had been "separated by ocean," rather than "connected by land"?

I

The prevalence of the myth of landed relationships is not limited to the Western Hemisphere. There exists a common tendency, when looking at a world map, to conceive of the blue-painted oceans and large seas as chasms and voids, effectively separating the land masses—particularly Eurasia, Africa, and the Americas —into inward-looking, intrarelated wholes. Meaningful relations, it follows, end at the water's edge. As a formula this conception would read: *Two points, connected by land, are closer than two points, equally distant, but separated by water.*

The formula admittedly possessed validity prior to the late fifteenth century, if two points separated by water meant two points separated by a wide expanse of open ocean. But even in prehistoric times man had discovered and put into practice what his sucessors have continued to practice while often failing to perceive, that water poses less of a barrier to movement and to trans-communication than does land.

The socio-political consequences of the comparative advantage of water travel are manifest in the arterial role which navigable rivers have played throughout history. Thus, the first political integration of a large territory and population occurred in Egypt, where even today almost ninety-nine per cent of the inhabitants dwell in that four per cent of the territory which stretches along the Nile. Other early societies developed along the Tigris-Euphrates, the Indus, and the Yellow Rivers.[9]

This integrating influence of rivers possesses great significance for contemporary South Asian politics. In the case of Burma, for

[9] There is some evidence that the Tigris-Euphrates civilization may antedate that of the Nile.

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example, an examination of the linguistic and relief maps illustrates that the Burmese-speaking people are limited essentially to the Irrawady and Sittang River Valleys, their deltas, and a stretch of coastal plain. In Thailand the Siamese-speaking element is essentially restricted to the Chao Praya Valley. In Vietnam the Vietnamese-speakers are restricted to the Red and Mekong River Valleys, their deltas, a thin coastal strip, and the river and canal-infested Cochin-China plain. It is therefore evident that the rivers and off-coast waters have been the main passageways for cultural and economic intercourse throughout South Asian history. People separated by great distances along a navigable river or sea coast are very often culturally interrelated and, what is of key political importance, are conscious of that interrelationship because it has been nourished by continuing contacts. By contrast, people only short distances away (for example, the Karens, Kachins, Mons, and others in Burma; the mountain tribesmen of the north, and the Lao-speaking people of the northeast in the case of Thailand; the "montagnards" in the case of Vietnam) have been comparatively isolated from the dominant people within the political state in which they now find themselves. Many of the major problems of contemporary South Asia are the *in tandem* consequence of the attempt to combine within single territorial-political units what have hitherto been effectively separated highland and riverine-coastal culture groups.

Coastal waters have also served as intercontinental avenues since early times. The key role that was played by the Mediterranean in a number of ancient civilizations is impressed upon all "Western" schoolchildren. What is seldom emphasized in children's history books, however, is that "the cradle of Western civilization" actually consisted of the intertwined civilizations of Asia and Africa, as well as Europe. Moreover, even prior to the Christian era, goods from monsoon Asia regularly reached the Mediterranean by way of the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the shortest possible overland route across the Isthmus of Suez. Similarly, a thriving ocean trade between east-coast Africa and the Indian subcontinent existed long before Vasco de Gama rounded southern Africa. The advances in navigational devices and shipbuilding which made possible "the Age of Discovery" represented, therefore, only an evolutionary, albeit a giant step in the pattern of

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human relations. Transocean voyages did not herald a radical departure from earlier patterns.

Significant overland movements have also occurred, of course. Overland migrations of people, covering great distances, are quite common facts of history; caravan routes for the carriage of goods long existed between the Orient and the Mediterranean and between the north and south Sahara; there have been empires such as the Khanate of the Golden Horde, which were based primarily upon overland relationships. But three points are evident: (1) Where navigable waters are available man, throughout history, has utilized them in preference to overland routes. In the conduct of relations beyond the immediate proximity, navigable waters have been a more important avenue than has land. (2) Both quantitatively and qualitatively, overwater relations have proved more pervasive than have overland relations. Thus, the historic overland migrations tended to be single-shot in nature; their routes did not form the channel for continuing cross-fertilization of the cultures located at the originating and terminal points of the migration. Similarly, the overland empires, such as that of the Golden Horde, proved to have little enduring impact upon the peoples of their further reaches.[10] The Chinese cultural impact remained confined to the river valleys and coastal plains, but had little impact upon the peoples of southern China, Tibet, Sinkiang, and Mongolia. Portuguese and Spanish culture had an enduring impact upon the variegated coastal-oriented people of South America, but much less a one upon those of the interior. Indeed, the influence of Castilian culture upon the coastal and riverine people of those territories in South America once controlled by Spain has been greater than it has been upon the Basques and Catalonians of territorial Spain. It is apparent, therefore, that the interrelationship which was noted between water transport and acculturation in South Asia is not unique to that region. (3) Important overwater contacts have been conducted, often without distance having any discernible impact, while territorially adjacent areas frequently have experienced little intercommunication.

[10] If, as it has long been assumed, the early Incas were not seafarers, the Inca empire would be an exception. But recent discoveries of pottery raise serious doubts about this assumption. See Walter Sullivan's article in the New York *Times*, June 1, 1969, and a description of a voyage by reed boat from Peru to Panama in the New York *Times*, June 22, 1969.

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II

The impact of technology upon "meaningful distance" has been a great and an accelerating one in quantitative measure. But has it altered or merely magnified the comparative disadvantage of land travel? An answer requires that one differentiate distance in terms of transportation, communications, and military strategy.

The continuous erection of road, rail, and pipeline networks is certainly evidence of man's progress in overcoming barriers to overland transportation. Nonetheless it remains the case that the water-transport of bulk items is by far the most efficient method. As but one illustration, consider the cost ratio of various forms of bulk-oil transport within the United States as compared with ship transport: movement by pipeline is four times as expensive; by railroad, twenty-two times; and by truck, seventy-five times more costly.[11]

Despite the proliferation of networks of other forms of surface transport such figures make evident that water transport, wherever available, would be the preferred method for the movement of bulk goods.[12] Illustrative of this preference is the fact that seventy per cent of all tonnage shipped in and out of United States ports represents intra-United States trade. Similarly, in functional though not in political terms, there is justification for considering the Panama Canal an internal waterway; one-sixth of all shipping through the canal is merely en route from one United States coast to the other. San Francisco is closely tied to New York by water transport, despite the fact that the navigable water distance between the two is more than twice the overland distance, is greater than the distance from New York to Rio or Istanbul, and is greater than the distance from San Francisco to the ports of Japan and Korea. The same comparative advantage explains why the transport of goods between Alaska and the group of forty-eight states south of Canada is conducted essentially as though each were an island.

[11] John Alexander, *Economic Geography* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963), 347.

[12] The distance, of course, must be sufficiently great to offset the cost and inconvenience of transloading goods from truck or train to ship and vice versa. If the trip is relatively short the advantage of direct rail- or road-transport from source to final destination will counter the lesser ton-mileage expense of ship transport. This fact accounts for the great loss in the *relative* importance of intrastate shipping within many states in recent years.

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And it lends a measure of truth to the occasional slip of writers and speakers when they refer to the forty-eight states as "the continental United States," in contradistinction to the Hawaiian and, inferentially, the Alaskan Islands. It also explains why the Alaska Highway, constructed during World War II for strategic reasons, has been of negligible economic importance. Where alternate sea-lanes are available, lengthy roads such as the Alaska and the still uncompleted Pan American Highways are only of tourist, psychological, and highly localized economic value.

Air freight is also at a disadvantage. Its importance is still limited to those classes of goods which enjoy a high value-to-volume ratio, to situations in which rapid delivery is important, and to situations in which alternate methods of transport are unavailable.

The role of water-travel relative to passenger-transport is, of course, vastly different; and it loses primacy to air-travel, and to land travel where adequate roads and railways are available. The pattern is not a simple one, however. While air travel is quite obviously the most important means of traversing long distances between important urban areas, it remains an inadequate means of reaching destinations of lesser import. Tales concerning the need to expend more time in reaching a relatively nearby airport than in traveling between two distant cities are now common ingredients of American lore. Since commercial intercontinental flights have long been a reality, such tales emphasize once more the inherent danger of assuming "land connects, water divides." They also raise the far broader question of the degree to which personal travel possesses significance for intercultural relations.

Capitals of "third world" states may be hours from Paris or Washington, and days, or even weeks, from points within their own states. As a result, the impact of air travel upon the great majority of the world's people has been negligible. Indeed, even in the case of states which possess a good intrastate transportation system, the direct impact of personal travel upon the society is minute. The average American, Frenchman, or Russian is not significantly affected by the coming and going of interstate travelers at New York, Paris, or Moscow airports; nor is his culture. On the other hand, if one is talking about the simultaneous visits of a foreign

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element in sufficiently large numbers to have a cultural impact,[13] then one could contend that the presence of the foreigner in such numbers is at least as apt to give rise to cultural isolation characterized by ethnocentrism and xenophobia. Intercultural person-to-person contacts, unless the necessary concomitant of some mutually desired function (trade or the prosecution of a military alliance in the face of a mutually recognized threat, for example), are apt to prove either unimportant or pernicious.

To contend that the impact of transcultural person-to-person contacts is probably not very great is not to be blind to the evidence that most societies today are culturally less isolated than formerly, and, therefore, more closely reflect one another in current tastes in music, dress, movies, architectural and structural design, student riots, and so forth. But two points should be noted. The first is that this transstate acculturation has not been due to personal contacts but to (1) the greatly increased interchange of goods, including such particularly pertinent items as machine tools, films, and technological and popular journals, (2) more efficient transcultural communications, and (3) the proliferation of multistate corporations such as General Motors, Uniroyal (formerly U.S. Rubber), and the International Business Machines Corporation, which facilitate the unencumbered intracorporate, interstate exchange of research results, style design, production methodology, and patents.[14] The second point is that the degree of this transcultural impact varies tremendously among states. Its most highly developed manifestation is most commonly held to be the recent impact of the United States upon the states of Western Europe—a transocean, not a transland relationship!

Technology appears to be reinforcing the primacy of water as an intercultural connector. Super-tankers, container-cargoes, pro-

[13] Recent illustrations might include Allied occupation forces following World War II, population transfers of Russians and Ukrainians into Kazakstan and other Asian areas of the Soviet Union, similar Chinese settlement in Sinkiang and Tibet, and the United States presence in South Vietnam and Thailand.

[14] For a report of an interesting speech on multistate companies by the chairman of a large British concern, see the *Christian Science Monitor*, April 25, 1969. The speaker referred to such companies as "the decisive business institution of our time" and cited a prediction that "by 1988, the free world's economy will be dominated by some 300 large companies responsible for most of the world's industrial output."

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portionately smaller crews, nuclear propulsion advances, artificial, deep-draft harbors, increasing mechanization of unloading and loading processes, and more powerful ice-breakers are all increasing the relative efficiency of sea transport. Investments in such developments by industry, and the continued emphasis by governments upon improving water travel, indicate their expectation of the indefinite paramountcy of sea transport. The current plan of the government of the Soviet Union, for example, calls for increased outlays for inland waterways, and its efforts to make the "northeast passage" along the Arctic coast utilizable during longer periods of the year continue to have a high priority. Farther west plans are now underway to connect the Baltic and Black Seas via the Rhine and Danube Rivers. United States interest in improving the Saint Lawrence Seaway and in creating a larger canal across the Isthmus of Panama offer still additional evidence of the optimistic future anticipated for water transport.[15] The advent of the "Air Age" and, more recently, the "Space Age," have not signified the deathknell of the "Sea Age."

The concept of communications-distance offers a number of parallels with what has been said concerning air-transport. Principal urban areas of the world are interconnected by communication channels without regard to distance or intervening oceans, while it is often much more difficult to make contact between those urban areas and nearby hinterlands. Despite some past technical problems in developing underseas telephone cables, the tendency for interstate channels of communication to be determined by demand rather than by distance or the intervening physical medium is evidenced by the often publicized fact that telephonic communication between South American capitals travels through New York, and two African points are in many instances telephonically joined

[15] Perhaps the most publicized recent example of faith in the future of sea-transport was offered by a private corporation, the Humble Oil and Refining Company, when in 1969 it supported a $30,000,000 venture in order to prove the feasibility of a year-round sea-route along the northern coast of the North American continent. The venture was justified on the grounds of the immense savings which could be obtained by complete ship-transport of the oil on the Alaskan North Slope to United States east-coast ports. It was estimated that the alternative of moving oil to ships by a north-south trans-Alaskan pipeline would jump the total delivery price from $.96 to $1.81 per barrel. See the New York *Times*, Aug. 18, 1969.

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only by a European detour.[16] The significance of such routes is in the lie they give to concepts of continental insularity and solidarity.

Recent technological developments and projected advances in the use of telecommunication satellites will bring all states, without regard to location, closer together in communicative distance. Intelsat satellites are even now available for the commercial use of telephone, telegraph, radio, and television transmission, and a vast extension of services is contemplated.

By itself, however, such a globe-girdling system will not affect areas otherwise poorly serviced by communications facilities. Continents will be more closely joined, capitals will be more closely joined, but sections of many states may remain essentially incommunicado.

Much publicity has been given in recent years to the integrating impact which the spread of the inexpensive transistor radio is having upon the less accessible areas of the states of Africa and Asia. Two warnings are appropriate, however. The first is that very little is known concerning either the degree or the nature of the impact of one-way communications. The phrase "meaningful monologue" is yet to be coined. Secondly, if the basic language, dialect, and colloquialisms common to the transmitting area are indistinguishable from those in the receiving area, then the two areas have long enjoyed an intensive, intracultural relationship. In such case, radio is merely augmenting an existing interrelationship, not creating a new one. If, on the other hand, language or dialect differs, then the announcer, even assuming that he can be understood, risks drawing attention to divisive rather than to common traits. If the programmers decide that it is best to make announcements in the local dialect or language, the question arises whether communications are strengthening intercultural contacts or cultural self-awareness. The transistors scattered among the tribes of northern and northeastern Thailand have been the means by which Peking and Hanoi draw attention, in the local dialect, to the distinctions and divisions between the listeners and the ruling Thais. Bangkok counters by broadcasts in the local tongues. In such a situation can one safely speak of transistorized assimilation? Or is

[16] See, for example, Albert Wohlstetter, "Illusions of Distance," *Foreign Affairs*, XLVI (1968), 248.

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it safer to note that cultural distance is being increased by the shortening of communications distance?[17]

III

The concept of strategic distance may appear anachronistic. In programming targets for ICBM's distance is immaterial, and it is also inconsequential whether the target be overland or overseas. Submarine-launched, intermediate-range missiles, however, continue to play an important role in the strategic planning of nuclear powers, so it might be noted that ocean relationships between potential enemies do affect vulnerability. Here again water connects and land separates, for the only meaningful measurement in this context is the distance of a target from the nearest major body of ocean-connected water. Again it is within this context that Omaha is one of the least vulnerable spots within the United States.

In any event, assuming that one *must* rule out the occurrence of nuclear warfare, distinctions between sea and land distances do retain strategic significance. Judging by their actions it appears most likely that those states in possession of modern weapons are not apt to confront each other directly, but that their interests are apt to be contested by proxy in relatively minor struggles. Soviet post-World War II practice, recent British and French retrenchment on international commitments, articles on people's wars by Chinese leaders, and the panoply of responses by Americans to involvement in Vietnam make it most improbable that nationals of the major states will participate directly in these struggles in large numbers. If present practices continue, however, the major states can be expected to provide essential logistics. And here one returns to the clear advantage of ship-transport, for one of the strange rules of the new "proxy wars" of the major states is total respect for freedom of the seas. Haiphong and Cam Ranh Bay have been doorways between a peace zone and a war zone; the United States and the Soviet Union have been able to supply to Vietnam as readily as they could, in the event of similar struggles, to Germany, Tanzania, or Vene-

[17] This subject is treated in greater detail below.

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zuela. If a state possesses a reserve capability with regard to its merchant marine the discrepancy of a few days in sea journey does not strategically affect the situation once goods have begun to arrive. For example, the difference in shipping time from the Persian Gulf to Britain via the Cape of Good Hope, as compared with the Suez Canal route, is approximately seventeen days. But the longer distance necessitated by the closing of the canal during 1967 affected the scale of deliveries to Britain for only a short time. Once the time gap between the arrival of the last tanker to pass through the canal and the arrival of the first vessel via the Cape had been closed, a compensatory increase in cargo capacity on the new run could and did neutralize the adverse effect of the canal's closing. There is, of course, an economic advantage in shortening distance. But the relative insignificance of this consideration is illustrated by the fact that much of the oil shipping will continue to use the Cape route after the canal is reopened. Costs associated with the seventeen-day delay are more than offset by the use of supertankers too large for the canal, and by the avoidance of canal fees.

Similarly, the overseas distance involved in the supplying of a war has little strategic significance, if the freedom-of-the-seas principle is observed. The important logistical problems of the Vietnam War have not involved the movement of goods to Cam Ranh Bay, but rather their unloading and their movement once ashore. The logistical distance from the closest port to a point in Laos, Sikkim, Niger, or Bolivia would unquestionably prove greater than the distance from that port to the United States. Guerrilla interdiction, inadequate road and rail networks, and the natural disadvantage of land transport are all involved.

There is, to be sure, one phenomenon in relation to which water could be said to separate and land to connect. This phenomenon involves a second strange rule of comtemporary warfare, as manifested in the practice of states. The rule holds (1) that in a "revolutionary warfare" situation supporters of each side will pay lip-service to the traditional view of the sanctity of borders (that is, that the government of one state should not become involved in affairs occurring on the other side of a state border without the permission of that state, nor should it permit activities on its side of the border which affect the internal af-

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fairs of the other state); (2) that the anti-revolutionary government and its supporters are in practice to observe the traditional sanctity of borders; and (3) that the revolutionary movement and its supporters will then use the sacrosanct side of the border for sanctuaries and for logistical avenues. As a result of this new practice, the significance of a common border between two states, in which the leaders of one desire the revolutionary overthrow of the government of the other, has been enormous in terms of the revolution's success or failure. When Yugoslavia, following its break with the Soviet Union, closed its borders to Greek revolutionaries the movement within Greece rapidly dissipated. Similarly, the insurrectionist movement within what was then British Malaya was never very effective, in part because the Thai government was not kindly disposed toward permitting its territory to be used by the guerrillas. On the other hand, the Algerian National Liberation Front was able to use Moroccan and Tunisian territory both for sanctuary and as a means of obtaining supplies. The post-1949 use of Chinese territory for the same two purposes by the Viet Minh is well known. So, too, is the use today by Hanoi of Laotian territory for supply lines (the Ho Chi Minh Trail) and Cambodian territory for both sanctuary and supply lines. Similar use of Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo is made by groups desiring to "liberate" Mozambique and Angola.

A government is therefore more immune to revolutionary movements if it does not adjoin another state. This certainly does not mean that island states are impervious to revolutions, as evidence the case of Cuba. But an ocean border does preclude the establishment of sanctuarial headquarters and supply depots immediately across the border. Moreover, it is much more difficult to supply war materiel from outside the state *without detection*. Policing a coast may pose problems, particularly if the coastal waters are customarily cluttered with large numbers of fishing boats, junks, sampans, dhows, and the like; but it is vastly easier than policing a land border of equivalent length. The Huk movement within the Philippines had serious problems obtaining supplies, as did the Communist movement in Java once it became a truly revolutionary movement (once it lost the support of the government following the abortive coup). Castro's frustrated desires to export his

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revolution throughout Latin America are well documented. How different would be the situation had he come to power in Venezuela or some other "mainland" state. But it is the interposition of the water and not the actual overseas distance that is the key to Castro's frustration; Jamaica is as remote as Brazil.

Overwater location, then, offers a measure of insularity from the effects of the contemporary propensity of revolution-oriented states to disregard the sanctity of borders when it suits their cause to do so. At the same time another—and more significant—practice of contemporary warfare, the recognition of the freedom-of-the-seas principle, results in the potential linkage of all coastal states without much regard being owed to distance.

The impact which the air transport of military contingents is apt to have upon military strategy as yet defies measurement. France has, in a state of readiness, the capability to establish a limited presence in former French Africa on very short notice. Britain claims it will maintain a similar capacity with regard to Malaysia and Singapore. In 1968 the United States conducted trans-Atlantic air-maneuvers in order to illustrate its capacity for rapidly increasing its forces in Europe; a similar airborne operation was conducted in Korea in March 1969. Even if one acknowledges severe limitations on the part of air-transport as a means of supplying sustained, large-scale operations, such a capability, regardless of importance, only augments what has been said concerning sea transport, and clearly points up the inaccuracy of equating strategic distance with actual mileage.

An examination of economic, communicative, and strategic distance, therefore, leads to the conclusion that distance is either meaningless—ICBM distance or intercapital communicative distance, for example—or that overwater distance is less segregative than overland distance. The forementioned formula should therefore be amended to read: *If distance is a meaningful consideration, then two points connected by water are closer than two points equally distant but separated by land.* Inexactitude, however, has not prevented the broadscale acceptance of the uncorrected formula, as manifested in popularly held myths of hemispheric, continental, regional, and state unity. All such myths contain two potential fallacies: (1) that the particular unit, whether a hemisphere, continent, region, or state, is somehow integrated and

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(2) that significant interests are not shared with those beyond the land borders of the unit.

IV

Hemispheric Myths: Enough has been said concerning the so-called "Western Hemisphere" to indicate that geographic misconceptions concerning hemispheric relations underlie many important political decisions. There is a fallacy built into the division of the world into two parts and in assigning to each half a title such as "Western" and "Eastern" or "Northern" and "Southern." It lends a sense of naturalness to a dissection that is in fact totally arbitrary, and it posits the existence of intrahemispheric relations which may be absent to the exclusion of interhemispheric relations which *are* present. Even if cultural distances could be measured in actual mileage—which they cannot—it should be evident that two points immediately on either side of a mythical hemisphere-dividing line are closer than either is to the geographic center of its respective hemisphere. Perhaps televised views of earth from space flights will ultimately rid man of one of his favorite myths, for even while he watches the earth is offering to his vision an uninterrupted series of hemispheres. When man at the subconscious level comes to realize that the number of hemispheres is infinite he will perhaps also realize that the number of possible interhemispheric relations of a cultural and political nature are likewise infinite. The patterns of intercultural relations have little to do with hemispheres. British and United States cultural ties are, at least in this period of history, more pervasive than those between the United States and Mexico. Similarly, Australia and New Zealand are closely tied to Britain and the United States despite an intervening equatorial line which demarcates northern and southern hemispheres.

Continental Myths: It is in continental myths that the "land connects, water divides" fallacy most commonly manifests itself. African continentalism, perhaps because it is the most youthful, has recently been the most vehemently articulated. African cohesion has been an a priori assumption of a number of statesmen such as Touré, Nkrumah, and Nyerere, and the assumption has been institutionalized in the Organization of African Unity. One

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of its more colorful articulations was made by Gamal Abdal Nasser in 1953:

> If we consider next . . . the continent of Africa—I may say without exaggeration that we cannot, under any circumstances, however much we might desire it, remain aloof from the terrible and sanguinary conflict going on there today between five million whites and 200 million Africans. We cannot do so for an important and obvious reason: we are *in* Africa. The peoples of Africa will continue to look to us, who guard their northern gate, and who constitute their link with the outside world. We will never in any circumstances be able to relinquish our responsibility to support, with all our might, the spread of enlightenment and civilization to the remotest depths of the jungle.[18]

The quotation is interesting as an example of how one who, according to the most common anthropological taxonomy, is a caucasoid may nevertheless identify himself with non-whites by stressing a geo-racial relationship; it is also a declaration of what might be termed "the Arab man's burden," which has been thrust upon him because some of the Arabs live in Africa. But for present purposes it is most interesting because it raises the question: In what way does Egypt or the entire northern littoral of Africa represent "the link with the outside world" for Dakar, Lagos, Cape Town, Cape Elizabeth, Dar es Salaam, and others?

Even a cursory glance at the transportation map of Africa will dramatize the absence of interconnecting facilities among the widely separated, important pockets of population. There is no African hub from which roads and railways emanate outward. Rather, the pattern of the transportation system, including navigable rivers, caravan routes, roads, and railways, consists of a number of seldom interconnected inward thrusts, usually short, from various points on the coast. South Africa is the only state whose interior could be said to be adequately serviced by a transportation system. There is no transcontinental railroad from north to south and, north of Rhodesia, none from east to west. The transportation map makes clear that economic and cultural ties among non-adjoining sub-Saharan African states have been practically

[18] Gamal Abdal Nasser, *Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution* (Washington, 1955), 109-10.

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non-existent. Most societies of interior Africa have been essentially culturally isolated, while those riverine, coastal, and railroad-neighboring peoples who have been affected by other societies have been most affected by ones outside Africa.

The case of South America is similar. The area has indeed merited the epithet "the hollow continent," for climate and topography have combined to orient the important enclaves outward—that is, the key societies have had their backs to the continent. The dominance of a common Latin culture in most of the states is not denied, but this same culture is shared by the peoples of many of the islands of the Caribbean and the Iberian Penninsula. By itself, then, the common culture does not prove continental solidarity. More instructive is the persistence of the more indigenous Indian cultures which dominate most of the interior and separate the Latin enclaves. Only in recent years has there been a real attempt by many of the capitals to make highway and cultural contact with the interior. That interstate relations have occurred among Buenos Aires, Bogotá, and Lima is fully acknowledged, but their landed relationship has quite evidently been relatively insignificant.

The Asian pattern is also characterized by a number of major cultural pockets, each oriented to the periphery rather than to the interior. Contacts between the steppe- and highland-dwelling peoples on the one hand, and the riverine and coastal dwelling peoples on the other have been insignificant, as shown, for example, by the rather meager impact that Han-Chinese culture has had upon the peoples of non-coastal, peripheral China. Moreover, transcontinental relations often have been more significant than intracontinental, as signified by the impact of British culture upon the language and political institutions of the subcontinent. Finally, it might be noted that while the phrase is geographically incorrect the relative absence of overland contacts does cause references to the Chinese of South Asia as "overseas Chinese" to acquire a measure of cultural accuracy.

Of all the expressions conveying continental unity one would anticipate "European" to be the most meaningful. For generations "the Continent" has meant mainland Europe, and to be "continental" has been to display cultural mannerisms common to Europe. A large measure of cultural integration would certainly

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appear consonant with the often publicized common Greco-Roman heritage. But how is one to reconcile this concept of "Europeanness" with the history of that area for the past two hundred years? No area of similar size has offered so drastic an illustration of divisiveness, reflecting strong national jealousies and rivalries. There is no reconciliation because a single European culture is a fiction, and a multiplicity of languages, dialects, religious denominations, and other cultural manifestations is the fact. The smallest of the multistate continents is incredibly diverse; a land connection has not made the German more French or vice versa. Emphasis has been on the particular cultural unit, and "Europeanness" has been only a myth. Attempts to unify Europe (1) have not been the result of a "natural" growth of contacts but of coercive superimposition; (2) have been undertaken not in the name of Europe, but in the name of a particular national group; and (3) have been defeated by the stout resistance of groups desirous of cultural and political autonomy.

With the notable exception of Charles de Gaulle few have spoken of European unity in the post-World War II period, because of the Communist-non–Communist division. On each side of that line, however, there has been a subsequent attempt at regional integration. By increasing economic contacts, both the EEC and CEMA hopefully envisage the unification of six states. Though the total area of each represents only a small segment of all of Europe, the problems with which each has been confronted due to competing nationalisms are instructive. At the minimum they can be said to illustrate the fallacy of automatically assuming historic common interests and characteristics among even adjoining states.

The illusory nature of continental concepts is perhaps best illustrated by a question with which scholars and orators have grappled for centuries: Where does Asia end and Europe begin? The fictitious bifurcation of the land mass is an acknowledgment that overland contacts between its Pacific and Atlantic shores have been unimportant, but the attempt at geographic division is, in essence, the attempt to determine a line on one side of which all the immediately local people look westward while, on the other side, they look eastward. Such an inanity would hardly

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warrant consideration were it not for the impact that it continues to exert on human convictions. De Gaulle, for example, often spoke of a Europe for the Europeans, stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals, as though the Soviet Union were prepared either to divest itself of its holdings east of that mountain range or were able to differentiate between the interests of its European and Asian components. A physical watershed need not be a human one.

The problem of differentiating Europe and Asia does not end with the Soviet Union. Is Turkey, with territory on either side of the straits, to be considered Asian? The matter is further complicated by the fact that the Ottoman Turks came originally from central Asia, but at least since the time of Attaturk have considered themselves European. Does Europe stop even at the eastern border of Turkey? Turkic peoples stretch almost uninterruptedly from Turkey to western China. Moreover, how is one to explain the exclusion from Europe of the Indo-European language area of Iran, West Pakistan, and northern India? Cultural contacts and political borders have shown a remarkable disregard for continental divisions.

The term *continent* derives from *continere*, meaning to hold together, to repress, to contain. The expression, therefore, least applies to Europe, because culture groups of that region can claim a greater global impact for ideas and customs than can be claimed for the cultures of any other region. "The Sea Age," "The Age of Discovery," "The Age of Imperialism," "Colonialism," "Neo-colonialism," and the prevalence of French, Spanish, Portuguese, and English in the most widely scattered regions are all testaments to the fact that Europe was certainly not a contained unit. Myths need not accord with reality, but it is particularly ironic that a recent French leader should have opposed an Atlantic community, denying a role to the United States with regard to the states of Europe simply because the United States is not European. Conveniently ignored were such matters as early French interest in the exploration of North America; France's alliance with the United States in the Revolutionary War; the United States-French transaction involving the Louisiana Territory; the United States-French alliances of World Wars I and II; de Gaulle's own interest in Quebec; and France's continued control of the

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trans-Atlantic islands of Saint Pierre and Miquelon, Guadeloupe, and Martinique, and of the trans-Atlantic mainland territory of French Guiana.

V

Regional Myths: As in the case of hemispheres one can postulate as many regions as imagination permits. "Latin America," for example, is larger than a single continent, although regional terms are usually employed in reference to an area smaller than a continent but containing a number of states. The minimal implication is that the peoples of the region possess a number of important characteristics in common, which justifies its treatment as a distinct and separate entity. Seldom, however, do regional terms warrant such an unqualified ascription. Although it always possessed the danger of obscuring essential distinctions, the phrase "Latin America" was, until recently, a convenient shorthand expression for all of the independent states of North and South America plus the neighboring islands, minus Canada and the United States. The acquisition of statehood by Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad-Tobago, and Barbados, as well as the anticipated statehood of British Honduras, however, antiquates the expression and again emphasizes the dangers of indiscriminately relating culture and location.

Other regional expressions are seldom more satisfying. Their arbitrariness is evident by the great variations in their geographic definitions over different periods and among authors in any given period. Changes in political borders and the relative knowledge of the complexities of the societies within the region help account for the geographic disparities in their descriptions. The region of the Near East, for example, is defined in the third edition of *Webster's New International Dictionary* as follows: "used originally of the Balkan States, later of the region included in the Ottoman Empire, and now often of all the countries of southeastern Europe, entire area extending from Lybia or Morocco, Ethiopia, and Somalia to Greece, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and sometimes India." One is tempted to ask: Inclusive or exclusive? The task of giving definition to the multiple definitions of such terms merits only sympathy, not criticism, and one can readily excuse, therefore, the oversight concerning Turkish territory in

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southeastern Europe; Greece's exclusion from southeastern Europe is more perplexing.

The incredible lack of precision in such terms would be humorous were it not for their tendency to evoke stereotyped images predicated upon the myth of cultural homogeneity. The images, in turn, hamper proper analysis.

The phrase "Southeast Asia" in most texts refers to Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Laos, Cambodia, the Vietnams, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The usual pattern of restricting regional groupings to landed relationships is broken here by the inclusion of Indonesia and the Philippines. Indonesia, which stretches some three thousand miles from west to east, reaches farther east than the farthest of the Far East states, Japan. Australia, which is excluded, is only a few miles across the Torres Strait from Indonesian territory. The Philippines, although also close to Indonesia, are markedly farther from the southeast Asian mainland than they are from China and Taiwan. The inclusion of the archipelagoes is due, of course, to the common ethnic heritage of the dominant group of mainland Malaysia with that of the Philippines and Indonesia. In the case of the Philippines this approach stresses early history, and, by contrast, ignores the fact that since 1500 Spain and the United States have had a greater cultural impact on the Philippines than have intraregional contacts, as evidenced by the prevalance of Catholicism and the widespread use of English. Moreover, it overlooks the fact that the dominant culture of Java is not the dominant culture of all of the Indonesian islands, including the two largest in terms of territory. But what is more important, if dominant culture is to be the criterion of membership, the off-African island of Madagascar (the Malagasy Republic) should have been included because of its Malay heritage. And Singapore, because of its dominant Chinese culture, should be considered part of the Far East not Southeast Asia. So, too, should that area populated by the Vietnamese. The puzzled responses evoked by the political activism of Buddhist monks in Vietnam would have been less common if there were broader awareness that Vietnamese culture is much more a reflection of the cultures to its north than it is of those to its west, and that the northern, Mahayana Buddhism, common to China, Korea,

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Japan, and Vietnam, differs from the more pacifist Theravada (Hinayana) Buddhism of Burma, Thailand, and Cambodia.

Two points are clear. Southeast Asia, just as the Far East, the Middle East, the Near East, Western Europe, Sub-Sahara Africa, and other such geographic regions, is a highly diversified area, and it is the distinctions rather than common characteristics which are usually of key political importance. Second, regional categorization is dangerous not only because it tends to obscure important distinctions, but also because it tends to ignore important interregional relationships.

State Myths: Of all the territorial concepts—hemisphere, continent, region, and state—it is the last which most resists generalization in terms of the degree of cultural, economic, and political integration. Some states, such as Japan, are quite thoroughly fused; others, such as Nigeria, are characterized by marked heterogeneity and centrifugal tendencies. Perhaps such discrepancies should be expected in confronting a unit which is found in such disparate territorial sizes. Canada, for example, is larger than Europe, and the Soviet Union is two to three times as large as either; at the other extreme, the Maldive Islands are approximately one-tenth the size of Rhode Island. Yet, from earlier statements, it should be evident that more important than the area is the distribution of population in relation to ease of intercommunication.

It is likely, however, that one must further differentiate between "natural" avenues of easy access, such as rivers and coasts, and artificial, man-made avenues, such as railroads and highways. There is little question that a highly intensive, modern transportation and communications network indicates extensive economic interrelationships, but its intercultural impact is less certain. Granted, it is a truism that centralized communications and increased economic contacts help to dissolve sectional cultural distinctions within what is fundamentally a one-culture state such as the United States. On the other hand, if one is dealing with two distinct cultures is it possible that increased contacts are apt to perpetuate and perhaps exacerbate nationalistic proclivities and particularism? Problems between the Walloons and Flemish of Belgium, the French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians, the Serbs and Croats of Yugoslavia, and the Czechs and Slovaks of Czechoslovakia have increased with increased contacts.

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The fact is that very little is known concerning the assimilation process. Because its essence is psychological, involving self-acceptance, it is very conceivable that programs designed for its accomplishment are doomed to failure; or, to put it more positively, that successful assimilation may best be achieved by contacts which are not made for that purpose. The Arab trader who in the midst of the busy bazaar of a sub-Saharan city quite unself-consciously prostrates himself on his prayer rug may exert greater cultural magnetism than the dedicated proselytizer. The Soviet Union, despite a half-century of ethnic plans and programs, is still plagued by "the national question." The failure of India and Pakistan to achieve their formal, constitutional commitment to have their varied peoples accept Hindi and Urdu respectively is also pertinent. So, too, is Franco's failure to Castilianize the Catalans and Basques. Such examples of resistance to governmental programs of assimilation could be multiplied. Programmed assimilation appears to produce an opposite effect. Assimilation is apparently most apt to be achieved as an accidental byproduct, not by design.

A related factor is that assimilation probably requires a period of great duration, extending well beyond a generation. More intensive contacts, whether by design or accident, may not only fail to telescope the process, but may well arouse a psychological barrier. Variations in tempo of intercultural contacts may not be merely a matter of degree, but may represent a qualitative consideration which determines whether a people move toward assimilation or ethnocentrism. The assimilation of all of the riverine people of China into the Han culture was accomplished only over many centuries. The post-1949 Chinese attempt to bring its remaining minorities into the state's cultural mainstream through greatly expanded contacts has resulted in substantial intergroup antagonisms.[19] Many contemporary states, indeed most of the states of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, contain large areas which have hitherto not been connected by arteries of transportation and communication. Such isolation is expected to alter rapidly, but the na-

[19] For some remarkably frank admissions concerning this matter by the Chinese Deputy Chairman of the Commission of Nationalities, see Liu Chun, *The National Question and Class Struggle* (Peking, 1966), particularly 18-22.

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ture of the cultural result may be very different from that which is usually envisaged. Cultural integration cannot be assumed.

It is also probable that assimilation involves not only the question of duration but of chronological time as well. At least in "assimilationist time" the telephone, radio, train, and motor vehicle are very recent introductions and, what is of greatest importance, postdate the advent of the age of nationalism. The people who succumbed to foreign cultural inroads prior to the eighteenth century were not aware of belonging to a developed, competing civilization, in which they had hitherto taken great pride. By contrast, peoples everywhere today are much more apt to be aware of their memberhip in a group possessed of a history, customs, beliefs, and perhaps a language which distinguish it from other ethnic groups.[20] There are many reasons for this increase in ethnic consciousness, a major one of which has been the great increase in the frequency, the scope, and the type of intra- and intercultural contacts. But regardless of its cause such cultural awareness is apt to hamper seriously any movement toward assimilation, and intercultural contacts are apt to strengthen the ethnic bond. It has been broadly assumed that an excellent communications and transportation network throughout a state has been a contributor to the cultural integration of all affected parts. While granting that such a network has tended to neutralize minor regional distinctions, it is more likely that the growth of an arterial system has occurred within what was already a fundamentally homogeneous cultural unit. Communications and transportation connections often strengthen common ties. But does this not portend an Iboland rather than a Nigeria, a Kurdistan rather than an Iraq, a Tibet instead of present China, a true Ukraine State rather than the U.S.S.R., a Flanders instead of a Belgium? *The "Age of Nationalism" may have heralded the end of assimilation.* And the end of assimilation portends increasing demands for the radical redrawing of most of today's political borders.

The matter is of the greatest importance, for the majority of states are multi-ethnic. Growing ethnic consciousness translated into self-determination movements is already challenging exist-

[20] See Walker Connor, "Self-Determination: The New Phase," *World Politics*, XX (1967), 30-53.

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ing political structures without regard to hemisphere, continent, or region. Myths of unity to the contrary, even most states are culturally divided. The growing demand today, for good or evil, is to make reality approximate the myth of state unity by redrawing borders to reflect ethnic unity.

VI

Myths vary greatly in the degree to which they accord with fact. Regardless of their factual basis, however, myths engender a reality of their own, for it is seldom *what is* that is of political significance, but what people *think is*. If United States leaders have believed that a special relationship has existed between the United States and the states of South America because of their landed connection, then special ties do in fact exist, regardless of the questionability of their underlying assumption. Why, then, refute myths of unity? Surely a misconception which gives rise to a conviction of a trans-state mutuality of interests, thereby promoting harmony, deserves cultivation not criticism.

The response must be that while myths of unity have a capacity for engendering harmony they also have a capacity for accentuating division. And the myths are invoked more often for the latter. The notion of "Africa for the Africans" is the result of a fallacious belief in intracontinental relations which never existed. It has also been the justification for expelling people of Asian heritage from East Africa, despite (1) the fact that the expellees were in most instances born in East Africa, and (2) that East Africa has had interrelations with Asia going back thousands of years, while its relations with the African interior have been virtually non-existent. Any geographic myth of unity, short of global scope, presupposes exclusivity.

Basing one's assumptions on myths also hampers logical analysis and can lead to questionable judgments. For example, it has long been accepted that colonialism per se is bad. But implicit in the popular definition of colonialism is the myth "water separates, land connects." Thus only if salt water flows between the mother country and the territory is it colonialism. The Soviet Union and China are seldom castigated for perpetuating colonial-

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ism, despite the fact that each contains huge areas, residues of an imperial age, which are populated by distinct minorities.

Another illustration of a questionable conclusion predicated upon the "water separates" myth is the concept of "spheres of influence." Its most recent manifestation is the position which holds that United States involvement in South Asia violates geographic logic. It is "natural," according to this school, for the Chinese "colossus of the north" to exert predominance throughout the region. As has been noted, however, the premise is not historically correct. Moreover, as long as freedom of the seas is observed the United States advantage in sea transport places the coast of South Asia, including that of South Vietnam, closer to the United States than to China.

Myths of geographic unity not only obscure important interunit relations but also tend to obscure important intraunit distinctions. It is what divides men and not what they have in common which is the catalyst of political history. Surely tribal nationalism is a more momentous fact of the politics within Africa than is African harmony. Ethnic nationalism may well be the most explosive challenge to the survival of the Soviet Union. Proper analysis, therefore, requires that one differentiate myth from fact.

It is not one world but a highly variegated world. The same is true of hemispheres, continents, regions, and most states. The patterns of distinctions and similarities, of shared and competing interests, are incredibly complex and kaleidoscopic in their dynamism. Although no set of relations is truly global, attempts to restrict a description of human relations to any subdivision of the globe are intrinsically unsatisfactory. A knowledge of the geographic backdrop is essential to an understanding of contemporary world politics, but it is seldom a sufficient explanation and often a deluding one.

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The Majority Principle: Calhoun and His Antecedents

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A reading of John Calhoun's speeches, state papers, and formal writings leaves a clear impression of masterly intellect.[1] From his earliest days as congressman from South Carolina to his last years as genius of the slave states, Calhoun spoke and wrote with a rare force and elegance. One might almost say that his words were in excess of the occasions; he philosophized, he generalized, he expressed himself as if his audience were made up of political scholastics. For this quality of irrepressible intellectual excess the idle student of political ideas should be grateful. More to the point, however, is the capacity of his thought to demoralize all those who subscribe to the principles of democratic government. For it is not easy to repel Calhoun's arguments, to repel his theory of concurrent majority. His thought is so elevated, so cunningly contrived, the values he invokes are so compelling that at times it seems nearly impossible to resist him. The embarrassment becomes more acute when one recalls the tribute

[1] Useful treatments of Calhoun's political thought are found in August O. Spain, *The Political Theory of John C. Calhoun* (New York, 1951), and Richard N. Current, *John C. Calhoun* (New York, 1963). The former is friendly, the latter is quite critical. There is a good brief analysis in David W. Minar, *Ideas and Politics: The American Experience* (Homewood, Ill., 1964), 266-77. Of great value are the stimulating pages of Richard Hofstadter, *The American Political Tradition* (New York, 1948), Chap. IV, and Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York, 1955), 158-67.

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paid him by J. S. Mill toward the end of *Representative Government*, in the chapter on "Federal Representative Governments."[2] Such praise is all the more galling because it came from one of the few prominent Englishmen to take up the cause of the Northern states during the Civil War. Still the effort must be made to overcome Calhoun's brilliance, whatever admiration we may feel for it, and whatever the admiration felt for it by a luminary like Mill. Not to try would be to leave democratic theory exposed to serious incursions.

I

For the sake of rough analysis, let us take a simple model of democratic government which is highly faithful to the majority principle.[3] The model would have six elements:

(1) Universal suffrage.

(2) The votes of electors weigh equally. Among other things, this means that constituencies have roughly equal populations.

(3) Representatives are elected by the majority (or plurality) in the constituencies. This excludes all forms of indirect election.

(4) Representatives vote according to the sense of the majority that elected them.

(5) There is majority rule among the representatives. This excludes such practices as filibuster.

(6) There are no extra-legislative restrictions on the will of the majority of the representatives.

Such a model assumes that a system in which everything is directly decided by the people in frequent referenda would be too crude, even though yet more faithful to the majority principle. The division of the country into constituencies reflects the diversity of the country. Each constituency putatively has a "character"; it is in some respects different from all the rest. A gathering of representatives is thus a gathering of men who bring to bear on any problem a multitude of viewpoints and concerns. Fur-

[2] John Stuart Mill, *Representative Government* in *Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government* (New York and London, 1950), 502.

[3] Especially relevant to our discussion of the majority principle are Henry Steele Commager, *Majority Rule and Minority Rights* (New York, 1950), Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago, 1956), Henry B. Mayo, *An Introduction to Democratic Theory* (New York, 1960), Chap. 8, and Elias Berg, *Democracy and the Majority Principle* (Stockholm, 1965).

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thermore, the political process requires continuous discussion, negotiation, and inquiry; it therefore requires a class of politicians. Then, too, the class of politicians is needed to superintend the work of execution and administration, putatively in the hands of agencies separate from the legislature. For all these reasons a representative system with the above six elements is to be preferred to a system of unmediated consultation with the people.

This model leaves much out, including the frequency of elections, the nature and place of parties, the complexities involved in ascertaining the sense of the majority, the difficulties raised by the fact that different issues call into being differently composed majorities, the question of electoral apathy and ignorance, the unequal political influence among the electorate, and a host of other considerations. Nevertheless it does provide a syndrome of elements that can be used to guide the critic in his judgment of the workings of democratic systems in the real world. It is apparent that the *moral* reason for subscribing to these elements—to leave aside practical or utilitarian reasons—is that they are indispensable to the realization of formal political equality. An attack on them, an attack on majoritarianism is, at the same time, an attack on formal political equality. And when the American system is judged by such a model, it soon becomes apparent that plain majoritarianism has suffered a rather hard fate in this country. Simply by confining ourselves to ideas and practices that range from the time of the Constitutional Convention to Calhoun's lifetime we could instance numerous exceptions to the demands of the model. A few of these exceptions are as follows.

The very idea of living politically by a written constitution offends item 6 (no extra-legislative restrictions on the will of the majority of the representatives). The legislature is meant to play according to certain rules, and within a larger framework; the rules and the framework are meant to be binding on the generations of men. The powers and relations of the legislature are defined. Though the definition is general, it is not so vague as to permit unlimited interpretive freedom. To be sure, everything in the Constitution (except the equal representation of the states in the Senate) is subject to amendment. But the states, unequal in population, count equally; each has one vote. And three-fourths of the states must agree to any proposed amendment; indeed the

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one-fourth plus one opposed may contain a proportion of the population significantly less than one-fourth of the whole. A minority can turn back a majority. We see that the amending process systematically offends item 2 (the votes of electors weigh equally), if we suppose that there is a fairly strict correspondence between the wishes of the people in a state and the votes of the state legislature or the state convention, and that there is in each state a decisive majority behind the state position on the proposed amendment. Or figuring each state as a single representative, we see that item 5 (majority rule among representatives) is offended by the amending process. In actuality, item 4 (representatives or delegates vote according to the sense of the majority in their constituencies) may also be offended.

Beyond the offense given to item 6 by the very idea of a written constitution, there is the offense to several items especially given by some of the content of the American Constitution and its amendments. The Constitution contains not only prescriptions for the structures and relations of federal public agencies, but also specific prohibitions on the will of the majority of the representatives in Congress and in the states (item 6).

Item 2 (the votes of electors weigh equally) is offended by the equal representation of states in the Senate. Item 3 (representatives are elected by the majority in the constituencies) is offended by the provision for the indirect election of senators; and in an extended sense of "constituency," by the provision for the indirect election of the president and vice-president.

What, then, can be said to defend these encroachments on the requirements of our model, on the requirements of a system of democratic government which is highly faithful to the majority principle? A different defense suits each of the different considerations we have mentioned.

We must take into account the political necessities inherent in creating a political unit out of smaller political units already in existence, in the very idea of a written constitution. It was not a question of inheriting a customary set of arrangements, but of making a break with the past. The need for explicitness was absolute. Obviously, however, the historical conditions give only a partial explanation. Those who framed the Constitution must have thought that their work embodied something more than

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expedience in the face of historical circumstances. They must have thought that their work embodied principles which men of succeeding generations, as well as their contemporaries, would have to acknowledge as *the* principles of political rationality. Through changes of fashion or mood, through periods of calm or turmoil, men would see the great superiority of free, republican, representative government. The benefits enumerated in the Preamble will accrue not only to "ourselves" but also to "our Posterity."

The federal nature of the American union dictated the requirement that the states, rather than the people directly, pass on proposed amendments. The requirement, however, that three-fourths of the states, rather than a bare majority, must approve a proposed amendment reflects the view that changes in the fundamental law must command widespread assent. In *The Social Contract* Rousseau stated this view succinctly: ". . . the more grave and important the questions discussed, the nearer should the opinion that is to prevail approach unanimity."[4] Rousseau is not referring explicitly to fundamental law; but his point has a wide range of implication. It is important to notice that what is involved here is not merely a lack of trust in, or a suspiciousness of, the bare majority. Rather, some version or other—it is hard to be precise—of the doctrine of consent could supply much of the basis for the sentiment voiced by Rousseau and procedurally defined in Article V of the American Constitution.

There can be no doubt that the specific prohibitions of the American Constitution were conceived in suspiciousness of majority will, whether the will of the majority of the people translated into the will of their representatives, or the will of the majority of representatives acting selfishly or misguidedly as a political class and able to manipulate the people into accepting an erosion of their rights, claims, and liberties. Today one may go so far as to assert that these rights, claims, and liberties would ideally be placed altogether out of the reach of the amending process, out of the reach of even overwhelming majorities. They have the status of absolutes because without them free govern-

[4] Jean Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract* in *The Social Contract and Discourses*, trans. G. D. H. Cole (New York and London, 1950), Bk. IV, Chap. II, 107.

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ment could not function; they are indispensably instrumental for the practice of citizenship in a democratic society. Beyond that they compose the legal and political preconditions for the creation of a society of free individuals. Thus they are among the means needed to achieve free government which, in turn, is among the means needed to achieve a society of free individuals; they are also among the means directly needed to achieve a society of free individuals. The creation of such a society is the ultimate standard by which everything political is to be judged. The hope must be that the enumeration of prohibitions on majority will (it is simultaneously an enumeration of guarantees for all) would work as a standing reminder to all men in society of what they must honor if their society is to honor the ultimate political standard, rather than as a continuously irritating obstacle to be weakened in one way or another. But should the temptation be present to chip away at the obstacle, the legitimacy of resistance to such efforts is increased by the explicit prohibitions of the fundamental law.

The offense given by the equal representation of states in the Senate to item 2 (the votes of electors weigh equally) is explained by the exigencies faced by the men who framed the Constitution. The explanation, in this instance, constitutes the defense.

Narrow suspiciousness of the people lay behind the provisions establishing indirect election of the president, vice-president, and senators. In the course of time direct election became the norm.

II

The anti-majoritarian impulse found in *The Federalist* papers, and to which Calhoun alludes at several places in the *Disquisition*, is so notorious as to need very little attention from us. It would nevertheless be worthwhile to rehearse some of the main arguments made by the authors of *The Federalist* precisely because Calhoun does allude to them, and because they assist in the understanding of his thought.

In Number 10 Madison defends representative government as against direct democracy in such manner as to give offense to item 4 of our model. He says, "The effect [of a representative system] is . . . to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing

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them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial consideration."[5] What matters is not the accuracy of Madison's prophecy concerning the way in which representatives will in fact behave. Nor does it matter that Madison may have deemed it advisable to sound more conservative than he really felt; he may have sought to adjust his argument to the sensibilities of his audience in New York. The consideration that does matter is that an element of the proposed constitution could be defended as he saw fit to defend it. Furthermore, he assumes an ideal number of representatives, and claims that the chance for electing good representatives is greater in the larger republic to be made of the several states than it would be in smaller republics, because there is a larger pool of candidates to choose from in the larger republic. And good representatives are those who "refine and enlarge the public views"; that is, those who do not habitually vote as the majority in their constituencies desire.

More important is Madison's stated preference for the larger over the smaller republic on the grounds that the former will be much more diverse in its social and economic composition. The federal republic will transfer a significant quantum of power from the hands of the legislatures of the states. These legislatures were too faithful to item 4 of our model: readily divisible, each one, into a majority and minority faction, the legislatures regularly translated the will of the majority of the people into law. Madison goes on:

> Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.[6]

Without formally abandoning item 5 of our model (majority rule among the representatives), Madison labored to produce a system

[5] *The Federalist* (Modern Library ed.; New York, n.d.), 59.
[6] *Ibid.*, 61.

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that would make any majority infrequent; the *status quo* would consequently be left substantially intact.

The object of fear was the House of Representatives. If the social impediments to the formation of majorities in the House failed, the Senate, the presidential veto, and the judiciary stood ready to offend item 6. The Senate ideally, and the president and courts literally would provide extra-legislative restrictions on the will of the majority of the representatives.

In the name of what political value did Madison attack majoritarianism? In Numbers 10 and 51 he speaks of justice. "Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society."[7] Of course Madison was interested in other values, including especially liberty. It would be foolish to reduce his passion to a single-minded anxiousness over justice. But the burden of the argument in *The Federalist* deals with the perils to justice raised by majority rule. By "justice" is meant the preservation of every man in what is his own, the preservation of property. In reality the many are pitted against the few; the many seek to use political power to make transgressive incursions against the property rights of the few. Unless the social structure is complicated enough, and unless the governmental structure provides checks on the legislative will of the popular branch of public authority (the House of Representatives), the existent relations of property are put in jeopardy. Madison refers in Number 10 to "a rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property . . ." and hints at other "improper or wicked" projects. *The Federalist* papers are full of dark thoughts about human nature, but it is the human nature of the less well-advantaged many that dominates the discussion. There will be free government—what alternative is there?—but a free government neutralized, rendered incapable of any action that looks to disturb the *status quo*.

In the decade of the eighteen-twenties a number of state constitutional conventions were held.[8] The majority principle figured centrally in the debates. Common to those who spoke against apportionment according to population, and in behalf of

[7] *Ibid.*, 340.

[8] There are excerpts of the debates, with editor's commentary, in Alpheus Thomas Mason, *Free Government in the Making* (3d ed.; New York, 1965), 405-40.

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property qualifications for the suffrage was a fear that "King Numbers" (in John Randolph's phrase) would threaten the foundations of property. The end of government was the protection of property, while unadulterated majoritarianism would subvert that end. Pure democracy was incompatible with justice. Furthermore, common sense dictated that a man's influence in politics should be proportional to his stake in society. Fairness dictated that a man's influence in politics should be proportional to the taxes he paid in support of government. (Daniel Webster of Massachusetts made much of the latter two points.) In a remarkable anticipation of Calhoun's mature views, Judge Abel P. Upshur of Virginia summarized the conservative doctrine:

> I admit, as a general proposition, that in free Governments, power *ought to be given to the majority; and why? The rule is founded in* the idea that there is an identity, though not an equality of interests, in the several members of the body politic: in which case the presumption naturally arises, that the greater number possess the greater interest. But the rule no longer applies, when the reason of it fails. . . . If the interests of the several parts of the Commonwealth were identical, it would be, we admit, safe and proper that a majority of *persons only* should give the rule of political power. But our interests are not identical, and the difference between us arises from property alone. We therefore contend that property ought to be considered, in fixing the basis of representation.[9]

We have seen so far that prior to Calhoun's writings American thought and practice had mounted a quite severe assault on majoritarian democracy. Calhoun was not breaking new ground when he assayed a theoretical critique of it. At work before he began the exposition of his views were certain principles that informed the political life of the United States. Though not usually explicit, a doctrine of consent could be relied on to make amendment of the fundamental law a legitimate process only when there was near unanimity. Though originally derived from the philosophy of natural rights, certain personal rights, claims, and liberties of a legal and political sort could be held to be indefeasible and championed as inherent in the nature of that political society which otherwise strove to accommodate majoritarianism.

[9] *Ibid.*, 435.

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Though also derived from the philosophy of natural rights, the protection of property in the name of justice could be advocated, without metaphysical reference, as the central end of government; and, as such, it would be morally entitled to force curtailments on majoritarianism. Whatever the mode chosen to articulate and support these political values—and one cannot impose a monolithic coherence or insist on a premature full self-conciousness—American statesmen had managed, with varying degrees of success, to make plausible the idea that there were political values as high as, or higher than majoritarianism. Which is to say that there were values as high as, or higher than *political equality*.

The qualifications of majoritarianism would themselves suffer qualification as time went on. The rights of property especially would undergo marginal encroachment, in the name of other values. The putatively indefeasible personal rights would trace a remarkably complex career, a career still in flux, and one that will remain in flux. But the most ardent majoritarian would have to concede that the debate between political equality and the other political values was more a family quarrel than a competition of alien and mutually unassimilable principles. Humane idealism, in the most expanded sense, was not the monopoly of the majoritarian side. Was Calhoun's contribution yet another voice in the family quarrel, or something else?

III

The presiding value in Calhoun's political theory is justice. Though the word is avoided in *A Disquisition on Government*, and liberty and power are declared the ends of government, it is clear that justice serves him as the ultimate standard by which political life is to be judged. On several occasions, in fact, before the writing of the *Disquisition*, he employed the word to capture the essence of his thought. In an address given in 1831 he declared justice the great end of government.[10] In a Senate speech on June 28, 1838, he said: "Our Union rests on justice—on the

[10] Richard K. Crallé (ed.), *The Works of John C. Calhoun*, 6 Vols. (Vol. I: Columbia, So. Carolina, 1851) (Vols. II-VI: New York, 1853-56), VI, 83.

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equal distribution of its advantages and burdens."[11] In a Senate speech on June 21, 1841, he said:

> . . . I avail myself of the occasion to say, that I would not divest New York of a particle of her natural advantages; but, at the same time, I would resist any attempt to aggrandize her, or any other city, at the expense of the others. Our system is built on justice and equality, and I would be as rigid in observing it between one place and another as between individuals and individuals. Justice to all, and privileges to none, is my maxim.[12]

Both speeches dealt with fiscal policy. But the same sentiments are to be found throughout Calhoun's works, capped by the *Disquisition*, which is devoted to contriving a system of government that prevents one interest from benefiting at the expense of another. Calhoun's moral concern is, or at least seems, identical with that of Madison in *The Federalist:* all should be protected in what is theirs against the grasping selfishness of any.

We must observe, however, that for Calhoun there was another source of danger to justice than selfishness—though he omits mention of it in the *Disquisition.* That was fanaticism. In a Senate speech on the reception of abolition petitions, given on February 6, 1837, he acknowledged that "a large portion of the Northern States believed slavery to be a sin, and would consider it as an obligation to abolish it if they should feel themselves in any degree responsible for its continuance. . . ."[13] Calhoun dwelt on the willingness of politicians to court the favor of abolitionists, and saw in that willingness the seeds of destruction of the Union. But he did not reduce the abolitionist impulse to disguised self-seeking. Nevertheless, despite the purity of the motives of the abolitionists, their movement threatened the institutions of the South, threatened to deprive the South of what was rightfully its own. Here, too, justice can be said to be the principle under attack. We must now look more closely at Calhoun's reasoning.

Two matters—one issue and one condition—elicited from Calhoun the strenuous exertion of systematic thought. The issue

[11] *Ibid.*, III, 357.
[12] *Ibid.*, 647-48.
[13] *Ibid.*, II, 628. See also I, 372-74 *(A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States).*

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was protective tariffs in the period (roughly) of 1828 to 1833. The condition was the division of the Union into free states and slave states, a condition increasingly vexatious from 1835 on. The two matters are linked; the debate over tariffs turned out to be a proving ground for many of the conceptions and intellectual strategies involved in the defense of slavery.

In the Tariff Acts of 1828 and 1832 Calhoun saw complete injustice. His words against these measures are terrifying in their indictment of the protectionists for reckless disregard of the elementary precepts of political rectitude. By imposing high duties on a large variety of materials and goods, the pro-tariff faction would raise the prices paid for many articles of consumption. At the same time they would make it vastly more difficult for the South to export its agricultural products; if foreign countries were to buy from the South, they had to be able to sell to the United States. Calhoun predicted ruin and desolation for the Southern states. The elimination of protection would relieve the South much more than it would embarrass the manufacturing states. Calhoun's response to the Act of 1828 was his "Exposition"; South Carolina's response to the Act of 1832 was its Ordinance of Nullification, a document intellectually nourished by Calhoun's "Exposition." During this period Calhoun gave a number of speeches elaborating his views, sustaining a high passion through all the elaborations.

Calhoun argued that protective tariffs were unconstitutional. The Constitution gave Congress the power of imposing duties on imports for the sake of revenue; it did not give Congress the right to impose duties for any other purpose. The revenue to be raised by the Act of 1828 is far in excess of governmental needs; the purpose is not to raise money but to protect domestic industries and employments. Congress had thus exercised a power withheld from it by the Constitution. In effect a bare majority of representatives (in the two houses) had done only what the amending process—requiring a greater and different kind of majority—could do. The prescribed procedure relating to the fundamental law had been violated.

In what consists the gravity of the violation? It is not easy to work out Calhoun's answer to this question, not easy to see what points are ancillary, what points central. He does not say that

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since the Constitution is the highest law of the land (what we have been calling the fundamental law), any violation of it is *eo ipso* grave. He does not say or suggest that the doctrine of consent (as the political expression of the idea of self-determination) is injured when the highest law of the land is broken, when it is amended irregularly. He does—and this is the most famous fact about him—make a great deal of the distinction between the delegated and the reserved powers of the Constitution; he makes a great deal of "states' rights." What Congress does not have, it cannot take; the states must give. They have not given Congress the power to impose duties for purposes other than revenue. Is Calhoun possessed of an abstract commitment to the preservation of states' rights? The answer cannot be Yes. Calhoun assumed throughout his lifetime that the Constitution, as framed and added to by the first ten amendments, as intended to work by its makers, was a set of arrangements and guarantees that conduced to the reign of justice in the United States. One of the most crucial features conducing to justice was the divison of power: interests are rooted in the states; the states must stay strong in relation to the national government if interests are to be preserved. The scope of national authority had to be strictly confined to prevent some interests from using that authority to enrich themselves at the expense of other interests. (The Madisonian analysis is exactly reversed.) It would appear, in short, that Calhoun's legalist arguments are instrumental to the cause of justice, as he conceives of it.

The most eloquent passages in Calhoun's longest and last work, *A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States*, deal with the threat posed to slave institutions by the growing strength of abolitionist feeling and of the non-slave states in general. In a Senate speech delivered on February 23, 1837, he asserted that on the subject of tariffs, the Southern states composed a "permanent minority."[14] In the *Discourse* he extends the application of that phrase to all the questions associated with slavery, especially the question of allowing slavery in the territories.[15] Where Madison's oppressed minority was a class, Calhoun's was a section. Calhoun was certain that abolitionist senti-

[14] *Ibid.*, III, 43.
[15] *Ibid.*, I, 375.

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ment (and presumably the sentiment for "containing" slavery) could not be appeased, and would, what is more, be courted by the class of politicians in the North and West who in their quest for a majority coalition able to win the presidency would take any support they could find. The Constitution, however, was made and accepted by men who countenanced the institution of slavery; in the most general way, the Constitution enjoined on public authority the protection of slavery, not its containment, and certainly not its abolition. And what the Constitution protected deserved protection. Calhoun, in his Senate speech of February 6, 1837, pronounced slavery to be "... instead of an evil, a good—a positive good." He touched on arguments in defense of slavery that were to become Southern commonplaces: slavery was the suitable state for the black race; slavery meant the absence of the conflict of labor and capital, and hence was the best foundation for free institutions; "... there never has yet existed a wealthy and civilized society in which one portion of the community did not, in point of fact, live on the labor of another."[16] In any case, the "peculiar institution," however hated or however praised, had to be preserved; the *status quo* had to be maintained.

IV

How, then, was a permanent minority—in the electoral college and in both houses of Congress—if not now a permanent minority, then inevitably one day soon—to protect itself against selfishness and fanaticism? How was it to secure its preservation, to secure justice for itself? Calhoun's answer, in a renowned phrase, was concurrent majority. He first used the phrase in a letter in 1832;[17] that is, after he had written the "Exposition." It recurs frequently thereafter, variously illustrated with examples foreign and domestic. It was Calhoun's mature view that the American Constitution, in its inception and by design, in its spirit and its specific prescriptions, reflected the theory of the concurrent majority.

The theory is stated abstractly in the *Disquisition;* it is stated

[16] *Ibid.*, II, 630-33.

[17] August O. Spain, 130. The letter, to General Hamilton, is found in *Works*, VI, 144-93.

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in the language of American constitutionalism in the *Discourse*.

In the *Disquisition* Calhoun says that the only way in which to prevent an interest or combination of interests from aggrandizing at the expense of other interests is

> . . . by taking the sense of each interest or portion of the community which may be unequally and injuriously affected by the action of the government separately, through its own majority or in some other way by which its voice may be fairly expressed, and to require the consent of each interest either to put or to keep the government in action . . . give to each division or interest, through its appropriate organ, either a concurrent voice in making and executing the laws or a veto on their execution.[18]

Calhoun is thus making unanimity the required condition for all measures that affect interests importantly, that carry with them the possibility of injustice. Since no community of any size or diversity can be counted on to achieve justice, all interests must be armed with the right to say No. Concurrent majority is the unanimous agreement of (the majorities within) all interests. One cannot tell from the *Disquisition* the meaning which "interests" had for Calhoun in the American context. However, in the same letter in which Calhoun first mentioned concurrent (or concurring) majority, he said that he viewed ". . . a confederated community as composed of as many distinct political interests as there are States. . . ."[19]

In the *Discourse*, as well as in speeches, Calhoun spells out the various features of the American constitutional system, some unfortunately altered in practice, some still intact, that incorporate the theory of concurrent majority. The key point is that ". . . the States, regarded in their corporate character, and the population of the States, estimated in federal numbers, are the two elements, of which the government is exclusively composed; and that they enter, in different proportions, into the formation of all its departments."[20] American government does not move by majority will of its people alone; the fact that it is a federal republic establishes it as a system loyal to concurrent majority. He says:

[18] C. Gordon Post (ed.), *A Disquisition on Government and Selections from the Discourse* (New York, 1953), 20.

[19] *Works*, VI, 114.

[20] *Ibid.*, I, 177-78.

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> It thus appears, on a view of the whole, that it was the object of the framers of the constitution, in organizing the government, to give to the two elements, of which it is composed, separate, but concurrent action; and, consequently, a veto on each other, whenever the organization of the department, or the nature of the power would admit: and when this could not be done, so to blend the two, as to make as near an approach to it, in effect, as possible.[21]

Apart from the construction and workings of the federal government, the retention by the states of their reserved powers reinforces the restrictions on the majority will of the people, as reflected in the House of Representatives.

There is no need to follow Calhoun through all the intricacies of the American system as he explains it. His work is indubitably impressive. The heart of the matter is that, as originally made, the American political system, in its division of powers, its separation of powers, its checks and balances, and the rigors of its amending process, would have made it almost impossible for injustice to be regularly forthcoming; American politics was to be largely the politics of the *status quo*. If change were to come about, it would have to have overwhelming support. The real meaning of concurrent majority in America was to be that two elements of our above majoritarian model would be offended: item 2 (the votes of electors weigh equally), and item 6 (no extra-legislative restrictions on the will of the majority of the representatives). To put it another way, the most important consequence of extra-legislative restrictions would be to render the votes of electors unequal in weight. The interests, one for each state, would be safe.

What, then, went wrong with the system? The source of much of the trouble was, in Calhoun's eyes, the nationalization of American politics. The presidency had grown ever greater in importance, and the fight for the presidency had generated political parties in quest of a majority in the electoral college. The mechanisms of national politics, from nominating conventions to caucuses, had introduced an extra-constitutional structure into American politics which increasingly worked with an unconstitutional effect—unconstitutional both in the sense that it violated the in-

[21] *Ibid.*, 181.

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tent of the framers and in the sense that it violated the ends of government. The two senses were one. The permanent majority was now organized and could control all agencies of government; the separation of powers had become enfeebled.[22]

Other factors intervened. The written constitution lent itself to contradictory interpretations; there was a majority construction and a minority construction.[23] American society had grown so rich that public funds derived from taxes intensified the struggles of politics and made politicians unscrupulous in their race for the prizes. In addition, the increasing wealth of America had combined with its increasing diversity and extent to make it all "... the more difficult to equalize the action of the government,"[24] to achieve justice, the equal protection of the laws. The Madisonian prophecy had been gradually but ineluctably falsified.

What was the solution? What could restore the capacity of a minority—a permanent minority—to impede the course of injustice? As early as the "Exposition" of 1828 Calhoun saw in the amending process the possibility of salvation. The procedure would be for an aggrieved state to nullify the objectionable law made by Congress and to thrust on it the duty to propose an amendment affirming the power it had already claimed. It is clear that Calhoun thought that though the South was a minority, it would never be such a small minority as to compose a fraction insufficient to defeat proposed amendments it did not like. Concurrent majority thus meant the unanimity of sections.[25] For this procedure to function, a state's right of nullification or interposition had, of course, to be granted. And if the state failed to gain enough support to block passage of the amendment, secession was morally justified.

Calhoun also wanted certain past measures repealed, measures which in his view violated the constitutional division of powers. Calhoun suggests yet another possibility toward the end of the *Discourse*. Something more than restoring the government to its federal character was now needed, something to supplement the

[22] C. Gordon Post (ed.), 27.
[23] *Ibid.*, 25.
[24] *Ibid.*, 14.
[25] *Works*, II, 250.

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procedure of interposition and amendment. Calhoun says that "perhaps" the United States should have two presidents, one elected by the North, one by the South, and each with the power to veto acts of Congress.[26] In short, the guarantees against majoritarian abuse had to become far more formal and institutionalized than the framers of the Constitution had made them.

V

Our concern is not with the correctness of Calhoun's understanding of the nature of the federal Union. Rather it is with his assault on majoritarianism. Has he successfully defended his curtailments of the majority principle? I would say that he had, if the following conditions existed in the period in which he spoke and wrote.

(a) The interests of a nation are on a plane of moral equality. No plausible case could be made for the contention that one interest was parasitic on others, or exploited others. All the interests are equally entitled to continued existence because none violates more than any other the moral standards all accept.

(b) The concept of interest has sufficient precision. The interests are clearly identifiable.

(c) Each interest is more or less homogeneous. The numbers of people included within each one are like-minded in their view of what serves their interest; they are all equally served by the same policies.

(d) The political arrangement through which each interest expresses and defends itself contains no other competing interest whose wishes could be ignored in favor of the dominant interest.

(e) Whenever the interest works through its political agency to impose a veto on a policy approved by the majority in the higher legislature, it does so only in situations that clearly threaten its continued existence, that clearly threaten it with grave and irreparable injustice.[27] It does not exercise its veto capriciously,

[26] *Ibid.*, I, 393.

[27] Calhoun said, "... the negative of the tribunes [in Rome] extended to all the acts of the Senate, and to their execution; and, —as it was a single government without limitation on its authority, —to all the acts of government. On the other hand, the negative of the governments of the several States extends

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or for the pleasure of exercising it.[28] The membership of the interest assume that there is a *prima facie* case against exercising the veto, which case can be rebutted only after anguished examination.

(f) There is a lack of consensus in the community. In the absence of obstacles, serious injustice can be expected.

Unless condition (a) holds, room is left for other moral and political values than the preservation of an interest to be introduced into the controversy. Justice itself could be cited against the claim made in the name of justice for continued and unimpaired existence.

Unless condition (b) holds, the theory of concurrent majority disintegrates. It could not be said with enough certainty who stands to benefit, who stands to suffer, from any policy.

Unless condition (c) holds, the interest can be seen as a cluster of interests. Any in the cluster may be harmed by what is done in the name of the interest as a whole; any in the cluster may have more in common with other interests or parts of interests than it does with those who are nominally included with it in the same interest. It may suffer injustice, whereas the structure of concurrent majority supposedly obstructs injustice.

Unless condition (d) holds, the same possibility of injustice mentioned in the preceding paragraph exists.

Unless condition (e) holds, the structure of concurrent majority, ostensibly reared to avoid the tyranny of the majority, turns into an instrument for control by the minority over the majority, if not for the tyranny of the minority.

Unless condition (f) holds, what moral or political value or values germane to *this* discussion would qualify as ample enough to restrict the workings of the majority principle, to force concessions from the value, political equality?

The terrible irony is that by the time Calhoun set to write his *Disquisition* and *Discourse* (1845-50) the theory of concurrent ma-

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only to the *execution* of such acts of the government of the United States, as may present a question involving their respective powers; which, relatively, are very few, compared to the whole." *Works*, I, 271 *(Discourse)*.

[28] On the tariff issue Calhoun said that the anti-protectionist side ". . . asks from Government no advantage, but simply to be let alone . . . while the other side claims, for the advancement of their prosperity, the positive interference of the Government." *Works*, IV, 91.

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jority as a solution to the problem of conflicts of interest was no longer appropriate. The problem of these years was the institution of slavery; the earlier problems of tariff and fiscal management had lost their salience.

A reasonable case could be made for the view that as far as tariffs were concerned, all the above conditions held, even when allowance is made for Calhoun's characteristic ferocity and immoderation. If one is willing to leave aside the manner in which slavery could affect the analysis of the struggle over tariffs—and the protectionists left it aside—then Calhoun's pleading is undoubtedly compelling. In a nation dedicated to the preservation of property, it is no eccentricity or exaggeration to say that the agricultural interests deserved justice. One of the great ends of government was being programmatically subverted. The most that one can say against Calhoun is that he probably underestimated the potentialities which the American political system contained for changing harmful policies, for allowing new sentiments to emerge and to be translated into new laws that rectified old wrongs. In actuality, the tariff was altered in a direction favorable to the South. Other appeals could have been made to Calhoun. The welfare of the majority could have been cloaked in phrases like "the common good" or "the public interest."[29] An effort could have been made to show that in the long run the South would have benefited from the prosperity of the other sections of the country. Other than economic benefits could have been offered as substitutions for the loss of economic ones. But these arguments must sound somewhat hollow, especially at a time and place notoriously materialistic.

The only trouble is that the great question of slavery could not legitimately be discussed within the conceptual framework of the *Disquisition*. Sentiment for abolition, for containing slavery, or for refusing to comply with laws relating to fugitive slaves did not represent an interest or cluster of interests ranged against some other interest, the slave interest. Abolition, containment, and non-compliance were not interests at all. They were moral feelings seeking political power to achieve moral ends. It will not do to impute the sadism of virtue, or hypocrisy, or blind-

[29] In his early days Calhoun defended "internal improvements" in this language. See *Works*, II, 191.

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ness to deplorable injustice at home, or whatever, to those who had anti-slavery sentiments. The evil of slavery was so gross as to forgive any imperfection that went into the making of the feeling that it was absolutely wrong, as wrong as anything in man's organized social life could be, and to forgive any imperfection that went into the effort to limit or destroy it. It is no accident that the language of interests does not figure in the *Discourse*, and that in this work Calhoun relies purely on technical constitutional arguments, of a historical and legal sort, to make his case for the right of a minority to veto majority will. Furthermore, given the nature of the evil, it is hardly surprising that the minority represented by Calhoun should have experienced attacks on what it thought of as its rights. Slavery had to breed fanatical hatred. The question of slavery cannot be taken as paradigmatic of the eternal clash between majority rule and minority rights. The question of which slavery was paradigmatic was the eternal clash between right and wrong—a clash, in this instance, as free of moral (as opposed to practical) ambiguities as clashes ever get. Calhoun himself knew that sin, not a battle of moral equals, not a battle of men standing for equally good or equally bad causes, was the kernel of the controversy.

VI

What, then, is the worth of the abstract political theory of the *Disquisition?* More particularly, does Calhoun in this book make a contribution to resolving the tension between majority rule and *justice?* (The stress must be on justice because self-determination, political rationality, and personal rights, other values traditionally thought capable of inducing tension with majority rule, were not within Calhoun's purview.) The answer is that, at the very least, his theory forces on the attention of those who cherish the model of majoritarian democracy the problem of consensus—but not quite in the way his admirers think.

Calhoun's vision of society—it is also Madison's—is one of factions straining to despoil each other, and barely kept from doing so by artful political devices. The view of human nature is Hobbesian disjoined from the political system advocated by Hobbes. It is hard to see, however, how any society made up of

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more than a few people could hold together if this view were adequate to the facts. Not all the artful arrangements in the world would suffice without a preponderance of civil feelings. A continuous and extensive fear of injustice is incompatible with the life of a society that means to remain one society. Fear of injustice cannot therefore be imagined as the basis for the requirement of unanimity, of concurrent majority. Even if it could, there is no guarantee that other motives would not govern a minority's use of its veto. That would lead to minority rule, a result that is morally unacceptable from any point of view. There is only one basis for the requirement of unanimity that is morally acceptable and that could conceivably be grounded realistically in the facts of democratic social life, self-determination. On the rare occasions when the fundamental law is being revised, an approximation to unanimity is morally desirable; at the same time, there would be a widespread understanding that such an approximation is, in fact, morally desirable. There would be consensus on the proposition that, on these rare occasions, consensus is again called for. By and large, revisions in the fundamental law would not pertain to the clash of interests, would not involve the contest of economic groups, but would rather deal with purely political arrangements.

Nevertheless there may be situations in which a minority group in society stands in constant peril from the majority. There may be situations in which a society is fundamentally divided into a permanent majority and a permanent minority, and in which the majority does not extend civil feelings toward the minority. A normal society could not exist in the absence of widespread civil feelings, no matter how much diversity it contains, no matter how many factions and conflicts of interest it contains. But a certain group within it may, for one reason or another, arouse the murderous animosity of the rest. Ethnic, religious, racial, and linguistic minorities come to mind from our own present experience. The rights of these groups could perhaps be designated as "interests," if the meaning of that word were extended. Calhoun's analysis would apply. It would then be an open question whether the majority would choose to be just and respect minority rights by complying with the arrangements

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meant to protect them. In any case, whether they did so or not, right is on the side of the minority.

The tariff issue of Calhoun's time presents itself analogously to the ethnic and other problems of our day. Thanks to the resources of American tradition and practice, South Carolina's nullification was a recognizable, if not a widely tolerable, act. Minority defiance had been prepared for by American federalism. Without those structures and procedures the alternatives would have been submission or rebellion. The important point is that the protectionists backed down. There was still enough civil feeling to produce compromise.

In sum, the American tradition facilitated South Carolina's action, and American civility permitted that action to conclude fairly happily. But the issue was tariffs, not slavery. Which is to say that only in certain matters, and in certain circumstances, does concurrent majority have any likelihood of success. The theory of concurrent majority does not have universal applicability. It is not a general theory of minorities; it is only a theory of the permanent minority. Concurrent majority actually presupposes some degree of consensus, although it declares itself to be a replacement for consensus.[30] Concurrent majority is allegedly made necessary by the muted warfare of every group against every group, but it could operate only when a forbearing majority accepts restraints on itself in its dealings with a permanent minority.

[30] See Louis Hartz, "South Carolina vs. the United States," in Daniel Aaron (ed.), *America in Crisis* (New York, 1952), 81.

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Personality and Politics in the *Persian Letters*

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The making of a social critic is a very complex matter. Not genius alone or literary ability, but obviously certain kinds of frustrations, anger, and failure to adapt to society drive individuals in some instances to try to understand their own life history. In this reflective process the analysis of society plays a major role, and the potential critic may assert that it was society's fault, not his, which caused their failure to come together. The rejection of society for the non-activist critic then may culminate in literary activity.

Montesquieu's failure to adapt well to his society began very early and while he was still part of his family. As a member of a noble household with aristocratic pretensions and prestige emanating from the judicial offices of his father, Montesquieu never perceived distinct lines or limits between the behavior of the individual, the role of the family, and the entire society of the *ancien régime*.

If the Abbé de Guasco, one of Montesquieu's closest friends in later life, can be trusted as a faithful recorder of the *philosophe*'s conversations, at least one bit of evidence survives about the psychic development of the author of the *Persian Letters*.

> He has said to some friends that if he were going to publish those letters now, he would omit those in which the fire of youth had got the better of him, being obliged as he was, by his father, to spend

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the entire day on the *Code*, after which he found himself so wrought up by evening that in order to amuse himself he began to compose a Persian letter, which flowed from his pen without effort.[1]

There are other kinds of evidence about his early life. We know when and where he went to college, who his teachers were, and what the rank of his family was in society, but save this recollection there is nothing intimate and self-revealing.[2] The childhood, adolescence, and early adult life of Montesquieu are almost completely unknown. With so little evidence it is impossible for a historian to apply the techniques of analysis developed by psychiatry. The history of the anxieties or the development of the "identity crisis" which caused this son of a *parlementaire* to reject the practice of law and to abandon high office in Bordeaux cannot be written.[3] But this recollection is a clue, an extremely valuable clue, to what Montesquieu's psychic development must have been.

In his *Pensées* Montesquieu wrote: "as far as my job of president went, I had an upright heart, I understood the questions as such; but as for the procedure, I did not comprehend it at all. I did apply myself, too, but what disgusted me the most, was that I saw stupid men with the talent which escaped me. . . ."[4]

[1] O. Guasco, *Lettres Familières* (Paris, 1767), 176. At best Montesquieu recalled this aspect of his early life thirty years after the events themselves had taken place. To my knowledge this well-known quotation has never been used to shed light on the personal development of the *philosophe*. It is well known to those scholars interested in the problem of dating the writing of the *Persian Letters*. For a suggestive interpretation of the *Letters* as autobiography, see S. Cotta, *Montesquieu e la scienza della società* (Turin, 1952), 111ff. That Montesquieu might have made the remark to Guasco is beyond doubt. Guasco may have forged some letters to enable him to include Montesquieu as an ally in his attack on Madame Geoffrin, but is there any reason to suspect that he fabricated anecdotes about his friend's early life? Moreover, Montesquieu wrote Guasco in 1752 that in making a new edition of the *Letters* there were "quelques *juvenilia* que je voudrais auparavant retoucher. . . ." Montesquieu, *Oeuvres Complètes* (Nagel ed.; Paris, 1950-), II, *Correspondance*, 1441.

[2] R. Shackleton, *Montesquieu* (Oxford, 1961), *passim*. J. Starobinski, *Montesquieu par lui même* (Paris, 1961), *passim*.

[3] My inspiration here is Erik Erikson, *Young Man Luther* (New York, 1958), *passim*.

[4] Montesquieu, *Oeuvres Complètes* (Pléiade Series; Paris, 1956-58), I, *Pensées*, 977. Also, whether or not Montesquieu seemed timid to others, he seems always to have felt very timid and insecure in conversation. "J'ay

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Though written about a period several years later than the years in which he worked on the *Code*, this thought confirms the frustration expressed in the first recollection. The *Code*, with its emphasis on principles, and the Parlement, bound as it was by interminable procedures and rituals, caused him frustration despite his efforts to apply himself. Owing to the lack of this sort of evidence our only alternative is to attempt to supplement these glimpses into Montesquieu's early life by making inferences from his early works, and by analyzing his thought in the context of the political and social climate of France in the Regency of Louis XV.[5]

I

It is tempting to assert that Montesquieu developed as he did as much because of the intense crisis which France experienced immediately after the death of Louis XIV as from a conflict with his father. The *Persian Letters*, as will be shown, were directly stimulated by day-to-day happenings in Paris which Montesquieu followed with almost a fixation and sense of despair. Without this intense religious and political conflict after 1715 Montesquieu might never have outgrown his provincialism, or developed from a local somebody and amateur scientist into a leading light of the eighteenth century. But the one recollection of an adolescent obedient to his father, yet resentful and frustrated with the study and practice of law, serves to temper any biographical analysis based solely on external conditions affecting his development. Montesquieu grew discontented with the heritage which his father attempted to force on him; the crisis of the Regency did the rest.

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toujours eu une timidité qui a souvent fait paroître de l'embaras dans mes réponses. J'ai pourtant senti que je n'étois jamais si embarassé avec les gens d'esprit qu'avec les sots. Je m'embarrassois parce que je me croyois embarassé, et que je me sentois honteux qu'ils pussent prendre sur moi l'avantage." *Ibid.*, 979.

[5] J. Dedieu, *Montesquieu et la Tradition Politique Anglaise* (Paris, 1909), does this for the social and political thought of the period, but a systematic analysis of the allusions to contemporary political events in Montesquieu's works is still to be done. F. Neumann's introduction to the *Spirit of the Laws* (New York, 1949) is brilliantly suggestive of what could be done.

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Though Montesquieu came to reject his *noblesse de robe* heritage, he remained bound and enthralled by it throughout his life. He studied physical sciences, he read Hume, Spinoza, Hobbes, Newton, and Locke; he gained entry into bright *salons*, academies, and finally the French Academy. But his mind remained the same: captured by the law. The striking thing about Montesquieu's thought is its continuity.[6] The principles, the forms, and the assumptions remained the same in his mind from the beginning to the end of his life. This was partly because they were broad, inclusive categories which could be stated in the form of a maxim. Indeed, what appears as maxim in the *Persian Letters* becomes laws of sociology in the *Spirit of the Laws*, as Montesquieu expanded each maxim, refined it, and supplied historical and later anthro-geographical evidence to illustrate the force of such laws in societies either dead or living.

By laws Montesquieu meant not only codes and other legislation either ancient or contemporary. His concern, indeed his passion, was to go beneath these to discover the reasons for their acceptance or rejection as laws. In discovering these reasons he found the relationships between morals, laws, and the classic forms of government. This reflective, deductive process of discovering relationships and analogies typifies what J. G. A. Pocock calls the "common-law mind."[7] By this term Pocock means the presence of assumptions, usually vaguely formulated political thought, the forms of government such as monarchy, aristocracy, and republic which, when supported by historical evidence, become a forceful ideology for change and revolution. Pocock traces the evolution of the "common-law mind" in English political thought, and demonstrates how it developed into the Whig interpretation of history, and finally into historicism.

There is much in Montesquieu which is akin to the thinking of Sir Edward Coke, chief justice of England in the reign of James I, and of his followers who, in the Great Rebellion and the

[6] This is not to imply that Montesquieu never changed his mind. His definitions of monarchy and republics, for example, changed after he traveled about Europe, but this was more of a refinement than a break with the views he had held when writing the *Persian Letters*. See Dedieu, 137.

[7] *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law* (Cambridge, 1957), Chaps. II, III.

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Glorious Revolution, developed semi-historical, semi-mythical notions of the English constitution.[8] For Coke and the Whigs of the late seventeenth century, English law was something handed down from "time immemorial," as custom. From this they proved to their satisfaction that both the Parliament and the Anglican Church were older than the Monarchy, more lawfully constituted, and therefore not the creations of kings or the inferiors of royal courts.

Scholars have not sought to discover whether a parallel Whiggish tradition existed in France; but the French *parlementaires* and their heirs, the supporters of the *thèse nobiliaire* in the eighteenth century, may have shared certain Whiggish assumptions about the past with their English counterparts. From the great jurists of the sixteenth century, who were very interested in the Frankish constitution, to Loyseau, Omer Talon, and Joly de Fleury, a Whiggish view may have been formulated to oppose the Monarchy in the judicial Fronde of 1648. If a Whiggish tradition did not in fact develop in France, then it was brought over, as Dedieu suggests, in the late seventeenth century.[9] Montesquieu's

[8] *Ibid.*, 42ff. In a fine new synthesis W. F. Church argues that Montesquieu was more *philosophe* than jurist; and after excluding him from the jurists Church concludes that jurists declined as political theorists in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. While this conclusion is obviously correct, Church defines the notion of jurist too narrowly and almost too professionally. Might it not be argued that some of the sixteenth-century jurists were more humanist than jurist? Not all of the prominent ones kept their chairs in law or their *offices* in royal courts. This is a false problem. Montesquieu's thought had a deep affect on the Parlements and *robe* generally in part because they thought of him as one of their company, just as Diderot did in the passage about Montesquieu which Church quotes. Secondly, Church touches very lightly on jurists who believed in the myth of the "Ancient Constitution" and almost dismisses their work as "little more than an effort to rewrite history so as to justify institutional changes that would protect natural rights—rights that were unknown in earlier French law." The importance of Joly de Fleury and Talon remains to be determined, since Church hastily defines the jurists as all supporting divine-right sovereignty and eager to ground French laws on religious principles and Cartesianism. By ignoring jurists who believed in the "Ancient Constitution" or excluding them as *philosophes*, Church defines the group as more unified or monolithic than they may have been. "The Decline of the French Jurists as Political Theorists, 1660-1789," *French Historical Studies*, V (1967), 1-40.

[9] On this point Dedieu's emphasis on the connections between English and French thought distorts rather than depicts Montesquieu's place in early eighteenth-century thought. See Neumann, xxv ff.

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thought was from the beginning more like that of the English Whigs than that of the court reformers Fénelon and Vauban, whom he admired for their criticisms of Louis XIV. But neither Fénelon nor Vauban were trained in the law, and, furthermore, neither came from Bordeaux, a city with a strong *parlementaire* tradition and English sympathies.

The most important predilection of the "common-law mind" was to revere the past, the era of Anglo-Saxons and Franks, and to fear the future. Judges less bright than Montesquieu shared with Montesquieu the fear that royal power had developed at the expense of liberties and that it would pervert or corrupt society. They prophesied doom. A despotism constructed on the ashes of broken liberties would, they argued, inevitably result from increased royal power.[10] This predilection toward fear is found in Montesquieu's letters when he writes about the crisis of the Regency of Louis XV, and about French society. In the *Persian Letters* Montesquieu is a prophet of doom. Not restricting himself to France alone, Montesquieu made numerous and random reflections about the nature of society and states, and of early, post-Roman European history, which demonstrate this love for the past and fear of the future.

Besides fearing the future those imbued with the "common-law mind" believed that historical incidents in the remote past determined once and for all, and significantly, the evolution of states, institutions, morals, and personal freedom. Beneath all of Montesquieu's thought lurks the historicist notion that some incident occurring several thousand years ago might permanently give character to a society. Like the judge or lawyer with laws and procedures centuries old, Montesquieu considered time in years, decades, or centuries as of little significance. The precedent, regardless of its age, was still a precedent which could affect the proceedings of a court and even condemn a man to death. Not unlike other historical incidents in the remote past, such as the defeat of a nation in battle, it affected the society for its entire, organic life.

For the Whigs monarchy was thought to have come to Europe unnaturally, as the result of either conquest by foreigners or of

[10] See C. P. Courtney, *Montesquieu and Burke* (Oxford, 1963), *passim*.

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stupidity. Montesquieu could not appeal to the Anglo-Saxons, as did Coke, but he came close when he has Rica write: "Properly speaking these tribes [which conquered Europe] were not barbarian, for they were free. But they have become barbarian since the day when, being subjected for the most part to an absolute authority, they lost that sweet liberty so in conformity with reason, humanity and nature."[11] In the *Persian Letters* Montesquieu scarcely ventures an explanation of how the tribes lost their liberty, and how individuals became corrupted by absolutism, but this problem is a theme in the *Spirit of the Laws*. He does include the Whiggish explanation, however, when Rica writes Rhedi:

> Who could imagine that the oldest and most powerful kingdom of Europe should have been governed for more than ten centuries by laws not made by itself? If the French had been conquered, this would not be hard to understand. But they are the conquerors! They have abandoned the ancient laws, made by their first kings in general assemblies of the nation [the equivalent of the Anglo-Saxon Parliament] and what is even more amazing is that the Roman laws they took in their place were in part made and in part written down by emperors contemporary with their own lawgivers.[12]

Mystified by what had happened, Montesquieu investigated the history of the Franks until he found an explanation.

Franz Neumann's essay summarizes Montesquieu's place in the quarrel over the Frankish constitution, showing that historically Dubos was correct, and not Montesquieu.[13] Coke and his followers, of course, were also incorrect in their interpretation of English history. But on nearly every other count Montesquieu's careful research and observations on human nature carried him far beyond the Whiggish and very partisan political quarrels of his heritage. On this crucial question of the origins of monarchy in France the "common-law mind" enjoyed a complete triumph.

II

Steeped as he was in legal and classical history, Montesquieu went far beyond the ordinary predilections of a judge to investigate

[11] The J. R. Loy translation of the *Persian Letters* (New York, 1961), Letter CXXXVI.

[12] Letter C.

[13] Neumann, xxvi.

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the forms of government. In the *Persian Letters* this interest remained second to his passionate concern over changing the course of politics in the Regency of Louis XV. The forms are there, to be sure, but they remain on the second plane as a kind of backdrop for the portrayal of a despotic government and its overthrow. It was Montesquieu's purpose to describe despotism in its most violent form so that Frenchmen would rally round the system of councils established by the Regent, the Duke of Orleans, to avoid the rise of an all-powerful minister such as Richelieu or Louvois.

Whether Montesquieu set about doing this deliberately, at least at first, is something we shall never know. But the *genre* with which he chose to depict despotism as it existed in Asia was something well established in political thought. Book III of Herodotus described how the Persians had come to choose monarchy, and how that monarchy had become despotic in the hands of kings who tried to conquer Greece. In the sixteenth century Parisian judges criticized the despotism of Henry III, accusing him of wanting to set up a Turkish despotism in France.[14] Now clearly the Turks and the Persians were not the same, but in the political traditions of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries they were thought to have despotism in common. It was believed that all Oriental governments were despotic, as Montesquieu had Usbek write to Rhedi: "Since I have been in Europe, my dear Rhedi, I have seen many governments. It is not like Asia, where the rules of politics are always the same."[15] At this level the *Persian Letters* rely on cliché to evoke in the readers an interest which was most certainly there. The encyclopedists such as Moreri and Bayle, who were in vogue at the time, insist on the despotic form of government predominant in Asia. But going beyond this traditional mode of expressing opposition to royal authority, Montesquieu investigates the characteristics of despotism. The political overtones must have been clear to his contemporaries, however, after he so closely defined the relationships between despotism and other forms of government. Usbek wrote to Ibben that

[14] The anonymous Huguenot author of the *France turquie* (Paris, 1575) attacks Catherine de Medici for what he claims is her policy to install Turkish, despotic government in France. P. Robiquet, *Histoire Municipale de Paris* (Paris, 1886), II, 105.

[15] Letter LXXX.

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> the majority of the governments of Europe are monarchies, or rather, called so, for I am not sure that there have ever been any true ones. At least it is difficult for them to exist very long in a pure state. For monarchy is a violent state, always degenerating into despotism or into a republic. Power must always diminish on one side and grow on the other. However, the advantage is usually on the prince's side, for he is the head of the armed forces.[16]

This represents the kernel of Montequieu's political thought. There exist pure forms of states which are never in existence but, because of the passions of men, are always more or less tending to come into existence. In the *Persian Letters* Montesquieu's scheme for the forms of government remains strictly classical, whereas in the *Spirit of the Laws* it actually comes to be a fourth form of government, something quite different from Aristotle's notion of despotism as perverted monarchy. But in the *Persian Letters* the point is clear: the danger of despotism is ever-present in monarchical states. As A. Crisafulli points out, however, the only complete expression of the evolution of states is almost poetical in the *Persian Letters*, set as it is in the society of the Troglodytes.[17] There everything is presented almost in the form of a parable.[18] This small Arabian tribe overthrew its foreign king, then formed a republic which the Troglodytes then proceeded to overthrow, only to find themselves in a complete state of nature. Out of this violence wise men came forth to establish a new society of peace and bliss. Montesquieu celebrates the birth of this new Troglodyte society by describing it in poetic terms:

> In the evening, when the flocks had left the plains and the weary oxen had brought the plow home, they would congregate, and over a frugal meal, sing of the injustice and misfortunes of the first Troglodytes, of the rebirth of virtue in a new people, and of its felicity. They would celebrate the grandeur of the gods and their ever-present favors to men who turn to them, as well as their inevitable wrath visited upon those who fear them not. Then they would describe the delights of country living and the happiness that

[16] Letter CII. L. Althusser gives a succinct description of Montesquieu's idea of despotism in *La Politique et l'Histoire* (Paris, 1959), 82ff.

[17] Letters XI-XIV. See A. Crisafulli, "Montesquieu's Story of the Troglodytes," *Publications of the Modern Language Association*, LVIII (1943), 372-92.

[18] Letters XI-XIV.

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> accompanies a way of life continually crowned with innocence. Soon they would yield to a slumber never interrupted by cares and worries.[19]

At the end of what may be called a parable on the forms of governments, a desire to name a king develops in the minds of some of the Troglodytes. The wise men scorn this desire, but they accept it as fate. A monarchy is established, and the cycle is complete from monarchy to monarchy, through despotism, republicanism, a state of nature, familial society, and finally to monarchy again.

To comprehend this parable, and to understand the reasons for the changes in states became Montesquieu's lifelong aim. It would require investigations into the morals, religion, military exploits, and character of statesmen in each society. In the *Persian Letters* his intentions were as yet unclear and his aims more immediate.

III

Time in a historical sense was of no consequence either to the Whig or to Montesquieu, because human nature was considered to be unchanging. So far as we know, when Montesquieu published the *Persian Letters* in 1721 he had not yet investigated the effects of climate and ethnic differences on morals and politics. These researches came later, not to be developed until the *Spirit of the Laws*. But what is clear is the need to investigate the links which bind societies together and the forces which cause individuals to conform to the laws of the state. In the despotic state it is the presence of love in its most intense forms, adoration and worship, which binds subjects to their prince, and fear for their lives which makes them express this love. On the subject of the relationships between the forms of government and the kinds of justice which by nature emanate from them, Montesquieu has Usbek write to Rhedi:

> If under a gentle government, the nation is as submissive as under a strict government, then the first is preferable, since it is more in conformity with reason whereas severity is a motive foreign to it.
>
> Be assured, my dear Rhedi, that in a state the degree of cruelty of

[19] Letter XII.

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> punishment does not cause people to obey the laws more. In countries where punishment is moderate, the laws are respected just as well as in those where punishment is tyrannous and frightful.
>
> Whether the government be gentle or cruel, punishment is always meted out by degrees. . . . One's imagination, of its own accord, conforms to the customs of the country where one is: a week of prison or a light fine impresses the European, brought up under a gentle government, as much as the loss of an arm frightens an Asiatic. . . . The despair of losing his reputation will literally torment a Frenchman sentenced to the selfsame punishment that would make a Turk lose scarcely a quarter hour's sleep.[20]

For Montesquieu, then, it was the custom, the mental image evoked by a law and a government, rather than the law and the punishment itself, which best expressed the character of a society. This led him to revere ancient customs, if they had not been corrupted to some group's advantage. Thus Montesquieu makes a distinction between the judge, the priest, or the nobleman, as they should ideally behave, and their counterparts, his contemporaries, whom he so often scorned. But none in itself was evil and all were necessary, including the priest, because Montesquieu could not envisage a society which was not bound together by some religion, whether civic, or eschatological, or historical.

Beneath justice lie the personal relationships which bind the state together. They are the same as in a family, between husband and wife, brother and sister, comrades in arms, old men and young men. In the *Persian Letters* Montesquieu discusses in detail neither virtue nor honor, because he was striving to examine all the possible bases for power in the hands of a despot. These bases are fear and love. Franz Neumann has justly pointed out that the *Persian Letters* are about love,[21] but by also taking fear into account it is possible to go beyond his interpretation to analyze the seraglio as Montesquieu's description of despotic government. What is the dynamic principle of the seraglio? Curiously enough it is that the master expresses only love to all his wives, and they in turn must express only love and submission to him. But between them are the eunuchs who regulate every minute detail

[20] Letter LXXX.
[21] Neumann, xvii.

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of life in the seraglio. When acting in the master's name they are given enormous power to punish, and if need be, to murder persons who do not bend to their will. This tension between the overt expression of love which is forced on everyone in the seraglio and the covert mechanism of fear of punishment and death is the dynamic of the society that is the seraglio.

But before describing the politics of the seraglio as despotic it is important to recall some of the historical events which occurred while the *Persian Letters* were being written. For it is through studying the work as political literature that the message of despotism becomes apparent. Montesquieu believed that at any moment a coup might occur in the Palais Royal, which, if it took place, would throw France into a despotism as oriental as anything Persia had ever known.[22] Indeed, the message of the *Persian Letters* to Frenchmen in 1721 lay less in the attacks on hypocrisy in French religion and manners found in the letters from Paris than in the hysterical and explicit letters from Ispahan.

France had been ruled for over fifty years by Louis XIV. This monarch and his ministers had used every political, religious, and cultural device to create a monolithic image of the king and his reign in the minds of all Frenchmen, and of many Europeans. Louis XIV's surveillance over the court of Versailles, his ministers, and judges, priests, poets, scientists, and playwrights had never once faltered in those fifty years. Then, finally, when Frenchmen were perhaps beginning to think that he was immortal he died and left this great machine of state in the hands of a boy. The repercussion was immediate and intense on every aspect of political and intellectual life. For his political administration, the Regent, in the name of Louis XV, dusted off plans for a group of councils, a *polysynodie*, to enable those hungry for power in the state to be organized and effective in the adminis-

[23] Apart from the tone which the *Persian Letters* conveys, Montesquieu expressed a bitter disdain for ministers in general. "Les ministres travaillent toujours contre la liberté: ils traïssent les lois, parce qu'elles genent toutes leurs passions." "Il n'y a pas parmi nous de si petit ministre, ni de comis à 1,000 écus d'appointements, qui n'ait plus d'affaires que les grand-vizirs d'Orient, qui sont à la tête de la milice, de la justice et des finances de l'Empire." *Pensées*, Pléiade, I, 1444. J. Ehrard, *Politique de Montesquieu* (Paris, 1955), 13f, depicts Montesquieu as somewhat ambitious and on the edges of power.

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tration of the state. These councils were composed of the most distinguished persons in the realm: princes of the blood, great nobles, cardinals, and also the ministers of the old king.[23] These functionaries, descending as they had from Colbert and Louvois, had become accustomed to great power. They had networks of friends in every segment of the state from the army, to the church, to the tax administration.

To switch from a government by one man who counted on two or three men to execute all his decisions, to a government which placed enormous power in a group of councils, proved to be impossible. The rush for pensions, the disagreements over financial and foreign policy, and the rise of provincial officials and Parlements to insubordination if not rebellion made the *polysynodie* ineffective and unpopular almost from the beginning.[24] These councillors also had to perform very unpopular tasks, notably the repudiation of much of the royal debt which was held in the form of *rentes*. Then, owing to France's involvement in a war first with Spain and then with England over Spanish colonies, a quarrel with the Papacy, and a clash of authority with the Parlement, the need for a strong government obliged the Regent to undermine the power of the Councils. The man who helped disgrace princes and dukes who had been on these councils was Dubois, the son of an apothecary from Brive. The demise of the councils enabled Dubois to rise in power and become a sort of first minister.

Orleans' and Dubois' policy of eliminating the *polysynodie* was gradually instituted and marked by intrigue, violence, and bitter family feuding. The members who thought of themselves as reformers, as the heirs of Fénelon and Boullainvilliers, believed themselves to have been deceived by the Regent, whom they saw as weak and, as Montesquieu put it, corrupted by Dubois. Montesquieu accused Dubois of having given the Regent Hobbes to read![25] But the councils had their defenders as well.

One of the most influential *hommes de lettres* who came to

[23] Dom. H. Leclercq, *Histoire de la Régence* (Paris, 1921), I, 127ff; Letter CXXXVIII.

[24] Leclercq, II, 55.

[25] "C'est l'abbé Dubois qui avoit gâté le duc d'Orléans et lui avoit fait lire Hobbes et autres livres de cette espèce." *Spicilège*, Pléiade, II, 1350.

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the defense of the *polysynodie* was Charles Irenée de Castel, Abbé de St. Pierre. He lashed out in a speech on the subject in the French Academy in 1718, after which he was ostracized from that body, and his publisher was imprisoned.[26]

St. Pierre's *Discours* has survived in a few copies from the second edition published in Amsterdam. It is worth mentioning because of the categories of government which St. Pierre discusses. The work is semi-historical, semi-political science, with its whole point being that in a monarchy there can be only four ways of exercizing power: by the monarch himself, by the grand vizirate, by the semi-vizirate, and by government by council. He names as Grand Vizirs both the mayors of the palace under the Merovingians, and Richelieu, who ruled as a "first Minister, or as the Turks call it today, Grand Vizir." Having given these definitions St. Pierre goes on to argue how superior is government by council over any which depends on power in the hands of ministers. St. Pierre staked his reputation on the defense of the *polysynodie* and suffered the consequences. He was dismissed from the Court and the Academy. Montesquieu said of him: "the excellent Abbé de St. Pierre, the best *honnête homme* there ever was."[27]

An *homme de lettres* ostracized from the Academy by the pressure of the government might not alone have triggered a desire to attack despotism; but this incident—when combined with the disgrace of Chancellor Daguesseau, the Duke of Noailles, and many other nobles; a plot to assassinate the Regent; the betrayal of France's interests by the treasonous and frivolous Duke of Richelieu; the banishment of the Parlement to Pontoise; and finally the rise and fall of John Law, with all the emotional uproar and violence which this entailed—left the reformers despairing and anxious. Montesquieu, following all these incidents, also despaired.

IV

The *Persian Letters* is not only a *roman à clef;* it is also a *roman à calendrier.* Robert Shackleton's discovery that Montesquieu ac-

[26] A. M. Wilson, *French Foreign Policy during the Administration of Cardinal Fleury, 1726-1743* (Cambridge, Mass., 1936), 25f.

[27] Quoted in Shackleton, *Montesquieu,* 65; *Pensées,* Pléiade, I, 1295, 1718, 1940.

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tually used Moslem calendars in the dating of the letters makes it possible to infer connections between incidents in the seraglio of Ispahan with those in the Palais Royal.[28] In the letters from Paris the dates never coincide completely, even in such obvious historical references as the death of Louis XIV; they are usually off about a month or six weeks.[29] With this in mind, then, let us look at letter CXLVIII from Usbek to the first eunuch in the seraglio of Ispahan. It is dated the 11th of the Moon of Zilhage, 1718.

> Receive with this letter unlimited power over the entire seraglio. Command with the same authority as myself. May fear and terror walk with you; run from apartment to apartment bearing punishment and correction. May the whole seraglio live in consternation. May everyone melt in tears at your approach. Question the whole seraglio; start with the slaves. Do not spare my love; let everything undergo your fearsome jurisdiction. . . .[30]

The date of this letter granting plenary power to the first eunuch is November 5, 1718, on the Gregorian calendar. What had happened in the Palais Royal? The promulgation of the *arrêt* which effectively ended government by council occurred on September 24, 1718.[31] Cardinal Dubois was made secretary of state for foreign affairs, which caused his friends, enemies, and Dubois himself to believe that he had the power once exercized by Richelieu and Louvois. The outcry that despotism had been established in France echoed across Europe in the pamphlet literature. It might be possible, with a good knowledge of court politics in the Regency, to find other adaptations of historical events in the *Letters*. Despair, both personal and political, became focused in these *Letters*, perhaps on a day-to-day basis, over a few months.

Again before turning to an analysis of despotism in the work itself it is necessary to mention one more historical incident which undoubtedly influenced Montesquieu's cast of mind. This

[28] Shackleton, "The Moslem Chronology of the *Lettres Persanes*," *French Studies*, VIII (1954), 17-27.

[29] If Montesquieu was as careful in dating as he seems to have been, it is possible that he also allowed time for the actual transport of the letters from Paris to Venice, or to Ispahan.

[30] Letter CXLVIII.

[31] Leclercq, II, 223.

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was the disgrace of the Duke de La Force.[32] This gentleman, who descended from an old, distinguished, Protestant family from the region of Bordeaux, had been one of the leading defenders of the *polysynodie*, and also the principal patron of the Academy of Sciences at Bordeaux, to which Montesquieu had been elected in 1716. La Force had not gone down in 1718 with most of the councillors, because he had been a fervent supporter of John Law, who was then in favor with the Regent. Then with the collapse and flight of Law in 1720, anti-Law courtiers, officials, tax farmers, and the populace itself went out to purge his friends. Dubois and the Regent were not above letting men like La Force fall as scapegoats.

The discovery in Paris of a warehouse filled with luxury items, spices, chinaware, and cloth took on a special significance; it occurred at precisely the moment of John Law's Bubble and the consequent threat of revolt.[33] The warehouse guard at first refused to name the owner of the merchandise, but when incarcerated he acknowledged that it belonged to the intendant of the Duke de La Force. Not even the greatest scandalmonger of the period, Saint Simon, could bring himself to recount the narrative of how La Force was publicly humiliated by being brought before the Parlement and censured for the possession of commercial goods.[34] The judges, after a long trial, nearly decided in favor of *dérogeance*, or loss of his title for having done something so base as to engage in trade.

La Force had been a supporter of the *polysynodie*, and to see him fall as the scapegoat for ministerial despotism infuriated Montesquieu. Yet he was powerless to help the duke; even the Parlement of Paris thought a victim was needed. Now one of the leading noblemen in the region suffered humiliation for a cause dear to Montesquieu. After La Force's flight to England Montesquieu kept

[32] Henri-Jacques-Nompar de Caumont, duc de la Force (1675-1726). For the entire incident, see Léon Lecestre, "Affaire du duc de la Force," *Revue des Questions Historiques*, CIII (1925), 322-60, and Leclercq, III, 310 ff. La Force was something of a scapegoat for the Regent and other aristocrats who, after seeing the great impact on public opinion which Law's failure had caused, joined the judges to humiliate the duke.

[33] Lecestre, 325f. The warehouse was part of the monastery of the Grands Augustins.

[34] *Mémoires*, ed. A. de Boislisle (Paris, 1926), XXXVIII, 137.

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him informed of events in France and negotiated the transfer of some funds which the duke had given for a building to house the Academy of Bordeaux. In fact, owing to the financial transactions over this building, Montesquieu at one point stood to lose ten thousand *livres*. He had cosigned a note on this property which had to be forfeited because of the financial disorders which arose from Law's system.[35] The question of whether he would have to honor this note was of concern to Montesquieu in the months directly preceding the publication of the *Persian Letters*.

Montesquieu's attachment to La Force never diminished, and it was he who gave the eulogy before the Academy after the duke's death in 1726. Montesquieu dared openly to defend the man and his actions in the ministry of the Regent, and he likened him to those great men in Greece and Rome who had been humiliated by the state they had sought to serve.[36] His vision of the French contemporary political scene and his Whiggish presuppositions joined to make Montesquieu see despotism as a terrible evil.

V

Montesquieu depicted the seraglio as a society run exclusively for the gratification of one man. It was a place where all other men have been emasculated, castrated, and reduced to groveling for favor. The men of virtue have been crushed or brutalized by fear and physical violence. The wives are all equal, loved and longed for, ignored and unknown, yet unloved and frustrated. They can only sacrifice to and adore the one person whose favor signifies either life or death; the sex act for them meant satisfaction in the ascetic pleasure derived from the pain of intercourse with a person who cannot be loved.

That Montesquieu saw sexuality as the basis for all relationships between families, friends, subjects, and citizens becomes clearer when he observed what he thought to be the different

[35] *Correspondance*, Nagel, III, 735, n.b.

[36] "M. le duc de la Force, plein de zèle pour le bien public, fut la dupe de la grandeur et de l'étendue de son esprit. Il étoit dans le Ministère; et charmé d'un plan qui épargnoit tous les details [Law's], il y crut de bonne foi. . . . Dans ce temps de trouble et de confusion, il fit une infinité d'actions genereuses, dont le public ne lui a tenu aucun compte. *Éloge* delivered Aug. 25, 1726, Nagel, III, 232.

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sexual relationships inherent in republican societies, monarchies, and democracies.[37] This explains his choice of Republican Venice for so many of the letters.[38] In Letter LVII Montesquieu has Usbek write: "The libertines here keep an infinite number of prostitutes and the devout a countless number of dervishes." But he did not criticize the morals of the citizens of St. Mark as a group, at least not in the *Persian Letters*.

Then in the late seventeen-twenties he journeyed to Venice, where he was astounded to find an extraordinary number of prostitutes, or so he thought. Their presence is a subject for comment on almost every page of his journal from Venice, because he began to wonder whether republics were in fact more virtuous than monarchies.[39] Virtue for Montesquieu was not quite synonymous with monogamy; he did, however, think it a sign of a

[37] Usbek writes: "The peoples of Europe are not all uniformly subjected to their princes. For example, the impatient temperament of the English allows their king scarcely any time to consolidate his authority. Submission and obedience are two virtues they make least of. On this score, they say extraordinary things. According to them, there is only one bond that can produce attachment in men: gratitude. A husband, a wife, a father, and a son are bound mutually only by the love they have one for the other, or by the benefits they make possible one for the other. These various motives of gratitude are the origin of all kingdoms and all societies." Letter CIV. Miss Pauline Kra argues that Montesquieu is attacking polygamy. "The Invisible Chain of the *Lettres Persanes*," in T. Besterman (ed.), *Voltaire Studies* (Geneva, 1963), XXIII, 9-60. This interpretation is a consequence of not analyzing the political forms, chiefly despotism, in which Montesquieu discussed marriage and morals. She is on much firmer ground, however, in pointing out the analogy between the harem system and the Catholic religious orders (p. 44). That Usbek defines priests and nuns as eunuchs may be explained by his attempt to find a Persian equivalent for persons having made vows of celibacy. The discussion of celibacy which follows these remarks in Letter CXVII indicates clearly that Usbek understood the religious as not eunuchs in the technical sense.

[38] In the *Voyages* we discover what a profound impression his visit to Venice made on him. Expecting to discover virtuous, upright citizens in a republic, Montesquieu seems to have found indolence and prostitution. His disappointment in this city of virtue was deep: "Mes yeux sont très satisfaits a Venise; mon coeur et mon esprit ne le sont point. Je n'aime pas une ville ou rien n'engage a se rendre aimable ni vertueux. Les plaisirs même que l'on nous donne, pour suppléer à tout ce qu'on nous ôte, commencent à me déplaire. . . ." Ed. A. de Montesquieu (Bordeaux, 1894), I, 41. See also Letter LVII.

[39] "Les Jésuites, grand directeurs à Venise. Comme chacun a sa p. . . . ., ils tolerent jusqu'à ce qu'ils puissent persuader le mariage. . . ." *Voyages*, I, 68.

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good, virtuous society. But in the *Persian Letters*, written before the visit, there was as yet none of this doubt about the morality of republicans. He believed that the brutalized sexual relationships of the seraglio in Asia were the basis for their despotic governments. And what had Louis XIV done? He had insisted on controlling the marriage plans of his nobles, which Montesquieu could interpret as one more sign of portending despotism. Usbek wrote of the Sun King: "He governs with equal talent his family, his court, and his state. People have often heard him say that, of all the governments in the world, that of the Turks, or that of our august sultan would please him best—so much significance does he attach to oriental politics."[40]

Montesquieu makes his point more explicit by insisting on the difficulties which husbands have in leading their wives to the marriage bed, for in despotic families and governments even physical attraction is destroyed.[41] Neumann points out that in the *Letters* it is only the love between brother and sister, between Aphiridon and Astarte (Letter LXVII), which gives pleasure and which results in the birth of a child, for they are rebels who have escaped the bonds of an intolerant and despotic society.[42] Montesquieu connects the presence of this freedom to the rise of populations in areas which are not despotic[43] and concluded that Asian populations were low because of the harem, which is based on hate and envy. This same theme is represented in the differences between Zelis and Roxanne, with the former expressing pleasure at being removed from the clutches of Usbek, who had imprisoned her, and Roxanne, whose faithfulness and love turn out to be only a disguise for the truth that any relationship based on one person's being totally subservient to the other can lead to nothing but despair, rebellion, or suicide. Usbek

[40] Letter XXXVII.

[41] The bride of a despotic husband struggles for months against his efforts to lead her to the marriage bed. Roxanne, in warding off Usbek's efforts to possess her, attempted to *immoler* or to kill her husband as a sacrifice. Letter XXVI. Montesquieu's choice of the word *immoler* suggests that he sought to convey the notion that the husband was the source of religious truth in the harem. The completion of marriage signifies total submission to the despot. Montesquieu contrasts this custom to that of European brides, and has Usbek admire the relaxed, sophisticated, egalitarian manner of European women.

[42] Neumann, xviii: Letter LXVII.

[43] Letter CXII.

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is filled with wonder at the behavior of European women, yet he is attracted to them because they show independence and something besides the overt submission with which Moslem wives hide their despair.

VI

Beyond the personal and familial basis for politics and sexuality, there remains the problem of how power is to be exercised. The *Persian Letters* is not only a *roman à calendrier*, but obviously also a *roman à clef*, depicting types more than it depicts real personages. As such it resembles St. Pierre's critique of the vizirate as he saw it develop in the French Monarchy.

For Montesquieu the mullahs are the learned doctors, such as the Sorbonne professors; the dervishes are priests and monks, chiefly the Jesuits; and the pashas are nobles who refuse to engage in trade. These masks are all quite obvious and have frequently been pointed out. But to my knowledge no one has pointed out that the eunuchs are the king's ministers, the Richelieus, Louvois, and John Laws, personified as men who have no power or status in their own right, but who exercize enormous power in the name of their lord. Like the ministers the eunuchs are of humble origin—one was a slave from Africa—yet they come to have enormous wealth and power through their service. But they are not really men.[44] Their only pleasure is to order about the wives—or subjects—because they cannot enjoy them or speak with authority to them in a normal fashion. Physical violence damaged them forever because they are incapable of executing the orders of Louis XV or of the Regent in their own names.

Montesquieu's theory of power is that it is impossible to delegate it without risking violence in the state.[45] It is the eunuchs and the ministers who stand between the ruler and the ruled. The distance from Ispahan to Europe forces Usbek to give orders by letter. The distance from Versailles or the Palais Royal to some remote province also forced the king's ministers to at-

[44] In addition to referring several times to the sexual frustrations of the eunuchs, Montesquieu portrays the relations which ministers have with their mistresses as loveless and corrupted. Letter CVII. The implication is that ministers cannot attract women to them on the basis of their personalities or manly qualities, but only because they have political power and wealth.

[45] Loy, 294.

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tempt to impose the king's will by writing letters, using threats, and instituting repression. Finally, it is the eunuchs who keep buying wives for their lord.[46] Are they not like provinces, beautiful but so dearly bought by the king's ministers through costly wars?[47] Like Fénelon, Montesquieu abhorred expansionist wars.

Usbek and Rica are themselves quite pleasant, engaging, and normal.[48] But what is done in their names is brutal and barbarous. Rica wrote Usbek: "I can't explain how it happens that there is practically never a prince so wicked as not to have a minister who is even more so."[49] Or again, in reference to Law: "What greater crime is there than the one a minister commits when he corrupts the morals of a whole nation, debases the most noble souls, tarnishes the splendor of high office, obscures virtue itself, and confounds the highest birth with universal scorn."[50] The only note of pity for the eunuchs in the whole work is sounded when the first eunuch writes: "I am never for one moment sure of being in my master's favor."[51] Like ministers they lived in fear of death or exile. It is clear that Montesquieu places the burden of responsibility for corruption in the state and in the seraglio on the rulers themselves.

Montesquieu then derives his *dénoument* for the *Persian Letters* from the inevitable effects of inefficient despotic government. The end is as abrupt as the rebellion which is depicted as the disintegration of a despotic society. Readers who had pondered the parable of the Troglodytes would know that Usbek was doomed to lose control because of his distance from the seraglio.

[46] Letter XCVI.

[47] "The right of being the husband of a pretty wife, which is conceded so carefully in Asia, is worn here with ease. Everyone feels readily disposed to seek a diversion wherever he can. A prince consoles himself for the loss of one fortress by taking another." Letter LV. Through literary device Montesquieu identifies the aims of the despot, which are to force all his subjects into submission, including his wife or wives, and to conquer foreign territories.

[48] Except, of course, that they believe in the submission of every subject to them. Montesquieu makes this point clear by having Rica give his views on compassion: "I must confess, Usbek, that I have never been able to watch anyone shed tears without being touched. I feel compassion for the unfortunate, as if they were the only ones who were men; and even the mighty, against whom I find my heart hardened when they are exalted, these I love as soon as they are fallen." Letter CXXVI.

[49] Letter CXXVII.

[50] Letter CXLVI.

[51] Letter IX.

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A society dispossessed of virtue cannot be stable without the ruler's presence, hence rebellions in Asia, princes in hiding, political assassination, and the general violent tenor of life in the seraglio could only end in rebellion.[52] Usbek's direct appeal to his wives in letter CLIV goes unheeded,[53] for his eunuchs are quarreling with each other, and his favorite wife Roxanne, in defiance, commits suicide.

The need to shock his countrymen into realizing their danger probably went ungratified in Montesquieu's mind, for few of his readers seem to have interpreted the work as an attack on Dubois. The richness and intensity of the work defeated its immediate purpose, but it became immortal. When his old friend Dodart wrote in 1722 that the Grand Vizir had just died, no one needed to explain to Montesquieu that Dubois was dead.[54] The literary image of Turks and Persians had become firmly established in his little group of friends. After the Regent's death in 1723 and after the rise of Cardinal Fleury, whom Montesquieu was convinced was not a man to become a Richelieu, the danger of despotic government diminished in France. Despite this improved political climate Montesquieu continued to investigate the moral and ideological foundations of the different forms of government, which are, after all, the subjects of his concern in the *Spirit of the Laws* and most of his other works.

In conclusion, we have seen that it is not possible to show the psychological development of Montesquieu through an analysis of letters and other documents, or to know the personal origins of his anxieties. It seems clear nevertheless after studying the *Persian Letters* that the political crises and his own adolescent crisis combined to fix him in his purpose for the rest of his life. The *Spirit of the Laws* was an outgrowth of the maturing young author of the *Persian Letters*. He abhorred despotism in all its forms, whether in Ispahan, the realm of political ideology, the Palais Royal, a source of unlimited power which made him despair, or in his father's *château* of La Brède.

[52] Montesquieu followed closely the rebellions going on in Persia when he was writing the *Persian Letters;* see Loy, 338 n. 342. It might be possible to discover the adaptation of some of these historical events of violence into incidents in the *Letters*.

[53] Letter CLIV.

[54] *Correspondance*, Nagel, III, Letter 20, p. 743.

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Chester A. Arthur and the Campaign of 1880

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Until recently students of late nineteenth-century America who have attempted to assess the political career of Chester A. Arthur, especially for the period prior to 1881, have been faced with an uncommon lack of primary source material. No other president left historians so little and has remained in such obscurity. The Library of Congress and the New York Historical Society each possesses a small collection of his correspondence, of little use to scholars, and a few miscellaneous letters are in his brother's papers, in the hands of autograph collectors, and elsewhere. Arthur's biographer George F. Howe constructed his book, published in 1934, largely from the papers, diaries, and memoirs of others, assisted by contemporary newspapers, magazines, and government reports.[1]

This situation has now been altered by the discovery of three Arthur letterbooks from the campaign of 1880. The well-preserved

[1] George F. Howe, *Chester A. Arthur, A Quarter-Century of Machine Politics* (New York, 1934). For interesting views of Arthur by contemporaries, see George F. Hoar, *Autobiography of Seventy Years*, I (New York, 1903), 405-06; Chauncey M. Depew, *My Memories Of Eighty Years* (New York, 1922), 117; *The Nation*, June 17, 1880, p. 445. See De Alva S. Alexander, *A Political History Of The State Of New York*, III (New York, 1909), 400-02. A widely-used but largely undocumented secondary impression of Arthur is in Matthew Josephson, *The Politicos, 1865-1896* (New York, 1938), 95-96, 286, 323. See also V. P. De Santis, "President Arthur and the Independent Movements in the South in 1882," *Journal of Southern History*, XIX (1953), 346-63.

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volumes contain 2,089 documents, including several hundred letters and notes in Arthur's handwriting. They enable the historian to view more accurately than before the workings of Roscoe Conkling's Stalwart machine on behalf of James A. Garfield and the activities of Conkling's chief lieutenant Arthur, but a year away from becoming the nation's chief executive.[2]

I

Arthur was chairman of New York's Republican State Committee in 1880 as well as the vice-presidential nominee. A loyal Stalwart, he had been placed on the ticket to win the support of Conkling, bitter over his hard-fought and unsuccessful campaign at the national convention to nominate the malleable General Grant.[3] "Lord Roscoe" was head of the nation's most powerful political machine, an apparatus that had survived the determined efforts of President Rutherford B. Hayes to destroy it.[4] New York had been won by the Democrats in 1876, and it was highly doubtful that Garfield could carry it and the election without the full support of the New York spoilsman. Conkling had little liking for Garfield; arch-rival James G. Blaine was a Garfield partisan, and the nominee had revealed a degree of affinity with the growing civil service reform movement. Conkling decided to work for the Republican presidential ticket only after a conclave in early August in which Garfield apparently led Stalwarts to believe that they could control New York patronage in the event of his election.[5] Arthur, of course, was in charge of securing New York for the party.

The State Committee chairman's role in the campaign has been

[2] I am deeply indebted to the owner of the letterbooks, Mr. Vincent F. Assaiante of Colorado Springs, and to his attorney and my student, Robert Murray of the same city, for allowing me to be the first to study these documents.

[3] The best account of the convention struggle is in Herbert J. Clancy, S.J., *The Presidential Election of 1880* (Chicago, 1958), 82-121.

[4] Hayes' clash with Conkling is recreated skillfully in Ari Hoogenboom, *Outlawing The Spoils: A History of the Civil Service Reform Movement, 1865-1883* (Urbana, 1961), 155-79.

[5] See David S. Muzzey, *James G. Blaine: A Political Idol of Other Days* (New York, 1934), 167-74; Theodore C. Smith, *The Life And Letters Of James Abram Garfield* (New Haven, 1925), 943-92. For good coverage of the August 5 conference, see *ibid.*, 1016-17; Howe, 119-20. See also Thomas C. Platt, *The Autobiography of Thomas Collier Platt* (New York, 1910), 128-32.

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hitherto virtually unknown. Howe said only that Arthur arranged speaking tours in the state and "devoted himself without stint to the work of organizing a more than unusually intensive campaign in New York and Brooklyn." An examination of the evidence now available reveals Arthur personally involved with every facet of the state campaign, including the financial assessment of government office-holders, and active also as a major participant in the national campaign.[6]

Arthur was indeed in charge of acquiring and scheduling a full slate of Republican speechmakers in New York. The task was highly time-consuming, and the correspondence surrounding it large. Among those solicited by Arthur for speaking engagements in the state were James G. Blaine, Secretary of the Interior Carl Schurz, Philadelphia Stalwart Benjamin Harris Brewster, clergyman Henry Ward Beecher, Secretary of State William M. Evarts, former Secretary of State Hamilton Fish, attorney Joseph H. Choate, Vermont Senator George F. Edmunds, and writer Mark Twain.[7] Most complied willingly; an exception was Blaine, who suffered a curious, unusually severe and long-lasting affliction of the throat. Twain replied:

> In answer: If I were a political speaker I should be glad enough to assist in this momentous struggle—but I have no strength in that direction.
>
> About the middle of October I may want to make just one little bit of a 15-minute speech at some big gathering in New York, merely to tranquilize the audience & hold them down whilst the real speakers of the evening are getting ready.

[6] Howe, 120, 122. The word "national" is used here in the very limited sense described brilliantly by Robert H. Wiebe in his *The Search For Order, 1877-1920* (New York, 1967), 27-37. Arthur had one correspondent, however, from Nevada. A. Zechandelaar to C. A. Arthur, Aug. 23, 1880 (letterbook III, document 51). The numbering of these documents is mine.

[7] [Chester A. Arthur] to James G. Blaine, Oct. 14, 1880 (III, 563); Secretary [Chester A. Arthur] to Carl Schurz, Oct. 19, 1880 (III, 576); Benjamin Brewster to Chester A. Arthur, Oct. 26, 1880 (I, 134); Henry Ward Beecher to Chester A. Arthur, Oct. 7, 1880 (I, 148); Wm. M. Evarts to [Chester A. Arthur], Oct. 5, 1880 (I, 283); handwritten telegram message, Chester A. Arthur to Hamilton Fish, Sept. 10, 1880 (III, 393); [Chester A. Arthur] to Joseph H. Choate, Sept. 24, 1880 (III, 738); [Chester A. Arthur] to George F. Edmunds, Sept. 24, 1880 (III, 729); S. L. Clemens to C. A. Arthur, Sept. 15, 1880 (I, 254). Unless otherwise noted, Arthur's letters cited here are in Arthur's hand, and were written for his secretary to be formally prepared and signed.

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He felt obliged to add a postscript: "I do not speak positively."[8]

In spite of at least two private assertions to the contrary, Arthur also participated actively in the supervision of speaking engagements outside New York.[9] With the Republican loss of Maine in September, Conkling and General Grant made plans to travel through the key states of Ohio and Indiana. Arthur was in charge of the arrangements surrounding the Midwest tour. All correspondence concerning speaking dates, travel accommodations, the size of auditoriums, platform dignitaries, and the like went through him. Both Conkling and Grant leaned heavily on Arthur's judgment.[10]

Candidate Garfield himself kept Arthur informed of local planning in his home state of Ohio. Together they arranged for a meeting at Warren, where forty thousand people heard Conkling for four hours—and Grant for seven minutes. On September 15 Garfield requested of Arthur by telegram: "Please arrange that General Grant-Senator Conkling & yourself spend the night of Sept [ember] twenty seventh at my house." Arthur replied on the twenty-second that he had informed Conkling and Grant about the offer and that nothing as yet could be confirmed. From this we may conclude that the idea for the famous meeting in Mentor, Ohio, between Conkling, Grant, and Garfield, a further attempt to heal wounds within the party, originated with the presidential nominee rather than with Stalwarts such as Senator Simon Cameron, General Grant, or Mark Hanna, as previously thought.[11]

[8] S. L. Clemens to C. A. Arthur, Sept. 15, 1880 (I, 254); see New York *Times*, Oct. 27, 1880.

[9] [Chester A. Arthur] to "Linton," Oct. 2, 1880 (III, 858); [Chester A. Arthur] to "Mervill," Oct. 16, 1880 (III, 852).

[10] See, for example, telegram, Roscoe Conkling to C. A. Arthur, Sept. 12, 1880 (III, 334); telegram, U.S. Grant to C. A. Arthur, Sept. 11, 1880 (III, 329).

[11] See, for example, telegram, J. A. Garfield to C. A. Arthur, Sept. 13, 1880 (III, 336); handwritten telegram message [C. A. Arthur] to James A. Garfield, Sept. 13, 1880 (III, 333); "telegram copy," C.A.A. [Chester A. Arthur] to [U.S.] Grant, Sept. 13, 1880 (III, 332); telegram, J. A. Garfield to C. A. Arthur, Sept. 15, 1880 (III, 350); [Chester A. Arthur] to [James A.] Garfield, Sept. 22, 1880 (III, 523); see J. A. Garfield to C. A. Arthur, Sept. 25, 1880, Vol. III, Chester A. Arthur papers, Library of Congress. For the view that Cameron and Grant were responsible for the Mentor meeting, see Alfred R. Conkling, *The Life And Letters Of Roscoe Conkling, Orator, Statesman, Advocate* (New York, 1889), 620-22; Platt, 134-35. See also Herbert Croly, *Marcus Alonzo Hanna*

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Details for the tour through Indiana were worked out by Arthur with the assistance of Republican boss John C. New. Conkling gave lengthy addresses in Indianapolis, Lafayette, Richmond, and Terre Haute before returning with Grant to New York. Arthur welcomed Conkling home: "I understand from the military style of your telegram that you report for duty and so ask whether I shall now make some appointments for you in this State." Within a few days, under the direction of Arthur, Conkling and Grant were speaking their way across New York.[12]

II

Stalwart efforts in the Midwest were rewarded on October 12 when both Indiana and Ohio went to the Republicans. To insure a similar result in the critical state of New York, the Conkling machine intensified its efforts there, making unprecedented demands upon federal, state, and city employes for funds. Political assessments had been applied to certain government workers for half a century; control of the spoils system in New York had been at the root of the clash between Conkling and Hayes. But hitherto the state had not seen the likes of the effort waged in the fall of 1880 to exact tribute for a Garfield victory and the maintenance of Conkling's political authority. Chester A. Arthur, portrayed by his biographer as an honest, though slightly compliant gentleman, and never before personally linked with assessments, was involved in this system of extortion in 1880—fresh evidence reveals—to a degree only surmised by his most fervid detractors.

(New York, 1912), 116-17; Clancy, 200. For a balanced account of the "Treaty of Mentor," see Smith, 1032-34.

[12] Telegram, John C. New to Chester A. Arthur, Sept. 13, 1880 (III, 340); telegram "copy," C. A. Arthur to John C. New, Sept. 22, 1880 (III, 343); handwritten telegram message [Chester A. Arthur] to [Roscoe] Conkling, Oct. 16, 1880 (III, 568); handwritten telegram message, C. A. Arthur to Roscoe Conkling, Oct. 19, 1880 (III, 574); handwritten telegram message, C. A. Arthur to Roscoe Conkling, Oct. 20, 1880 (III, 576); [Chester A. Arthur] to Chauncey M. Depew, Oct. 22, 1880 (III, 820). Arthur had complete control of Conkling's speaking schedule. Marshall Jewell [Chairman of the Republican National Committee's executive committee] to [Chester A.] Arthur, Sept. 15, 1880 (I, 350).

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Arthur's State Committee mailed a total of twelve assessment circulars to government employes in the sixty-seven days leading up to the election.[13] Every postmaster in the state was required to remit a specified sum—often three per cent of his reported annual income—as were all workers in the New York Customs House and the local offices of the Internal Revenue Service. Few were spared; circulars were received by police chiefs, workers on the new capitol building at Albany (right down to the night watchmen), lighthouse keepers, and ship stewards.[14] Many of these same employes received similar circulars from the National Congressional Committee and a myriad of local committees.[15]

[13] The best account of political assessments for the campaign of 1880 before the emergence of the Arthur letterbooks was by New York attorney Frederick W. Whitridge, "Political Assessments," in John J. Lalor (ed.), *Cyclopaedia Of Political Science, Political Economy, And Of The Political History Of The United States, By The Best American And European Writers*, I (New York, 1890), 152-55. Among the studies that utilized Whitridge's article, which featured the publication of three State Committee circulars, were: James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*, II (2d rev. ed.; London, 1891), 130; Charles R. Lingley, *Since The Civil War* (rev. ed.; New York, 1926), 167; and E. E. Sparks, *National Development 1877-1885* (New York, 1907), 162-63. Harold Gosnell, in his *Boss Platt And His New York Machine* . . . (Chicago, 1924), 24-25, misread Lingley's version of Whitridge, and his error was repeated and curiously compounded by Donald B. Chidsey in his lively *The Gentleman From New York: A Life Of Roscoe Conkling* (New Haven, 1935), 307. See also Hoogenboom, 185, 225-26; U.S., *Congressional Record*, 47th Cong., 2d Sess., 1882, XIII, Part 5, pp. 5332-44.

[14] A national list for the Congressional Committee was prepared in the office of First Assistant Postmaster General James N. Tyner. James N. Tyner to Edward M. Johnson, Aug. 18, 1880 (I, 688); for more on Tyner, see Leonard D. White, *The Republican Era: A Study In Administrative History, 1869-1901* (Free Press ed.; New York, 1965), 271-72. Frederick G. Gedney to E. M. Johnson, Oct. 23, 1880 (II, 92, and accompanying list, 91); James G. Scott to John N. Knapp, Oct. 4, 1880 (II, 43); James W. Eaton to Edward M. Johnson, Oct. 19, 1880 (II, 125); see also the unsigned memorandum from the Quarantine Department (II, 322).

[15] Many complaints about this are found in the letterbooks. One postmaster charged that twenty per cent of his net salary had been taken by various assessments. J. F. Bishop to Republican State Committee, Oct. 19, 1880 (II, 198); civil service reformer George William Curtis knew of a man taxed nearly seventeen per cent. Charles E. Norton (ed.), *Orations And Addresses of George William Curtis*, II (New York, 1894), 14-15. No total figures appear in the letterbooks. Whitridge reported on "the highest authority" that the Congressional Committee received at least $100,000, and estimated that the New York State Committee took in between $90,000 and $125,000. Whitridge,

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Hundreds of replies to these circulars crossed Arthur's desk, and the chairman passed them along through the proper channels, frequently making notations to assist the prompt collection of payments. The confidential appeals for the names of all postmasters and officials of the Internal Revenue Service in the state were written by Arthur, though signed by a committee secretary. The request of the superintendent of construction at the capitol building to collect assessments totalling $945 came from Arthur's pen. Likewise, Arthur wrote to a federal judge (once more making it appear to come from a committee secretary) asking "if you can not now make some report in regard to the matter of contributions for this Committee which was the subject of consultation between . . . you and the other judges." Another federal judge asked Arthur confidentially where he might hand over the collection he had made from colleagues on the bench. Yet another judge mailed his $500 "contribution" directly to Arthur, inquiring about the status of his nomination to office by the committee.[16]

On October 23 the committee disseminated widely the one circular signed by Arthur—the only form letter not asking specifically for funds. It read:

> The results of the recent hard fought contests in Indiana and Ohio clearly betoken Republican success at the approaching election. But with mere success the party should not and must not content itself. It must achieve a thorough, sweeping, overwhelming triumph which

"Political Assessments," 153-54. One piece of evidence from Arthur's pen suggests that the State Committee had a campaign budget of $52,000, and that the chairman had a difficult time raising that amount. In late October Arthur wrote to Levi P. Morton, a Republican banker and future vice-president, currently raising a special fund to carry New York in the election, calling attention to the committee's immediate need for $27,000. In what appears to be a draft of the letter Arthur wrote: "We are $27,000 short of the amt they [?] agreed to give me and I have to pay out the money this afternoon. I am in serious trouble if something is not done at once." [Chester A. Arthur] to [Levi P.] Morton, n.d. (III, 593); letter draft in Arthur's hand, n.d. (III, 594). See Robert M. McElroy, *Levi Parsons Morton* (New York, 1930), 109-11.

[16] Secretary [Chester A. Arthur] to J. W. Eaton, Oct. 14, 1880 (III, 558). James W. Eaton to Edward M. Johnson, Oct. 19, 1880 (II, 125); Arthur letters for Oct. 9, 1880 (III, 500). Garfield, too, was concerned with the success of campaign circulars. Smith, 1023. Secretary [Chester A. Arthur] to "Dear Sir," Aug. 14, 1880 (III, 602); Secretary [Chester A. Arthur] to Fred C. Gedney, Oct. 16, 1880 (III, 832); J. C. Langbein to [Chester A.] Arthur, Oct. 16, 1880 (I, 82); [Chester A. Arthur] to "Judge Folger," Oct. 6, 1880 (III, 532).

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a hostile Congressional majority can find no pretext for disputing, and which no man throughout the land can have the hardihood to call in question.

To this end the State of New York must swell our Electoral majority with the noble contribution of its thirty-five votes.

We are daily receiving assurances that our forces in every county are united, zealous and confident. *By that very confidence we may be lured into a dangerous inactivity of which our alert and desperate foes will not be slow to take advantage.*

And so we come to you with earnest appeal. Take heed that no feeling of security shall tempt you to abate your efforts. From now until the counting of the votes has ceased, *Work*. Inspire your friends by your own activity. See to it that the canvass in your neighborhood is thorough and that every Republican ballot is polled and counted. *"Push things."*[17]

The political cynicism and ideological poverty identified with this era by Matthew Josephson, Ray Ginger, and others are reflected clearly in the over one hundred replies to the Arthur circular which are preserved in the author's letterbooks. Dozens of respondents asked the Committee frankly for a monetary consideration to inspire personal loyalty and activity. As one Republican put it rather typically: "My time is money." Many others sought funds to bribe Democrats, Greenbackers, the Irish, and the "floating vote." The possibilities for purchasing votes must have been plentiful. One physician wrote to Arthur: "I have organized a good working force in the town. But many of these doubtful voters are so for commercial purpose or for the purpose of being well cared for on the Day of Election—and that is the way they must be reached. I fear the funds from our county committee will be insufficient for all I wish to accomplish."[18] Many New York Republicans obviously understood the mechanics of political power in the postwar period, and desired merely to imple-

[17] This circular is found throughout the third letterbook. In two cases Arthur made revisions of circulars, and it may be that as state chairman he played a major role in creating each of the committee's appeals. The revisions are in letterbooks (III, 516, 583).

[18] M. Hatch to C. A. Arthur, Oct. 26, 1880 (III, 142); D. F. Evarts, M.D. to C. A. Arthur, Oct. 25, 1880 (III, 192); see also E. C. Spaulding to C. A. Arthur, Oct. 27, 1880 (III, 157). There is no indication of a single favorable reply by Arthur.

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ment victory in the fashion long associated with General Grant's friends. Later revelations of Republican chicanery during the campaign in Indiana (to which Arthur was privy) illustrate the orthodoxy of the proposals received and filed by the vice-presidential candidate.[19]

III

Although not otherwise famous for great energy, Chester Arthur devoted much effort to the campaign of 1880, and, with the aid of a few clerks, kept up with his voluminous correspondence effectively and handled local details with thoroughness and dispatch.

He informed one writer that his committee could not provide physical equipment for local campaign clubs. Several inquirers were advised that the committee could not afford either to subsidize New York newspapers or found additional ones.[20] He replied to dozens of requests for funds to return New Yorkers home to vote.[21] He personally ordered a large supply of pamphlets disparaging the probity of Democratic vice-presidential candidate William English. Upon request he recommended a man for a job in the Post Office, solicited a civil service transfer for another, and acquired a copy of a veteran's discharge papers to assure his party of one more vote. In addition, he complied with the normal flood of requests for pictures and autographs, kept a sharp eye on the petty cash, ordered campaign flags mailed upon request, and found time to congratulate the father of new twin boys named Garfield and Arthur.[22]

[19] *The Nation*, Feb. 24, 1881, p. 122; Hoogenboom, 205-06.

[20] [Chester A. Arthur] to J. A. Parker, Oct. 22, 1880 (III, 701); [Chester A. Arthur] to "Harden," Oct. 2, 1880 (III, 871); [Chester A. Arthur] to "West," Oct. 2, 1880 (III, 920).

[21] The committee, for reasons of cost, refused to make such expenditures. See Secretary [Chester A. Arthur] to Chauncey M. Depew, Oct. 25, 1880 (III, 589); [Chester A. Arthur] to J. W. Douglas, Oct. 23, 1880 (III, 812). There is evidence that Republican clerks in Washington were given reduced fares by certain railroads to return to New York. John Hammond to Republican State Committee, Sept. 27, 1880 (III, 303). Some Republicans raised funds to send voters home for the election. [Chester A. Arthur] to "O'Connor," Oct. 20, 1880 (III, 636).

[22] Handwritten telegram message, E. M. Johnson [Chester A. Arthur] to Murat Halstead, Sept. 9, 1880 (III, 555); [Chester A. Arthur] to [Thomas L.] James, Oct. 8, 1880 (III, 919); Secretary [Chester A. Arthur] to Secretary of the Navy, Oct. 14, 1880 (III, 320); memorandum written by Arthur, "Disbursements by

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While Arthur did not leave New York during the campaign, and made not a single major address, we may now conclude that he was an active and significant participant in the narrow Republican victory of 1880. His administration of the Conkling-Grant tour through Ohio and Indiana no doubt played a major role in the party's success within the Midwest. His efficient leadership in New York was unquestionably a large factor in winning this state and the national election. His participation in the political assessment business sharpens the contrast between the Conkling henchman demanding a three-dollar tithe from a night watchman on a state construction crew, and the dignified President of the United States, three years later, signing the first significant civil service act in the nation's history.

Mr. Reed," listing secretarial expenditures totalling $7.77 (III, 265); A. J. Woolidge to Chester A. Arthur, Sept. 20, 1880 (III, 23); [Chester A. Arthur] to [Eugene] Birdsall, Oct. 23, 1880 (III, 792).

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A Note on Economic Trends in Indonesia*

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Contrary to prevalent impressions, certain indicators suggest that Indonesia did not orient her national economic system in all dimensions along the lines of a Communist model during President Sukarno's tenure. While reliance on domestic and international Communist forces kept increasing, a monetary policy persisted which strengthened the private sector of the economy, the country's bourgeoisie. Specifically, credit allocations by the Central Bank of Indonesia—an agency of governmental policy—imply a noticeable shift toward private enterprise economy with the share of the public sector shrinking.

In order to detect changes in attitude toward the private sector versus the public sector several approaches were considered: (1) analysis of the composition of gross domestic capital formation by the type of purchaser as private sector or public sector; (2) analysis of employment by the private sector versus the public sector; (3) analysis of consumption expenditures by the private sec-

* The author is indebted for assistance in developing the analytical framework of this essay to Professors Albert G. Hart, Alexander Erlich, and Harold Barger of Columbia University. The research was supported by Ford Foundation and Danford Foundation fellowships. In addition to the works cited, this article draws on Eliezer B. Ayal, "Private Enterprise and Economic Progress in Thailand," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, XXVI (1966), 5-14, and I. G. Patel, "Selective Credit Controls in Underdeveloped Economies," *IMF Staff Papers*, IV (1954-55), 73-84.

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tor versus the public sector. Lack of data prevented a systematic analysis along these more conventional lines, however. Eventually a new method was developed utilizing the ratio of change in domestic credit for the governmental sector *to* change in domestic credit for the private sector. (Somewhat similar conceptually is the indicator suggested by U Tun Wai.[1] That indicator is derived by dividing the monetary system's claims on the private sector over national income.) The newly coined "national economic organization policy indicator" reads:

$$\text{NEOPI} = \text{change in the ratio of } \frac{\text{domestic credit for governmental sector}}{\text{domestic credit for private sector.}}$$

Analysis of credit allocation is largely determined by the institutional setting. In countries with developed banking facilities and practices, the traditional tools of monetary policy, such as the discount rate, open market operations, and variable reserve requirements, can be effectively employed. In underdeveloped countries, however, where banking systems are less sophisticated, selective controls of bank credit appear to be the practical alternative.[2] And precisely because of its overriding role, selective credit control enables us to deduce the economic policy of the Indonesian government. Periodic changes in monetary policy may be viewed as an indication of the government's economic policy in support of one sector at the expense of the other, and in a larger sense, as a reflection of changes in governmental attitude regarding rational economic organization.

The allocation of total domestic credit between the public and the private sectors in Indonesia is presented in Table 1 (following text). From the outstanding accounts of private business and the outstanding accounts of the governmental sector we can observe their expansion through the decade 1954-63.[3] The year-to-year computation of the ratio of credits for the government to credits

[1] "Interest Rates in the Organized Money Markets of Underdeveloped Countries," *IMF Staff Papers*, V (1956-57), 249-50; see also E. M. Bernstein, "Latent Inflation: Problems and Policies," *ibid.*, I (1050-51), 8-9.

[2] I. G. Patel, "Monetary Policy in Postwar Years," *ibid.*, III (1953-54), 73-84.

[3] No comparable data are available since 1963.

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for the private sector illustrates the relative weight of the two chief borrowers.

The analysis is based on data provided in the "Monetary Survey" section of *International Financial Statistics*.[4] Here figures are given for "Domestic Credit," which is composed of two groups: "Claims on Government (Net)" and "Claims on Private Sector." The "Reconciliation of Annual Data" shows a detailed breakdown of all domestic credits. Given all accounts of the government, the reader can see how the "Claims on Government (Net)" is composed of borrowings from and deposits with the Central Bank, commercial banks, savings banks, post office deposits, and the like. The "Claims on Private Sector" is less complex because the whole amount of funds is channeled through commercial banks.

One may infer from these indicators that, as a whole, the decade under investigation does not show that in Indonesia an increasing share of the domestic credit went to the public sector at the expense of the private sector. On the contrary, the share of the private sector was slightly greater in 1963 than ten years earlier in 1954. Even more indicative, when contrasting the first half of the period (1954-58) with the second half (1959-63), one finds a significant decline in the ratio. Numerically, the decline in the average annual ratio[5] is from 3.396 to 2.232. This represents a shift away from the public sector and toward a greater emphasis on private business.

An objection to drawing conclusions from the computed ratio might be based on the occurrence of sizable inflation. It is conceivable that under inflationary pressure the Central Bank would be compelled to take measures contrary to its basic philosophy on monetary policy. For example, the government, to keep the ad-

[4] Published monthly in Washington, D.C., by the International Monetary Fund; see *Supplement to 1964-65 Issues*, 34-37.

[5] The calculation of arithmetic mean:

$$\bar{X}_{1954\text{-}58} = \frac{1}{5} \sum_{i=1954}^{1958} \qquad X_i = \frac{16.98}{5} = 3.396;$$

$$\bar{X}_{1959\text{-}63} = \frac{1}{5} \sum_{i=1959}^{1963} \qquad X_i = \frac{11.16}{5} = 2.232.$$

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ministrative machinery running, may have to expend a higher proportion of its revenue paying the governmental apparatus even at the expense of productive investments (including social overhead capital). On the other hand, it is also conceivable that private business can influence the monetary authorities to lend to the private sector at a faster rate than payments to public projects and administration increase.

The inclusion of the cost of living index in Table 1 is intended to provide some insight into this problem through comparison with credit allocation data. In the period 1960-62, for example, a sudden increase in the general price level coincided with an increase in the ratio of claims on government to claims on the private sector. A threefold rise in the costs of living was associated with a 58 per cent increase in the public/private ratio. But the opposite case occurred in 1958-60 when a 69 per cent increase in the cost of living index coincided with a 64 per cent decrease in the

TABLE 1

Allocation of Total Domestic Credit Between Public and Private Sector in Indonesia, 1954-1963 (In Billions of Rupiah)

Year	*Claims on Government Net*	*Claims on Private Sector*	*Ratio**	*Cost of Living Index***
1954	9.31	2.99	3.11	41
1955	10.88	4.16	2.62	55
1956	13.16	4.84	2.72	62
1957	18.90	4.48	4.22	69
1958	28.28	6.56	4.31 (16.98)	100
1959	31.81	13.08	2.43	126
1960	30.86	19.89	1.55	169
1961	54.09	29.15	1.86	209
1962	106.48	44.72	2.38	582
1963	248.26	84.40	2.94 (11.16)	1260

Source: *International Financial Statistics, Supplement to 1964-65 Issues*, 34-37.

* Claims on government/claims on private sector.

** The "cost of living index" is defined as the percentage of expenditures necessary to maintain the standard of living of the base period (1958).

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public/private ratio. At any rate, there appears to be no evidence which would dampen the reliability of the above suggested "national economic organization policy indicator."

An important question which does arise from this analysis, however, is whether Sukarno knew that the bourgeoisie was gaining relative strength in his country. Did he build up the private sector of the national economy deliberately, or did some of his associates connive behind his back? Problems of this nature invite further research.

Yet, the value of designing appropriate economic indicators seems apparent. As the Indonesian experience suggests, the analysis of changing trends in the national economic organization of a country can shed light on circumstances relevant to impending changes in the political organization.

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Book Reviews

Government and Revolution in Vietnam *by Dennis J. Duncanson. New York and London, Oxford University Press, 1968.—xlv, 442 pp. $9.50.*

This study, "an inquiry into causes, influences, and motives rather than a chronicle of events" (p. 17), offers much new material and quite a few new ideas on the history of Vietnam. The author, who reads Chinese and Vietnamese, studied many works not accessible to Western scholars unfamiliar with these languages. He also benefited from private sources of information during his stay in Vietnam as counsellor for aid in the British Embassy in Saigon. To some extent this book is a valuable contribution to the literature on Vietnam. Unfortunately Mr. Duncanson's ambition must have been to rewrite Vietnamese history from the beginning to the present, along lines that contradict almost everything on which Vietnamese and Western scholarship have so far agreed. Furthermore, Mr. Duncanson's rewriting of history reveals tendencies that can be described only as anti-Vietnamese and anti-American, the latter in spite of the author's approval of American intervention in Vietnam, which he describes as "unprecedentedly altruistic help" (p. 21). President Roosevelt's demand that Indochina be emancipated after World War II, the author says, was based largely on misinformation. Altogether, American thinking about Indochina was dominated by a mistaken anti-colonialism. The Vietnamese national leaders fare even worse. They were longing for the emoluments and prestige of office,

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but refused to accept responsibilities and instead accused the French of trying to maintain control of Vietnam. Duncanson actually deplores "France's new found haste to grant [independence] to Vietnam" after World War II, which the Vietnamese nationalists, who will no doubt be surprised to learn this, "interpreted as an undignified flight from colonial responsibility on her part" (p. 197). Ngo Dinh Diem's wise refusal to cooperate with the French under the Bao Dai puppet regime is called "disdainful."

More surprising still is what the author has to say about earlier Vietnamese history. In customs, religion, philosophy, language, law, and administration, the Vietnamese appear in this book as mediocre pupils of the Chinese. Their mandarins were more corrupt and less competent than the Chinese. Political unity was brought about in Vietnam "under some sort of Chinese influence and under a Chinese label, rather than by internal forces" (p. 29). The existence of a strong Vietnamese culture before Chinese rule over Vietnam is not mentioned. Instead China is called "the fountainhead of Vietnamese culture, in addition to being the cradle of the nation" (p. 24), two statements whose dubiousness is surpassed only by Mr. Duncanson's belief that Vietnam became independent because China "abandoned it" (p. 40). China's attitude toward Vietnam is said to have been "not entirely passive" but the "commonest motive for invasions by Chinese armies" has been the appeal to the Son of Heaven by Vietnamese emperors who had lost their throne; and these invasions were undertaken "in the hope of bringing about what the Chinese emperors sincerely believed was a righteous settlement" (p. 375). Little is said about the territorial expansionism of every strong Chinese dynasty, and nothing about the efforts of the Chinese to hold on to Vietnam after each invasion, efforts defeated repeatedly by Vietnamese national resistance.

The anti-colonial movements against the French are described in terms hardly different from the most discredited colonial propaganda. All insurrections against the colonial regime were "crimes against the people." The "criminal" motives of the Vietnamese insurgents are contrasted with the "undoubted humanitarianism of the French military" (p. 119). The killing of some French officers by the indigenous garrison at Yen Bay in 1930 is called murder; the slaughter of the entire garrison by the French is not mentioned at all. Duncanson merely says that the government "reacted swiftly." Insurrection came about not because of existing intolerable social and political conditions but rather because of "foreign encouragement," and more often than not it was mere "banditry." The Communists are described as "foreign-oriented," and

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their movement is said to have been started "for Russian reasons of state" (p. 19).

The treatment of the Diem regime, apart from some good descriptive chapters, is no less surprising. Here again the importance of social and political conditions is denied. The country's only problem was how to establish an effective administration. The issue of colonialism and anti-colonialism, overriding all others in the thinking of three generations of Vietnamese nationalists, is called "irrelevant." Diem erred "not by imposing too much government on his people, but too little" (p. 19). His fault was not that he was tyrannical, which Duncanson does not deny, "but that he did not know how to administer" (p. 377). The success of the Vietcong resulted not from lack of social reform and too much political persecution but from "administrative inefficiency" (p. 377). Neither the failure of land reform nor Diem's suppression of village elections caused political harm. On the contrary. Self-determination on the local level was of no benefit to the people—rather it "has been the initial cause of their trouble" (p. 377). To pursue social reforms or work for even minor improvements in the people's lives by "offering medical assistance or distributing aid" revealed a totally mistaken view of South Vietnam's real problems. What mattered was "chasing the enemy" (p. 264). The right road was taken by Diem with his strategic hamlet program, which most observers regarded as a disastrous failure. "Hundreds of thousands of peasants slept every night with new found peace of mind behind their hamlet fences and dutifully gave thanks to the patriarchy of Ngo Dinh Diem for it, as [Nhu's] Republican Youth told them to" (p. 339). But just then Diem, so successful with the people, was deposed (when he should have been saved) "to gratify American opinion." In fact, "it is possible," Duncanson says, that the situation that led to the fall of Diem "was engineered by the Communists with an eye on the U.S. press" (p. 281). We also learn that the CIA "controlled" the Michigan State University Group (p. 280).

In the eyes of the Vietnamese nationalists this must surely be the strangest book yet written by a Westerner about their history and their present problems. It is to be hoped that the sharp controversy this book is bound to arouse will not entirely obscure the author's achievement in some of his descriptive chapters.

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Malaysia: Prospect and Retrospect, The Impact and Aftermath of Colonial Rule *by Sir Richard Allen. London, New York, and Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1968.—xiv, 330 pp. $7.75.*

This book differs from previous works on the same subject to the extent that it continues the story to a more recent date. For the first ten chapters it covers events which are fairly well known and which have been related by authors with a deeper knowledge of the subject. As from 1962 a new phase begins, the period of "confrontation," which was the Indonesians' reply to the creation of Malaysia. The topics covered in the last nine chapters give more scope, therefore, for original research and are particularly useful in describing the relationship between the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia itself. To the British there is much here that is new about the Indonesian attitude toward Borneo. Sir Richard Allen was until 1962 a diplomat and one whose last mission was as ambassador to Burma. His professional training and experience are reflected in this book, which is sound and well documented in matters of negotiation, diplomacy, and the constitutional problems which arise in a multi-racial community. Of the usefulness of the book there can be no doubt; it is conspicuously balanced and fair in its final summary as contained in chapter 19 and the epilogue. The book is well organized, moreover, and concludes with a useful chronology of events from 1600 to 1967.

Where the author is less successful—in his handling of trade and war—he fails to consider the picture of renascent Asia in the modern world. He does not analyze the economic and strategic importance of the whole area between China and Australia. He gives no account, save in very general terms, of the conflict in Borneo between 1963 and 1966; his maps are few and not very informative; and he does not assess the strength of the armed forces which the different nations possess. To that extent the book seems a little remote from Southeast Asia and more suited for the use of students in Wisconsin or Cornell. There is room, in fact, for other books dealing with Malaysia from other points of view. What we miss above all in this book is any but passing reference to China. Chairman Mao rates but a single mention in the index and the Korean War is noticed in only a single page. Is this not Hamlet without the Prince? For the future of Malaysia and of Southeast Asia as a whole, the foreign policy of China must surely be the decisive factor. It is arguable, incidentally (as the author perceives) that Southeast Asia would achieve stability more rapidly if the United States forces were to withdraw from Vietnam. It is their presence there

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that has encouraged the Malays and Malaysians to quarrel among themselves.

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A History of Burma by Maung Htin Aung. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1967.—x, 363 pp. $12.00.

Acquaintances of the former rector of the University of Rangoon and one-time head of the Burma Historical Commission, and especially those who are familiar with his valuable contributions to the literature of Burmese folklore, will be dismayed at his amateurish venture into the field of history. He writes as a partisan defender of the historicity of the traditional Burmese chronicles, which were fashioned to serve dynastic ends rather than to present objective history. In his reaffirmation of the spirit and content of the chronicles, the author ignores the very substantial body of modern scholarly research covering many aspects of Burma's history. Around eighty per cent of the book concerns Burma's history to 1885, reflecting both the spirit and content of the chronicles. In his endeavor to bring the story down to date, he depends upon an uncertain memory and unconcealed personal prejudices. Aside from a brief bibliographical essay covering the successive chapters the author provides no documentation for his *ex parte* account.

Students of political science may be more interested in his treatment of the more recent period. Mistaken details abound in his post-1900 account, items which could easily have been checked by anyone seriously concerned with accuracy. He claims that documentary films were available to Burmese movie-goers in 1899-1904 covering actual events of the Boer War and the Russo-Japanese War (p. 277). He charges that British colonialists tried deliberately to humiliate the Burmese by treating them as Indians; that successful candidates for the Burma Civil Service (including Htin Aung's two distinguished brothers?) became hopeless misfits; that missionary schools regularly favored Christian students in the allotment of both grades and privileges; that Burman troubles with Karens and other non-Burman peoples, which long predated the colonial period, were due to the division and distrust fomented by British rulers and Christian missionaries. The political significance of the Saya San rebellion of 1931 is overplayed. The Simon Commission was operating two full years prior to its alleged appointment in 1931 (p. 292). Dr. Ba Maw's difficult role as minister of education during the university strike of 1936 is not

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mentioned; the Thakin party did not boycott the elections of 1936 (three were elected). No mention whatever is made of the Freedom Bloc organized in 1939 by Dr. Ba Maw and the Thakins. In Htin Aung's account of Burma's post-independence period, presented only in the form of a dialogue between editor and author, all the actors are presented as national heroes, following the traditional spirit of the royal chronicles.

The author's motivation for such a prejudiced performance may be easier to surmise than is the puzzling collaboration of the reputable university press in its accomplishment. Htin Aung's traditionalist approach is apparently calculated to find favor among persistent xenophobic elements currently prominent within Burma's government and society. There is every reason, of course, to encourage indigenous scholars of the newly independent countries of Asia to write their own history, provided they are willing and able to undertake serious research and the critical evaluation of sources. Htin Aung fails on both counts.

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The Taiping Ideology: Its Sources, Interpretation, and Influences *by Vincent Y. C. Shih. Seattle and London, University of Washington Press, 1967.—xix, 553 pp. $10.00.*

This scholarly publication, mainly tracing the sources of the Taiping (TP) ideology, is a masterpiece of Professor Shih, an authority on Chinese literature and philosophy. The Taiping Rebellion (1851-64), one of the largest uprisings in the history of mankind, furnishes a starting point for the study of China in transition, and initiates a century of rebellions and revolutions. The rebel leader Hung Hsiu-ch'üan was inspired by some knowledge of Protestant Christianity. His relative Hung Jen-kan, with many missionary friends in Shanghai and Hong Kong, was better informed about the Western religion and governments and was a pioneer of China's modernization movement. Which culture, Chinese or Western, has had more influence on the TP leader? Shih has traced every major aspect of the TP religious, political, economic, military, and social systems, and has concluded that at the rock bottom of the TP's mental structure was the traditional Confucianism, interspersed with popular Buddhism, Taoism, vulgar beliefs, and superstitions. This thesis is well supported by his extensive quotations and

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judicious dissections and is agreed to by the reviewer. Although occasionally Shih's ambitious attempts to prove this TP idea derives from Lao Tzu and that idea from Mo Tzu, this poem from Tao Yuan-ming and that land system from Juan Yuan, are not convincing, and although there are a number of factual and typographical errors, they do not hurt the overall value of this volume.

One point which may be discussed, however, is the nature of the *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo* or Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace. To Professor Shih the Taiping movement was not a revolution but a rebellion and "it would be doubly objectionable to call it a 'peasant revolution.' " Shih's reason is that "for a movement to be called revolution, not only must violence be the means for bringing about change, but the leaders must show a desire to make changes" (p. xiv). These are apparently his prerequisites for a revolution.

He also, however, seems to make contradictory statements: "The Taiping system of land ownership is revolutionary" (p. 233); " 'The Land System of the Heavenly Dynasty' indicates that the writers had a genuine feeling for the people and a sincere wish to better their lot; the Taipings tried to accomplish this aim by common sharing of all goods" (p. 234); "The Taipings, who believed themselves mandated by Heaven, were certainly eloquent in expressing sympathy for common people, thus making their ideology very appealing to the people at large" (p. 295).

From these statements, the TP seems to be revolutionary. Moreover, the TP not only used violence to get rid of imperial governors and generals in more than ten provinces, but also showed their desire in their economic and political program for a primitive communism to share property, to have a democratic form of government and equality of sex. Shih says, "This idea of economic equality is truly amazing."

Peasants comprised a majority of the Chinese population, and served as a vanguard in uprisings to better their life. Their blood was shed in vain, because it was usually a few, educated, bourgeois leaders who harvested the peasants' contribution to the rebellion but forgot the peasants' basic desire for which they fought at the start. In tsarist Russia peasant revolts were endemic; in agrarian China peasant insurrections were cyclic. Many such manual workers occupied the main positions of the TP leadership as well as their following. Professor Shih says, "Peasant participation alone does not make a campaign a peasant movement" (p. 442), which may be true. It is true, too, that the Taiping movement was different from the German peasant war, the *Bauerkrieg* of the fifteen-twenties. Some scholars have measured Ori-

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ental institutions by European counterparts and thus denied the existence of feudalism *(feng-chien)* in China. If Chinese girls have a beauty contest but none of them can measure up to the Western standard of size of chests and hips, can we say that China has neither beauty nor such a contest?

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Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, 2 Vols., *edited by Howard L. Boorman and Richard C. Howard. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1967-68.—xv, 483, ix, 481 pp. $20 each.*

The biographical approach to Chinese history, particularly to those periods where we are only now beginning to put down preliminary guidelines, has proved a most fruitful one. Twenty-five years ago, when the Ch'ing period had hardly been explored in depth, the appearance of Arthur Hummel's *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period*, a model of organization and presentation, provided beginner and experienced scholar alike with a vital research tool, which remains perhaps the most essential reference book on any China scholar's shelves. Even now, with the rapid expansion of studies on the nineteenth century and with the publication of an extensive monograph literature, it remains the only English language source for many aspects of the history of its period, often fuller and almost always far more reliable than the available Chinese sources.

The need has long been felt for similar reference works covering other periods. For the earlier dynasties as for the Ch'ing, there are extensive and fairly well-organized collections of biographical material to which the scholar can turn as a first resource. For the present century, however, things are far more complicated, and it is no exaggeration to say that it is usually far more simple to find details on the life of a Ming statesman than on his modern equivalent. The appearance of the work under review will revolutionize the situation for the Western and the Far-Eastern historian alike.

The editors and their many collaborators have faced an enormously difficult task. Not only are the sources for twentieth-century history scattered and ill-charted, since modern and contemporary literature has been neglected by Chinese and Western bibliographers alike until very

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recent years; not only was the political condition of China during this period generally so chaotic that the standardized productions of government historiography as compiled in earlier periods could no longer be produced; the editors have had to face the problem created by the fact that many of their subjects are still living and active. Moreover both Communists and Nationalists have a vested interest in their own version of many of the events of the period, and much source material is not freely available.

In spite of these considerable difficulties, the entries in this dictionary on highly controversial figures seem to me judicious, balanced, and impartial. The lengthy article on Chiang Kai-shek, for example, and the equally excellent article on Chou En-lai, seem to me models of scholarly detachment. The violent blacks and whites in which Chinese historical writings on the twentieth century are usually composed are replaced by a much more persuasive scholarly grey.

The selection of persons deserving entries also seems very sensible. Unlike Hummel's emphasis on scholars and writers, I personally find the inclusion of many rather insignificant military figures and the omission of some important scholarly men annoying. But this has after all been the century of the soldier in China, and probably the preponderance of generals does in a sense characterize the period. More important, the authors have made a very brave attempt to include representatives of members of professions who unlike the generals, politicians, and scholars would never have found a place in any traditional work of biography—bankers, doctors, gangsters, actresses, engineers, and even a few overseas Chinese. This, too, helps give an index of the ever increasing diversification of Chinese life which began with the Republican period.

It is more difficult to comment on its convenience as a work of reference. This will not be clear until the appearance of the last volume, which will also include a full bibliography. But the work of editing has been done very well, cross-indexing is full and accurate, and in over a year of regular use I have noted only a handful of minor inconsistencies. When one considers that many of the entries were originally written in Chinese and that there are over a hundred names on the title page, the work of the two editors and their staff deserves the very highest praise. My only cavil is that the use of Chinese characters is, by Hummel's standard, parsimonious. But presumably their inclusion on a wider scale would have escalated the costs of production to an impossible degree. The excellent production of these two volumes reflects great credit, too, upon Columbia University Press.

I am sure that after the last volume has finally appeared we will all

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wonder, as we wonder with Hummel, how on earth we ever managed without it.

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The Anatomy of China: An Introduction to One Quarter of Mankind *by Dick Wilson. New York, Weybright & Talley, 1968.—xii, 327 pp. $8.50.*

Dick Wilson, as editor of the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong) from 1958 to 1964, had an outstanding opportunity to observe the Chinese People's Republic at close range; in addition, he visited the country in 1964. The fruits of his enduring efforts were harvested in a book first published in England in 1966. *The Anatomy of China* is that earlier work, revised, retitled, and up-dated. It is a general survey of contemporary China in its social, economic, and foreign-relations aspects.

Wilson depicts the efforts of the Communist regime to remold Chinese society—completely. He gives credit for achievements in that regard, but suggests that much of the intelligentsia's original good will for the Communists has now been dissipated and finds that the aging leadership has failed to win the rising generation over to the revolutionary way of life it would prescribe. He finds the peasant's life richer than in the past, but with attendant disadvantages. Concluding his section on society, he points up the cost to the nation of the benefits gained thus far, while leaving open the question of just where the balance lies.

As regards the economy's industrial sector, the author gives due credit to the U.S.S.R. for achievements in the first Five-Year Plan, then remarks difficulties encountered as a result of the first heavy reliance upon Soviet patterns. He stresses the important role played by Chinese chauvinism in the country's turn to "self-reliance," and finds that the industrial program will suffer for lack of access to the sophisticated experience of an advanced industrial country.

In the realm of foreign affairs, Wilson finds failures and potential for more failure for Peking's policies. He strikes a final hopeful note by opining that the next generation of Chinese leaders, disillusioned with the present fruitless policy, "will begin to move towards a greater understanding of how the rest of us . . . work and think and live."

There are some errors of fact in Wilson's work, but only a few. This reviewer's main adverse criticism would be that a number of the au-

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thor's judgments with respect to China are milder and less incisive than appear warranted by the facts. For critical instance, he initially gives generous credit to the commune venture, but he offers no analysis of the commune system per se in his later (relatively short) section on China's economy; and he evidences an overall indecision with respect to agricultural prospects in the observation that we shall see a breakthrough in Chinese agriculture only after another thirty years. There is a parallel important shortcoming of this book issued in 1968; despite various references to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (which began in 1966) scattered throughout the text, there is no treatment of that earth-shaking phenomenon as a separate topic, and there has been incomplete integration of what little was added on the matter to what had been written before. In this respect the up-dating has not met the challenge of the changed situation.

But this book, with the bird's-eye view and useful data it offers, remains in sum total a valuable contribution to the understanding of contemporary China.

O. Edmund Clubb
Columbia University

Justice in Communist China *by Shao-chuan Leng. Dobbs Ferry, N. Y., Oceana Publications, 1967.—xvi, 196 pp. $6.50.*

The author has utilized a wealth of documents, newspaper accounts, and refugee reports to piece together an outline of the complex public order system created in China by the triple intermingling of ancient Confucian tradition, a century of Marxist thought, and fifty years of Soviet experience. His narrative carries the reader through the evolution of the *li* and the *fa* of old China, the experience of the first Chinese soviets of the nineteen-twenties and thirties, the period of the United Front with the Kuomintang, and finally the three stages of development of the People's Republic: militant communism, stabilization, and renewed militancy.

To the reader conversant with developments in Soviet Russia there are parallels and contrasts. The first two stages of Chinese Communist rule sound like those of the Russia of 1917 and of the New Economic Policy, but with 1957 comes the shock of something out of the Russian experience. The Chinese denounce the Soviet model and swing back to a new militancy featuring flexibility of law, wide use of conciliation procedures, and abandonment of attempts at codification of law. From this

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reversion to militancy, Dr. Leng observes emerging in 1965 a new interest in stability, but it is crushed in infancy by Mao's "great proletarian cultural revolution" of 1966. This unexpected step seems to the author to be a "desperate measure to postpone the inevitable."

Would that Dr. Leng could have found court practice. He whets the reader's appetite by disclosing the existence of texts systematizing it, but he cannot find them. Nor has any other specialist in the world outside China found them. Readers must content themselves with comparison based on doctrine and personalized accounts. One can only guess that the Chinese tradition of conciliation shows through even today to keep many cases out of court, while the tradition of police authority also keeps many criminal cases out of court. If this guess proves to be correct, Soviet and Eastern European Marxian Socialist law will be seen to rest on a different tradition. China and Eastern Europe stand united in the same "legal family" but subject to quite different historical influences.

In spite of the lack of judicial evidence, the reader can put down this book feeling that Dr. Leng has performed a notable service, for he has made the new Chinese legal system less enigmatic than Westerners have previously thought it was.

JOHN N. HAZARD
Columbia University

Competitive Interference and Twentieth Century Diplomacy *by Richard W. Cottam. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967.—243 pp. $5.95.*

Competitive Interference and Twentieth Century Diplomacy is an important contribution to the literature of American foreign policy for three fundamental reasons. First, it deals with an urgent and recurring problem, namely the issue of intervention and nonintervention in the conduct of a nation's foreign policy. Second, it adds to the growing literature of theories of international relations which still has had little apparent effect on the making of policy. Third, its author embodies in his approach concern for area studies with attention to the central issues of international politics.

The first question is one which has baffled American policy-makers and the public since the beginnings of the republic. The whole debate between isolationists and internationalists arose from the governing con-

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cepts in the minds of people concerning what our role should be in the affairs of the outside world. The idea of no entangling alliances assumes that the healthiest kind of foreign relations are no relations at all. In fact, this notion proved from the earliest days to be both impractical and unnatural for a growing continental power. In those very periods when we talked most about isolationism and noninterference, we were building up a broad network of economic, cultural, and social relations with Europe and other parts of the world. Severely formulated views about intervention and nonintervention have never been practical for states, since, given the attitudes and programs of other nations, an American posture of noninterference is, in effect, a guarantee of an interventionist regime by others at many points on the globe. In the same way, to push forward an absolute concept of intervention is to postulate an approach to other nations that in practice must be a blend of some interference with some restraint, no matter the power of the intervening state. The virtue of Professor Cottam's study is that he tries to deal with discrimination, quantitatively as well as qualitatively, with the capacities of states to intervene in the affairs of other states. He sets up types and categories of interference and indicates on what basis these are likely to be employed with success or failure. A section entitled "Tolerance Levels of Interference" is particularly useful in this regard. It helps to define "those acts of interference which go beyond a peoples' tolerance threshold . . ." (p. 77).

Following the Second World War a principal characteristic of international studies was the attempt to put forward ordering concepts and theoretical principals. Now, two decades later, it seems clear that none of these approaches is wholly satisfactory. Indeed, part of Professor Cottam's study is devoted to pointing up the limits and irrelevance of theoretical works of men like Hans J. Morgenthau. Failures, if they are such, will not excuse political scientists from undertaking to put forward their own more valid and useful theories. This is precisely the effort Cottam has made in offering a theory of American foreign policy on problems of interference. What is most notable is the extent to which Cottam, even while rejecting earlier theoretical efforts, builds upon them in his own analysis and theorizing. Thus, for example, he makes use of Gabriel Almond's idea of an "attentive public" and of some of the concepts of Morgenthau on power and influence even while questioning their validity for a more sophisticated study.

A final quality worthy of note is Professor Cottam's use of data and findings from the area studies field. He is himself a specialist on Iran and the Middle East, having served for two years in the American Embassy

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in Iran. His first book, *Nationalism in Iran*, is more nearly an area study than a work in international politics. Yet in his effort to advance views about long-range strategy, the use of power as a leverage in extending the influence of states, and in analyzing the improvement of the institutional base of American diplomacy, Cottam calls into play his knowledge of several foreign areas. It would be difficult to underestimate the value of the specific findings that someone familiar with a foreign area can bring to the analysis and study of international politics. More efforts of this kind would be welcomed, for they help to refute the popular criticism that theory must, for all time, be abstract and remote from reality.

KENNETH W. THOMPSON
The Rockefeller Foundation

Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900 *by Robert L. Beisner. New York, Toronto, and London, McGraw-Hill, 1968.—xvi, 310 pp. $6.95.*

Robert Beisner has written a thorough study of anti-imperialists who comprised a highly interesting and relevant group in the nation's history. This volume stresses the social, cultural, and political alienation of a dozen men who were unable to translate their alienation into effective political pressure on matters of foreign policy.

Two components of the movement are dissected. The Mugwumps (Schurz, William James, Godkin, Norton, Atkinson, and C. F. Adams) emerge as an elderly, politically naive, but courageous group which tended to see the struggle as a replay of the battle against slavery a half-century before. They bucked not only the diplomatic, but some of the social, cultural, and economic currents of their time; the diplomatic was simply the most tangible issue politically. The chapter on James is especially good, perhaps because he is intellectually closest to our own time. The second component group were the dissident Republicans (Hoar, Carnegie, Harrison, Boutwell, Reed, and Sherman) who found themselves trapped between party loyalty on the one hand, and, on the other, revulsion against "imperialism" and the new, dominant elements within the Republican party.

Professor Beisner has accepted and built upon Fred Harvey Harrington's pioneering work of thirty years ago, emphasizing Harrington's thesis that factors of a constitutional, "moral and political nature" were fundamental. He has gone beyond Harrington in exploring economic

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thought (particularly in a provocative section in the essay on Atkinson) and in detailing a racism which was as prevalent here as it was among the Roosevelt-Lodge expansionists. His analysis of the secondary themes of the anti-imperialist program is indeed one of the major contributions of this book. For example, he shows how most anti-imperialists were imperialists in such areas as Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Hawaii, concentrating any protest almost entirely on the Philippine issue.

The author also observes how William McKinley short-circuited many anti-imperialist moves either through personal charm or political manipulation before the protests could become effective. This volume demonstrates once and for all that the anti-imperialists and the President were not at all far apart on the broad issues. The American consensus was hard at work. In this respect the book is too narrowly defined, for it does not explore the Cleveland-Olney dissenters on the Democratic side nor—more important—the objections raised by men who occupied the political spectrum between the Bryanite Democrats and the Debs-de Leon factions of the American Socialist movement. There is little here on those who were less hung up on the eighteen-forties and who looked instead to a twentieth century where that consensus might be at least questioned if not effectively challenged politically. "The Anti-Imperialists" in the title of this book means those who were half paralyzed from the start because, for all their distaste of their own America, they would protest only within a particular political-economic consensus, including even a two-party system. In other words, this book is about some anti-imperialists, not the anti-imperialists. Within this defined subject area, Professor Beisner has produced a good, useful, and exceedingly well-written volume.

WALTER LAFEBER
Cornell University

The World of Andrew Carnegie: 1865-1901 *by Louis M. Hacker. Philadelphia and New York, J. B. Lippincott, 1968.—xxxvii, 473 pp. $8.95.*

If you believe that America's peculiar version of capitalism is a heavenly dispensation and that industrial productivity is proof of grace, you will find comfort and support in Louis Hacker's survey of American economic life in the late nineteenth century. *The World of Andrew Carnegie* is in large measure an idiosyncratic textbook devoted to that thesis. Under such standard headings as government policy, agricul-

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ture, and urban growth, the first three-quarters of the book catalogues a variety of information about the American political economy. The effect is rather tedious. Without secondary themes to integrate the material, the organization seems to lack a clear logic, the standards of selection appear arbitrary, and the repetitions become irritating. What cohesion this portion of the study does enjoy derives from a steady stream of particular, explicit judgments of books, men, and events, judgments that mark these pages as uniquely Louis Hacker's. The final quarter of the volume, far tighter and far more interesting, details the rise of Andrew Carnegie as king of the steelmakers. Both the man and his empire emerge sharply from an account that makes fine use of primary sources. Whether or not you find the scrappy Scot as wise or as masterful an administrator as the author does, you can still appreciate the excitement of a story well told.

In his introduction Hacker states that he has written a very different book. Citing William Graham Sumner, he promises a reconstruction of late-nineteenth-century American *mores*. Quoting Herbert Butterfield, he rejects "the subordination of the past to the present" and sets as his objective "making the past our present and attempting to see life with the eyes of another century than our own." On the contrary, Hacker has written history from the top down and from the present backward. The only *mores* he considers are those of the industrial chieftains and their apologists. The values of other Americans are either ignored as irrelevant or condemned quite literally as wrong. He is alternately scornful and savage with various dissenters—"utopians" and "inadequate" men—whom he evaluates not with reference to their own time but according to the canons of contemporary economics and conservative ideology. His most cutting remark is that a reformer had once failed in business. The rationale for such an interpretation lies in the wonders of the modern American system. To achieve the productivity and the economic freedom of today, Americans simply had to pay the price—a minimal price, he claims—of rampant industrialization after the Civil War. The glories of the present justify the hardships of the past. Hacker, in other words, prefers winners. The losers after all lost.

ROBERT WIEBE
Northwestern University

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Poverty and Politics: The Rise and Decline of the Farm Security Administration *by Sidney Baldwin. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1968.—xvii, 438 pp. $10.00.*

It is "quite misleading," says the author, "to discuss the rise and decline of an agency in terms of life and death" (p. 363). Nevertheless, this is what *Poverty and Politics* is about. "From the very beginning," he writes,

> the FSA was perceived, especially by its leaders and defenders, as the "social conscience of the New Deal." Far more than other New Deal agencies, the FSA drew its ideological nourishment and its external political support from the loose alliance of liberal, labor, and social welfare groups upon which the New Deal itself rested heavily. By the end of 1942, with the New Deal on the brink of oblivion and with the vectors of opposition to the FSA converging, the agency arrived at Armageddon (p. 364).

This excellent book is a case study penetrating fields called public administration, political science, and history. Master of his materials, with keen insights and sensitivity to universal questions that resist universal answers, the author relates infinite factual detail skillfully and writes beautifully.

How is one generation to evaluate the performance of a preceding generation? The "visionary optimism" of those who inspired and served the FSA

> was a defiant and blasphemous faith which is generally viewed today as naive or quaint by many presumably sophisticated poverty warriors. Lacking . . . faith, the social and political innovator is tempted to flee from conflict and find refuge in feasibility and in a preoccupation with administrative minutae and, perhaps, personal careerism. There is a tendency, perhaps, for concern about institutional equilibrium maintenance, and survival to lead to conservatism. The leaders of the FSA, on the other hand, were risk-takers. In the eyes of some of its critics, the agency pursued a quixotic quest for the unattainable. However, even if the maladjustments of society are to be merely "managed" and not "solved," both a will and a way are necessary—political power, administrative means, and some of the optimism of a Don Quixote (p. 419).

Surely some of the problems of poverty that FSA tried to solve within rural society, and was withheld from solving, rise up to plague us in another form in our urban centers today.

The FSA met strong resistance both within and outside government. Internally the

> growing power of the FSA within the USDA; the development of a special clientele possessing considerable political potential; . . . fears and resentments of people in hundreds of rural communities who believed that their

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> own social status, prestige, political power, and profits were being threatened by uplifting those beneath them ... were some of the anxieties [that conferred upon the FSA a] subversive image (p. 262).

The "power structure within agriculture," the extension services, state land grant colleges of agriculture, and the American Farm Bureau Federation "in the long run ... represented an important source of danger to the life of the FSA" (p. 286). The "developing rapport" between the FSA and the National Farmers Union, a "major competitor" of the Farm Bureau, only added to the "schizophrenia" within the USDA. Was the Agriculture Department to serve the needs of the more successful farmers and also the less successful, more needy ones, or was serving the latter a threat to the former?

One small inaccuracy only met the reviewer's eye. The Tolan Committee was created on April 22, 1940, to "investigate the interstate migration of destitute citizens"; its shift in name and emphasis to the "impact of the national defense program" came later (p. 345).

The author calls the migratory labor camp program "one of the most distinctive and provocative programs of the FSA" (p. 383). The reviewer wishes that *Poverty and Politics* included as intensive a treatment of that program, which was oriented heavily toward the West and Southwest, as the author's characterization of it implies it merits. Hopefully he will get around to that subject next.

PAUL S. TAYLOR
University of California, Berkeley

Men Who Govern: A Biographical Profile of Federal Political Executives *by David T. Stanley, Dean E. Mann, and Jameson W. Doig. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1967. —xiv, 169 pp. $3.95.*

This book draws a portrait of the personal and occupational background of the federal political executives appointed by five presidents—Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson. The total number of executives thus surveyed totals slightly more than 1,000 individuals, who received some 1,600 appointments to federal executive positions. The 180 positions filled by these appointments include the secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and general counsels of the major executive departments, as well as the chief administrators of selected agencies outside these departments and the members of seven independent regulatory commissions and boards.

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Much of the statistical data presented confirm established impressions regarding the top leadership of American bureaucracy. Political executives commonly come from urban, Eastern, and Protestant America. As contrasted with business executives, their background is likely to be the field of law rather than science or engineering. President Eisenhower drew more heavily on the ranks of business for his appointments than did the other presidents surveyed. President Truman, on the other hand, relied much more than other presidents upon career civil servants for his appointments.

Somewhat more surprising, perhaps, is the finding that political executives come to their posts with considerably more background in governmental administration than is commonly believed to be the case. Almost two-thirds of the appointees had had a median of five years of experience at the time of their first appointment. Some readers may also be surprised to find that political executives are even more likely than career administrators to restrict themselves to working for one agency.

But anyone with an appetite for surprises is well advised to dine elsewhere than on the contents of this book. One very strong impression that it leaves is that the authors must have kept a very tight rein upon their intellectual curiosity to have been satisfied with penetrating so thinly into their subject-matter. The data presented in this small volume are the sort one might expect a research assistant to be charged with gathering as background for a serious and wide-ranging study of the role and activities of political executives in the national policy process. The three authors of this book are, as their other work reveals, serious and talented scholars. It could hardly have stretched their intellectual muscles to prepare this manuscript for publication.

FRANCIS E. ROURKE
The Johns Hopkins University

Party Leaders in the House of Representatives *by Randall B. Ripley. Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1967.—xiii, 221 pp. $6.75.*

This is a useful book in several ways. For a member of the House such as myself it is encouraging that affirmative attention is being given our little understood legislative assembly. This is no minor matter. Second and perhaps foremost, Dr. Ripley's book is full of substantive and helpful historical facts about the evolution of the House *qua* institution that

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most have forgotten. Memories are thereby refreshed and this, in turn, offers a fruitful opportunity for deeper perspectives regarding the House, that complex and fascinating coordinate body of the Congress. Third, the book demonstrates the extraordinary disparity between conclusions of competent observers of the institution depending on whether they look from the outside or from the inside as members. One example must suffice. Dr. Ripley writes on page 3: "Since the beginning of Franklin Roosevelt's administration, the House leaders of the President's party have, in effect, acted as lieutenants of the President, accepting virtually his whole legislative package and working for its adoption." Based on inside experience, I can authoritatively comment that during the period since 1949 on major matters this was almost wholly untrue of the legislative conduct of Speaker Rayburn of Texas. However, Dr. Ripley furnishes a precisely accurate description of Speaker McCormack's conduct in this respect. Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy soon learned to consult Speaker Rayburn prior to making major proposals. Conversely, in my view, John McCormack of Massachusetts, speaker since 1961, is President Johnson's "ambassador" to the House. A fourth and a most important usefulness of the book are many passages which reveal how difficult it is for even a competent outside observer, such as Dr. Ripley, to discern what is really happening from what appears to be happening. His description of vote-counting procedures in connection with major legislation is so narrow and oversimplified as to make quite clear that unless members of the House are prepared to be much franker in public it is hopeless to expect that the reality of the legislative process will ever be known to students and observers, much less the general public. Despite my caveats, Dr. Ripley's impressively researched book deserves to be read and retained by students of the House of Representatives.

RICHARD BOLLING
U. S. House of Representatives

Presidential Primaries: Road to the White House *by James W. Davis. New York, Thomas Y. Crowell, 1967.—xii, 324 pp. $2.95.*

This study of the presidential primary system by James W. Davis provides much worthwhile data, even though there are some flaws of research.

Mr. Davis finds that the growth in influence of presidential primary politics has come from a greater mass media impact on nominations, along with the influence of opinion polls.

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The author traces the American nominating process from the caucus through the convention system to the modern primary-convention hybrid process. He argues for some kind of "model" laws such as the Florida statute (based on the principle of delegate responsibility).

Primaries and campaign strategy are analyzed in terms of the types of situtations a candidate finds himself in (presidential versus out-party, organization-supported and independent). The highlight of this discussion is a thought-provoking comparison between the FDR pre-convention campaign of 1932 and the Kennedy campaign of 1960.

Other topics dealt with by Davis are the hazards of campaigning, obsolescence of "favorite-son" candidates, the independent candidate (an excellent discussion), the unannounced or undecided candidate, presidential nominating finances, and prospects for presidential primaries.

Presidential primary campaigning costs have become "a critical problem for the candidate of modest means," Davis says. He observes that

> as early as 1920, Republican aspirant General Wood spent a total of about $743,000 in the 13 primary states in which he campaigned. Campaign expenses have continued to rise as jet air transportation, chartered buses, enlarged publicity kits, increased mail and phone costs, higher office rents and hotel bills, large office staffs, and the high cost of television broadcasts consume huge bundles of money (p. 204).

Davis reviews the problem of getting information about primary expenses, despite existence of the Federal Corrupt Practices Acts, and notes that the Heard study of this subject, even though thoroughgoing, had limits. The author details specific expenditures of candidates from 1912 through 1964, and finds there is still much room for broadening the base of campaign contributions.

The author refers to the 1966 presidential campaign finance law (part of the "Christmas tree" tax bill) which "permits the individual taxpayer, by marking an 'X' in a corner box on his income tax return, to allocate one dollar of his income tax (or two dollars for joint returns) to presidential campaigns." The "deceptively simple" plan could be a bonanza for the two major parties, but as of May 1967 it was under fire in Congress, so that its future is cloudy. It seems possible, however, that some kind of action will eventually be taken to shore up financing of the campaign process to help preserve the two-party system.

Davis' work shows a prodigious amount of effort, and although it has a few minor flaws in footnoting it makes a helpful contribution to our knowledge of presidential primaries.

WILLIAM C. SPRAGENS
Wisconsin State University, Oshkosh

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The 50 States and Their Local Governments *edited by James W. Fesler. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1967.—xviii, 603, xi pp. $8.50.*

Among the many kinds of gaps with which the public is exhorted to concern itself, one of the most important is that between the experts' pool of knowledge and the layman's need and apathy in the field of government, particularly state and local government. Most attempts to close the gap run into trouble. The subject is immense; there is difficulty in condensing or summarizing it without oversimplification; the many facets of any analysis overwhelm the reader.

Professor Fesler and his seven collaborators have found a way to deal with the problem. What they have produced is as packed with facts as a small encyclopedia, but as exciting as a report from the battle lines. They have looked at state and local government with both the telescope and microscope, and they see the broad aspects and specific problems. They have looked at the interconnections as well as the forms. They look at the present in the light of the past, but with a keen sense of future change. They have described, interpreted, and appraised with the sure hand of scholars and with objective concern for more effective results.

The device that enables them to accomplish so much, apart from such unseen procedures as good planning and relentless editing, is the utilization of a kind of systems approach. They look at the broad problems of the country and how they are dealt with by the several levels of government, what roles state and local governments have come to occupy, and how they and the national government relate to each other and among themselves. Then the mechanism of government is examined as a set of systems.

What emerges is a tremendous panorama: the great resources and diversity of our many governmental units, the problems with which the various units of government deal, the successes and shortcomings evident in dealing with those problems, the multiplicity of movements for reform and improvement.

Out of this emerges still another level of observation which yields some conclusions that all politicians and thoughtful citizens ought to ponder. The United States has the most complicated set of governmental institutions in the world. They need constant upgrading and change to meet changing needs. Second, we have more government than people can handle effectively. We need to do some streamlining and we need to increase the amount of citizen attention and participation in government. Third, the fear that state and local government will be swallowed

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up by a single central government is groundless; state and local government (except for defense) far overshadow the federal government and are growing more rapidly, but there is constant change in the roles performed by the several levels of government. Finally, people who think that government may get so big that it will overwhelm individuals and become unresponsive or who think that the problems of our increasingly complicated society will become so tangled that they defy solution will get from this book some perspective with which to judge their concern and the antidotes to apply.

NEIL STAEBLER
Ann Arbor, Michigan

From Sacred to Profane America: The Role of Religion in American History *by William A. Clebsch. New York, Evanston, and London, Harper & Row, 1968.—xi, 242 pp. $5.95.*

Clebsch, professor of religion and humanities at Stanford, has written a plucky book. Depressed by the disposition to see American religious history as the synthesis of denominational setting-up exercises, and scornful of mere "copular" attempts to link American religion with American reform or the American economy, he endorses a functionalist approach which "construes religion as integral to society and society as embracing religion." In six case studies he develops the argument that the central dynamic of many American endeavors has been religious; but, partly because the world is wayward, and partly because religious aspirations are inherently transcendental, the long-term results of these endeavors have been profane successes, the despair rather than the vindication of later religious generations. He thus rejects the notion that America has simply become more "secular," in favor of a continuing dialectic between the sacred and the profane.

He makes his best case in discussing education. Religious men helped create schools and colleges to increase piety only to see their institutions increasingly define success in terms of personal achievement and societal well-being. Clebsch' section on the drive to foster "participation" and a sense of "personhood" also yields revealing insights. The churches, he argues, took the lead in stressing the rights of women and children, and gave greater stress to the importance of the family than had been characteristic of the natural and civil law. Yet today some church leaders complain that the denominations wallow in "effeminacy and infantilism," and seem positively fixated on the value of "familiality."

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They ought to acknowledge, he concludes, that these failures of the present are only measures of past successes.

Clebsch also employs his paradigm to explain a persistent attribution of novelty to American experience; a prudential morality; an American nationalism unlike any previous nationalism; and a commitment to pluralistic culture as well as pluralistic religion. He is unevenly persuasive. It is true that he is trying to give new order to a particularly unkempt field. But he is also, at least for my tastes, a little capricious in his selection of illustrative material, and a little careless with names and dates. More fundamentally, his point of view seems somewhat blowsy; Henry Mencken, Richard Niebuhr, Thorstein Veblen, and George Santayana tug him in different directions both intellectually and stylistically. Still, his book is a suggestive attempt to theologize social history.

ROBERT D. CROSS
Swarthmore College

Prayer in the Public Schools: Law and Attitude Change *by William K. Muir Jr. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1967.—ix, 170 pp. $5.95.*

In June 1962, on the last day of the term, the Supreme Court handed down its decision ruling unconstitutional public school recitation of a non-sectarian prayer formulated by the New York State Board of Regents. By that time the *Schempp-Murray* cases, involving Bible reading and recitation of the Lord's Prayer, were well on their way to Supreme Court determination. With the expectation—held by most students of the subject—that the Court would similarly rule these practices unconstitutional, Muir decided to engage in a before-and-after exploration of how the Court's ruling would affect the attitudes of decision-makers in the school system of a Midwestern city. (The city is given a fictitious name in the book, but enough descriptive details are supplied to enable the knowledgeable reader to make a fair guess at its identity.) This book is an account of the study and the conclusions reached by the author.

For his work in the field of public law upon which this book is based, the author received the 1966 Edward S. Corwin Award of the American Political Science Association, and the award is undoubtedly merited. There have been studies of compliance and non-compliance with Supreme Court decisions; Gordon Patric's account of the impact

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of the *McCullom* decision and Frank Sorauf's of *Zorach* v. *Clauson* are excellent examples in the church-state field. This study, however, appears to be the first exploration of what effect, if any, a major Supreme Court decision has not on conduct but on attitudes, at least in the church-state area.

Muir's method was to engage in in-depth interviews with some twenty-eight public school administrators (members of school boards, superintendents, and principals), and as a control group five non-sectarian private school headmasters. Each respondent was interviewed twice, once before and once after the *Schempp-Murray* decision was handed down. The interviews encompass not only the respondents' subjective reactions to the decision, but also a narrative of the events that transpired before and after the decision, for example, meetings of the school board, the advisory opinion of the board's legal counsel, the wavering positions of city and state officials and the school board members' reactions to them, and the like.

The author's conclusions are not particularly startling. Major Supreme Court decisions do affect attitudes, although, expectedly, more to reinforce than to change. However, the attitude changes which the author describes are not in respect to commitment to the validity of the decision, legally, morally, educationally, or politically, but to compliance with it. Moreover, as to these, the changes appear to be more indirect than direct consequences of the decision, they are based on such factors as the extent of commitment to compliance by lawyers and political leaders, the threat of legal action in case of non-compliance, and so forth.

The style of the book is annoying, at least to this reviewer. Muir, on the basis of two interviews, draws rather detailed and highly impressionistic character sketches of his respondents (for example, "Berman, the Jewish junior high-school principal, clutched at a version of reality with a ferocity equal to Miss Fitzgerald's desperation. The first Jew to obtain a school principalship, Berman had been ravaged by his rise to the top"). Muir even recounts imaginary conversations between his respondents. The whole thing gives the book something of a semi-fictional tone. Nevertheless, as a pioneering effort, it is very much worthwhile.

LEO PFEFFER
Long Island University

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American Legal Realism: Skepticism, Reform, and the Judicial Process *by Wilfrid E. Rumble Jr. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1968.—xiv, 245 pp. $6.75.*

The book makes a valuable contribution to American legal philosophy. It reviews a controversy about the nature of the judicial process which reached its height in the nineteen-thirties prior to President Roosevelt's attempt to pack the Supreme Court. During that period thousands of pages were written, mostly by law professors, attacking the nineteenth-century conception of the common law as a system of principles derived from past decisions, growing more certain year after year as these principles were analyzed and applied by trained lawyers and judges. The ideal of the supremacy of a separate science of law over the sovereign of a nation was the great contribution of England to civilized society. It was the unwritten constitution of England.

When our federal government was formed a written constitution defined and limited its powers. But early in our history Chief Justice Marshall in *Marbury* v. *Madison* informed Congress, in much the same way as Coke informed King James, that it was the Supreme Court which had the authority to interpret the Constitution and Congress had to follow that interpretation. All this was summarized in the phrase "The Rule of Law above men," which represented the philosophical bedrock of our judicial process.

In the first decade of the twentieth century our industrial society had outgrown the rigid logic of common law principles. Roscoe Pound at the Harvard Law School and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in the Supreme Court were among the first to recognize this fact. Holmes announced that the life of the law was not reason, but experience. Pound advocated what he called "sociological jurisprudence." What they meant was that judges should substitute a modicum of common sense for slavish adherence to obsolete precedent. But put in those simple terms the idea destroyed the image of a judiciary administering a rule of law above men. Holmes and Pound seemed bent on destroying the ideal of Law as a great repository of impartial principles.

It was after the great depression that judicial realism got its momentum. It became apparent then that the standard law school curriculum was hopelessly out of date. The curriculum divided law into separate fields. Partnerships and corporations were separate subjects. Equity was a separate subject for study. At Yale William O. Douglas (now an associate justice of the Supreme Court) combined half a dozen separate so-called fields of the law into a single course called "Business Units." Wesley Sturges did the same thing in a course called "Credit Trans-

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actions." The abstract principles of the law were treated as a vocabulary which meant different things, applied to different situations. The industrial or economic situations to which the so-called abstract principles of the law were applied rather than the common law principles became the center of attention. Those changes in legal curriculum were, I think, the most significant result of the legal realism of the nineteen-thirties.

In order to justify these changes in the study of the law, the notion that the established formula or principles of the common law represented the perfection of human reasoning had to be abandoned. And thus emerged the philosophical controversy about legal realism. How could the judiciary claim that the law was a separate science which only the judges had skill and training to unravel and apply, after having knocked down the principal ideological support for a separate branch of learning called the law? Faced with this dilemma the judicial realists rode off in all directions. At Yale Robert Hutchins obtained money for what was called an Institute of Human Relations. Human relations, of course, included the law. Psychiatrists, psychologists, anthropologists, and economists were consulted and gave lectures in law schools. Law schools became more interesting and exciting because of the legal realists. The profound changes in our attitudes toward the established principles of the common law which occurred during the depression resulted in an outpouring of philosophical literature and controversy. That literature is analyzed by Mr. Rumble in elaborate detail. He has performed his task exceptionally well.

THURMAN ARNOLD
Washington, D.C.

Labor Politics American Style: The California State Federation of Labor *by Philip Taft. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1968.—viii, 288 pp. $7.00.*

The state federation of labor, as Dr. Taft notes, is a special kind of grass-roots institution found only in the United States. State federations exercise little influence on local and even less on national and international unions; they have no power over their affiliates. In most cases they operate on a meager budget, with no power to levy assessments or to collect per capita dues. And yet they have served as important arms of the labor movement, in lobbying activities, in applying political pressure on elective and appointive officials, and as a means through which organized labor has made its views known to administrative

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agencies. The earliest federations were those established in New York (1865) and New Jersey and Massachusetts (1879). The California State Federation of Labor, founded at the turn of the century, has long been one of the most active and efficient of the state federations and merits the attention Dr. Taft devotes to it in this study which is one of the Wertheim Publications in Labor History.

As might be expected, Dr. Taft has written a useful, thorough, and scholarly account of the California State Federation which is obviously intended as a reference work. Even so it is unnecessarily pedestrian. It contains more information than insight, more facts than illuminating judgments. The narration proceeds in a straight line, with one fact placed after another, much as a bricklayer might construct a sidewalk. It need not have been written in this manner. For example, Dr. Taft could have enlivened the narration no end, and with no sacrifice of scholarly detachment, by telling his readers a bit about the cast of characters. For those who knew them in their "prime" it would be difficult to imagine a more colorful cast, for it includes such well-known names (to Californians at least) as Paul Scharrenberg, John F. ("Jack") Shelley, Hugo Ernst, George Kidwell, Ed Vandeleur, J. W. Buzzell, Harry Bridges, Jack Tenney, Harry Lundeberg, Einar Mohn, P. H. McCarthy and many others. Just a few details about the more prominent members of the cast would have added a significant dimension of interest. Dr. Taft might have told his readers that Jack B. Tenney of Los Angeles Musicians Local 47 (pp. 72, 119), who served as chairman of the notorious Tenney Committee which was used by sections of the leadership of organized labor to red-bait the opposition and, in many cases, to silence it altogether, began his California career as the composer of "Mexicali Rose" and last made the headlines as the vice-presidential nominee of Gerald L. K. Smith's anti-Semitic party. A few details about Tenney's career as a labor politician would certainly have been in order. Similarly Dr. Taft refers throughout to P. H. McCarthy without mentioning the fact that he was known to two generations of San Franciscans by the colorful and accurate sobriquet of Pin Head McCarthy. The reader learns quite a lot about the career of Ed Vandeleur but he never meets the man. Such intensely interesting and remarkably able leaders as George Kidwell and Harry Bridges are merely two names in this narrative.

As to the politics of the State Federation, I would offer mild criticism of Dr. Taft's handling of two major issues. It is true, as he writes, that the labor movement always *said* that it wanted to organize farm workers in California; it is also true that it tried to organize them, at intervals, without much determination, but never succeeded. My reading of

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the record is that the labor movement never really wanted to organize farm workers, as shown by the fact that it never put much money, muscle, or effort into the task. Organized labor in California for a long time derived an advantage from the fact that farm labor was associated with inferior status; "white men" would not take "stoop labor" jobs, for which racial and other minorities—Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos, Mexicans, Hindus *et al.*—were regarded as culturally and biologically well adapted. The effect was to seal off the urban labor market against potential competition. Largely because of this policy the State Federation was able to win the acquiescence of the farm groups in various legislative measures in which labor was interested. In each instance the farm groups insisted, as the price of their acquiescence, that the proposed legislation should except farm labor from its provisions. Also it seems to me that Dr. Taft is much too gentle in dealing with the role that organized labor played in anti-Oriental agitation on the West Coast. In league with the Native Sons (and Daughters) of the Golden West and the Joint Immigration Committee, organized labor played a highly successful game of racial politics in California for many decades. To understand how this game worked, one would have to supplement Dr. Taft's acount with other reading.

Among Dr. Taft's most valuable insights are some extremely perceptive statements about the growth of industry in California. For example, he notes and properly stresses the enormous impact that World War II had on California's industrial expansion, largely because so much of the fighting was in the Pacific. The impact of World War II in California started earlier, was more intense, lasted longer, and had greater effect than in any other state. Between 1940 and 1944 the federal government invested over one billion dollars in aircraft plants, shipyards, steel, synthetic rubber plants, and other facilities. And—a most important point—California did not convert to war production but expanded old plants and built new ones, principally the latter. It should be added that the war in Korea had much the same effect and for the same reasons. As in so many other aspects of its history, California has always been "the great exception," the constant beneficiary of a variety of windfall benefits that at first blush appear to have been fortuitous but, on a closer look, turn out to have been consequences of its geographical position or its history or its climate or its amazingly rich and varied resources.

Dr. John T. Dunlop points out in a foreword to this volume that we need more such histories of state federations as well as central labor councils, as these bodies are likely to become more important as a consequence of the growing role of legislation, administrative decisions,

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and political developments at local and state levels in affecting the welfare of workers. I wonder if this projection is sound. There are signs, here and there, that state federations and local councils are finding it increasingly difficult to win the concurrence of the unions in whose names these bodies speak. In the 1968 election, for example, the California State Federation rejected the endorsement of Jesse Unruh, the extremely influential Democratic leader and Speaker, for re-election to the State Assembly although he was endorsed by the Los Angeles County Federation. In disgust, Unruh said of the State Federation—which purports to represent 1.5 million organized workers—that it "hasn't enough political muscle in the state legislature to get a Mother's Day resolution passed." This is not, of course, an accurate statement, but even so the influence of the state federation has steadily declined, largely because it cannot secure the backing of its affiliates. In this same election the State Federation endorsed one candidate for State Senator from San Francisco, the local labor council another. New conditions may well force organized labor to fashion stronger vehicles for state and local political action than the old-style federations and councils that now dot the landscape.

CAREY MCWILLIAMS
New York City

Economic Failure, Alienation, and Extremism *by Michael Aiken, Louis A. Ferman, and Harold L. Sheppard. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1968.—vi, 213 pp. $7.50.*

This is a slim volume—an impression that forms both upon receiving it and upon reading it. The work represents a good try, on an important problem; unhappily, it tries to do too much with too little, and the outcome is an unpersuasive, disappointing book.

The authors set themselves three tasks, all centering around an analysis of 305 interviews with workers (260 whites and 45 Negroes) who were discharged when the Packard Motor Car Company closed in 1956. These workers, who were interviewed some twenty-seven months after the shutdown, were old, poorly educated, and relatively unskilled; hence they experienced serious re-employment difficulties. The authors seek (1) to determine the connection between the individual's background statuses, labor market experience, and economic deprivation, on the one hand, and the dependent variables of alienation and political

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extremism; (2) to assess the influence of race; and (3) to examine two major interpretations of extremism (the mass society thesis and the economic insecurity argument—the former emphasizing the worker's low social integration and the latter emphasizing financial resources and market uncertainty).

The analysis is most successful on the first of these problems and least successful on the third. It is shown, for example, that age was the crucial factor determining the post-displacement market experience, an experience whose dimensions can be partially grasped by noting that only forty-five per cent of the sample was actually re-employed at the time of the interview, almost one in four *never* found a job, and thirty-two per cent were "two-time losers" who had found and again lost a job. More important, the authors sustain the view that economic deprivation is a crucial intervening variable; it is through deprivation (loss of savings, increased debt, and cutback on essentials) that the market experience is translated into feelings of anomia and retreat from friends and relatives. On the whole, the two-time losers suffer the most; and interestingly enough, race in itself is not a powerful factor.

So far, so good; but the specifically political portion of the work then suffers an accumulation of weaknesses. The mass society thesis, for example, cannot really be assessed without data on secondary group memberships, and with so minimal a review of the available evidence. Further, a single question (asking whether the government should have taken over the plant) is, indeed, "a weak and limited indicator of political extremism" (p. 114), as is the single question (about Senator Joseph McCarthy) as a measure of "anti-democratic orientations." The authors are surely right in saying, at several points, that the analysis is not "conclusive" (for example, pp. 97, 114).

One intriguing mystery: the "never re-employed" workers fared *better* than most (for example, they were lowest in both political alienation and anomia). These results appear to violate some well-accepted creeds —for example, that the tie to the workplace "is the most fundamental and essential of all social relationships" (p. 65). Perhaps these men (generally older) simply made their discharge an occasion for retirement, a change in engagement with the workplace to which they (somehow) rather readily adjusted.

Happily, the book involves enough such mysteries and problems—for example, the conception and measurement of alienation, or the stress on objective deprivation as against feelings and perceptions—to keep the reader thoughtfully occupied.

MELVIN SEEMAN
University of California, Los Angeles

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The Doctor Shortage: An Economic Diagnosis *by Rashi Fein. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1967.—xi, 199 pp. $6.00.*

Bargaining for Health: Labor Unions, Health Insurance, and Medical Care *by Raymond Munts. Madison, Milwaukee, and London, University of Wisconsin Press, 1967.—viii, 320 pp. $7.50.*

Rashi Fein argues cogently that the demand for physicians' services is not the same as the demand for physicians. People want good care, but this does not mean the physician is needed to do every procedure along the way. Economist Fein's differentiation goes to a basic policy-making issue in the health field. Yes, more doctors are needed, but simply producing more doctors would be about the most costly way of meeting demand for physician services. For years, fearing federal influence through grants for medical education, the American Medical Association contended there was no need for such an effort because there was no doctor shortage. Recently the AMA conceded the fact of a shortage and urged an "immediate and unprecedented" expansion of medical schools. A substantial increase in graduations would be necessary not only to meet demands expected through 1975, but also simply to maintain the current ratio of 150 MD's to one hundred thousand population. In 1966 the estimated unmet need was 50,000 physicians. (The United States has about 300,000 MD's now, but not all render personal health service.) Such estimates, however, are based on current patterns of organization and utilization of physicians' services; these are not irrevocable. Producing more doctors, as a single strategy, may have the advantage in some eyes of leaving patterns of organization, delivery, and financing of care in their old grooves. On the other hand, to improve the efficiency of physicians—even a few per cent would save manpower equal to that of a year's graduates—would require profound changes all along the line, in hospitals, medical teaching, health insurance plans, government programs, nurses' training, and the like. The nation now is groping for a means of developing a strategy for efficiency, mainly because rising medical-hospital costs have an enormous impact on Medicare, Medicaid, and other government programs. Fein's diagnosis puts the focus where it belongs, on physicians' services; he sees that many services customarily performed by MD's might be done by subordinates, such as registered nurses or assistant doctors (now being trained at least at one medical center). As a logical supporting step, such services under MD supervision should be covered by private and government health plans. Another recommendation is for magnifying physician productivity through group practice arrangements. In their closed-panel, prepaid form, these have been

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favored by labor unions and abhorred by fee-for-service medical conservatives. In existence for decades, group practice has had spotty success; by and large, middle-class Americans have afforded (or have not challenged) the inefficiencies of traditional medical economics. For a discussion of group practice potentials and pitfalls, turn to *Bargaining for Health: Labor Unions, Health Insurance, and Medical Care* by Raymond Munts. A former union organizer who joined the Wisconsin economics faculty, Munts contends that organized consumers should bargain with the health industry over the manner in which services are provided, rather than with insurance companies over premiums and benefits. For "prepayment divorced from the provision of services can inflate the cost, and even encourage the poor practice of medicine," he says. He criticizes many labor-management plans for focusing on the wrong targets and he maintains that their attempts to secure benefits solely for their own clients often are inimical to balanced growth of health services in the community. To both Munts and Fein, irrationalities of organization are major causes of shortages and poor care. This is where public and private planners should train their sights. More doctors are needed, but probably far fewer than some think.

MAL SCHECHTER
Washington, D.C.

Tom Rivers: Reflections on a Life in Medicine and Science *an oral history memoir prepared by Saul Benison. Cambridge, Mass., and London, The M.I.T. Press, 1967.—xxi, 682 pp. $17.50.*

This book is significant both for its content and for the approach to historical research that it represents. Dr. Thomas Rivers (1888-1962), a native of Georgia, was for many years director of the Hospital of the Rockefeller Institute. In his work on viruses he was one of the leaders in American medical research. Much of his own research was concerned with polio virus; in his later years he became one of the most important advisers to the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis, and played an influential role in the programs that led to the development of the Salk and Sabin vaccines. He was a man of immense vigor and energy, friendly but irascible and pugnacious, "a curmudgeon," in the words of Dr. Benison, who here sets down the record of the career of Dr. Rivers as told in his own words during the course of tape-recorded interviews.

This book is thus an oral history memoir, and is part of "a systematic attempt to obtain from the lips and papers of living Americans an ex-

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pansive personal record of their participation in the political, economic and cultural life of the nation" (p. viii). Dr. Benison, inspired by his teacher, Professor Allan Nevins, has devoted himself to recording oral histories of leaders in American medicine. Because of the speed of modern travel, and the ease of communication by telephone, many events that would formerly have been recorded in personal letters and other documents may now be transmitted only in talk from one individual to another; the written and printed documents, bulky as they are, may give no indication of many vital aspects of the true course of events.

Oral history, however, is far from being merely a record of the spontaneous responses of the person interviewed. It involves an arduous study by the historian of the available written records, so that he may see and define the relevant historical relationships. He is then prepared to question his subject intelligently, to frame questions concerning unrecorded aspects of recorded events, and to see interconnections that would not otherwise be apparent. In this instance Dr. Benison made an intensive study of the published work of Dr. Rivers and his associates, and also had access to much unpublished material in the files of various leading workers at the Rockefeller Institute and elsewhere. Dr. Rivers, of course, checked carefully the typed versions of the interviews.

These interviews give the scientific autobiography of Dr. Rivers in freely flowing, uninhibited talk. He provides illuminating pictures of many of the leading figures in virus research and related fields, from Simon Flexner to Jonas Salk and Albert Sabin. Many sharply controversial episodes are relived in vivid detail. The voice is that of a powerful individual, with strong convictions and strong prejudices; Rivers speaks of many of his colleagues with the warmest admiration; of some others, with sharp criticism. Dr. Benison provides numerous footnotes to place some of these criticisms in perspective. Rivers, for instance, offers a sharply hostile view of the famous bacteriologist Hideyo Noguchi; in the footnotes Benison records the views of Peyton Rous and Peter Olitsky, who provide a very different and far more sympathetic view of Noguchi.

This is a document of great interest for all who are interested in the development of medicine and medical science in our time. In setting it forth, Dr. Benison is well aware of the limitations imposed by the personal prejudices of the speaker and the fallibility of human memory. It is not in itself history, but it is splendid material for the historian. I look forward to other similar autobiographical records from leaders in American medicine whom Dr. Benison has interviewed.

JOHN T. EDSALL
Harvard University

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Harper's University: The Beginnings, A History of the University of Chicago *by Richard J. Storr. Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1966.—xvi, 411 pp. $8.95.*

From its beginning, the University of Chicago has been the beneficiary of good fortune. At its founding (second incarnation) it not only enlisted the dedicated services of two indefatigable Baptist workers in the vineyard of higher education, Thomas Wakefield Goodspeed and Frederick T. Gates, but it attracted the never-to-be-underestimated power of John D. Rockefeller's money and of William Rainey Harper's educational leadership. Now the University of Chicago has again had good fortune in the choice of its historian. Richard J. Storr's effort will rank with the excellent institutional histories of other great universities by other first-rate historians, Harvard by Morison, Wisconsin by Curti and Carstensen, or Yale by Pierson.

It is no derogation of Storr's achievement to point out that he in turn was fortunate as author and historian. The principal actors in the university's founding, separated by a thousand railroad miles between New York and Chicago, produced a steady stream of letters which have provided Storr with mountains of primary source material. The first president's administration, cut short by the onset of cancer, provided a circumscribed time period of little more than fifteen years to be covered in a book of four hundred pages. Add to these ingredients generous amounts of time for research and a supply of research assistants and the result is a chef d'oeuvre of institutional history.

Yet, social scientists and historians interested in the generalizable aspects of the history of education may find this history not entirely suited to their tastes. It is rather more narrative and descriptive than analytical and interpretive. The particularistic and biographical elements are stressed to the relative neglect of the social, cultural, or educational context of the two decades straddling the beginning of the twentieth century. Absorption in administrative, organizational, and financial problems overshadows the play and interplay of basic educational ideas. Some readers will not be overwhelmingly interested in the minute details of negotiation whereby the founder was persuaded to put up more money to cover deficits blithely incurred by the big thinking of the president. But these are matters of reading taste.

I found most intriguing, and therefore particularly good, the discussions of early academic plans for graduate and undergraduate programs together with their realization or frustration, the development and fate of the professional schools, the schemes for affiliation, and the clash of ideas over educational policy. I wanted more discussion

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of this kind; I hoped for comparison of the Chicago way with the contemporary Harvard, or Columbia, or Cornell, or Wisconsin ways. I wanted a bit more emphasis upon generalization about the Chicago experience in relation to what Stuart Hughes calls the "central grouping symbols" in the history of higher education. But one cannot do everything. Perhaps the first years of a new institution are inevitably devoted primarily to financial, administrative, and building matters.

In a sense, though, Storr is a prisoner of his own good fortune as historian. Faced with a precious mass of primary material he naturally makes the most of it, but in relying heavily upon personal correspondence he reflects what administrators are interested in when they write business letters to one another. It is tantalizing and a bit frustrating to witness in great detail what Goodspeed wrote to Rockefeller or what Gates wrote to Harper, while knowing that just off stage in the academic wings are men like John Dewey, George Herbert Mead, Harry P. Judson, James R. Angell, J. Laurence Laughlin, Albion W. Small, James H. Tufts, James H. Breasted, Paul Shorey, and a host of others in that galaxy of Chicago's early faculty, busily engaged in their intellectual and educational endeavors. We glimpse such molders of the ideas of our times only as harassed administrators or frustrated professors.

But I am talking about another kind of history of higher education. Professor Storr accomplished admirably what he set out to do. He has recorded faithfully and fully, with skill and imagery, the beginnings of *Harper's* university.

R. Freeman Butts
Teachers College,
Columbia University

The Concept of Representation *by Hanna F. Pitkin. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1967.—vi, 323 pp. $7.50.*

By explaining different uses of the concept "representation" Hanna Pitkin has produced a major contribution to the study of representative government. Her book properly begins with Thomas Hobbes, for he gave "the first extended and systematic discussion of representation in English." With certain qualms and inconsistencies detected by Mrs. Pitkin, Hobbes advanced the "authorization view" of representation,

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the view that concentrates on the formality by which representatives are appointed. This view strongly favors the rights of representatives over the represented, since the act of authorizing representatives serves as a license for their actions. Mrs. Pitkin examines some modern proponents of this formalism, the *Organschaft* theorists, theorists of democratic representation like Tussman and Plamenatz, and Eric Voegelin in a class by himself. She concludes that the "authorization view" is only partly true because it cannot satisfy our desire to call certain authorized governments non-representative. It must be corrected by attention to the substance of representation, and one must ask what the representative is and what he does.

The representative may be required to be a good likeness of the people he represents, fulfilling their desires or at least discovering their opinion. He may, on the other hand, serve as a symbol, like the British king. Taken together these conceptions of what the representative is add to the authorization view; they bring up the importance of resembling one's constituents and the necessity of pleasing them by means of irrational belief. But they fail by themselves to supply reasons by which the representative can guide his action, and it becomes necessary to ask what the representative does. Mrs. Pitkin's book culminates in the search for the meaning of representation as "substantive acting for." She considers and rejects the analogies of the actor, the trustee, and the substitute, and she finds solace in the thought that the actions of the mandated and the independent representative will normally be the same. If in the abnormal case the representative wishes, like Burke, to prefer his constituents' interest to their opinion, he must determine their objective interest. Yet "the modern world," including the author, does not share Burke's elitist belief that political questions have right answers, and it is necessary to yield something to the more recent view that interests are subjective. One cannot yield everything, however, for representation is impossible as an activity unless interests are in some degree objectively determinable. Mrs. Pitkin concludes that the institutions of representation are needed to check on the ideal, and the ideal to inspire the institutions.

The method of this book is "the new way of doing philosophy," and the *cognoscenti* of ordinary language will know how to interpret Mrs. Pitkin's statement that her work is based on J. L. Austin's work but would have been based on Wittgenstein's, had she read him in time. The many who merely speak or speak merely ordinary language will note that her discussion reaches heights of excellence when it considers the extraordinary language of Hobbes and Burke. Indeed, she might have sought the substance of representation in the different conceptions

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they held of the rights of man, for the rights of man seem to make possible that objective determination of subjective interests which is required for representative government. But this possibility is suggested by Mrs. Pitkin's own analysis. It is the special virtue of her work that so well defined an argument has room for so many issues and so much scholarship.

HARVEY C. MANSFIELD JR.
Harvard University

Contemporary Political Science: Toward Empirical Theory *edited by Ithiel de Sola Pool. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1967.—xvi, 276 pp. $7.50.*

In his 1967 presidential address to the American Political Science Association, Gabriel Almond discussed the relations between the older political theory, largely sociological and normative, and the newer, more empirical, and more rigorous political science. Eight other distinguished social scientists were asked to deal with the same question (before plenary sessions of the 1966 convention) with respect to some particular field of political study. It is these papers that have been brought together in the present volume. The editor, who is also one of the contributors, has provided useful introductory statements for each of the chapters, serving to point up the ways in which they relate to each other and to the general theme.

After Almond's own address, which not only explains the difference between the old and the new but also argues for the continuing importance and relevance of the former, the next two papers deal directly with the question as posed, Pool taking the problem of the effect of full political participation on political stability, while Heinz Eulau discusses theories of representation. Classical political theory, Pool finds, holds that full political participation seriously threatens political stability. This proposition, he contends, is negated by contemporary empirical research, in the case of the American polity. While it appears to be supported by studies of developing countries, the reason it holds in these countries is that they lack an important requisite for stability—consensus. Whether there *is* a "classical" view on this subject and if so whether it can properly be derived from Aristotle, Hobbes, and Rousseau, neglecting Bentham and the Mills, to mention no others, seems highly doubtful. Eulau argues that the chief role of theory regarding representation has been negative—to show what representation is not.

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In particular, he condemns Burke. Interestingly enough, his own sketch of a theory is more Burkean than are most of the theories he criticizes.

Herbert Simon and Harry Eckstein deal with the subject in less frontal fashion. But each, in the course of discussing his chosen problem, also makes a substantial contribution to the general topic. Simon does this while arguing, among other things, that the advancement of political and administrative science aids in the accommodation of conflicting values—one of the problems to which traditional theory has addressed itself. Largely using materials and ideas drawn from Max Weber's life and work, Harry Eckstein provides a fresh and original discussion of the problem of where and how to draw the line between detachment and involvement and the further problem of fruitful communication between the practitioners and the scientists of politics.

In another pair of chapters displaying a common approach, Robert Dahl and Lucian Pye enter pleas for the development of theory that will enable us, with our data and our measurements, to evaluate total political systems. Dahl fears that most political scientists who are equipped to manipulate data are not at home in the language of value and tend to underestimate its importance, while exaggerating the reliability and objectivity of their indicators.

Finally, Karl Deutsch and Edward Shils demonstrate theoretical minds at work in highly provocative ways. Deutsch projects and interprets communications data in accordance with his own theoretical framework to find hope for internationalism. Shils, while showing that the valuation of privacy is a modern phenomenon, himself sets great store by it and argues that it is today seriously threatened, not least by proposals for a National Data Center.

The editor's own conclusion from the papers presented is that "normative political theory and empirical political science are not contestants." "They are," he continues, "as a team in tandem when brought to bear on public policy" (p. 230). Taken as a whole, the volume both demonstrates and illustrates the validity of this proposition.

J. Roland Pennock
Swarthmore College

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Political Parties and Political Development *edited by Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966—viii, 487 pp. $8.50.*

The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development *edited by William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham. New York, London, and Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1967.—xi, 321 pp. $6.75.*

Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure *by Frederick C. Engelmann and Mildred A. Schwartz. Scarborough, Ontario, Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1967.—277 pp. $5.95.*

This trilogy on political parties involves developmental and comparative analysis across nations, across time, and across parties. The excellent volume edited by LaPalombara and Weiner contains essays on European parties by Hans Daalder, Giovanni Sartori, Otto Kirchheimer, and Stein Rokkan; on American parties by William N. Chambers and Morton Grodzins; on Middle Eastern parties by Dankwart A. Rustow and Leonard Binder; and on African parties by Immanuel Wallerstein and Rupert Emerson. Lucian W. Pye contributes a general essay on Asian party systems, and Robert E. Scott does the same for Latin America. LaPalombara and Weiner open and close the collection with attempted theoretical statements, first on the conditions facilitating the development of political parties and then on the impact of parties on political development. For the editors the concept *political development* "remains elusive," but what they mainly have in mind is the notion, already adumbrated by Lipset, Almond, Pye, and others, that political development involves a political system passing through crises—crises of identity, legitimacy, integration, participation, distribution, and so forth. Speculating about how some of these systemic crises may have affected the development of political parties provides, to some extent, the major thread for the contributions to this collection of essays.

Still, the essays are highly eclectic. Daalder's paper contains a delightful comment on elitist theories; Sartori's pole-vaulting is exhilarating, and this essay provides a good, hard-headed argument for retaining in the comparative analysis of parties an emphasis on "structural and procedural engineering"; Kirchheimer presents a very thoughtful functional approach; and Grodzins demonstrates the limitations of focusing on party cleavage and consensus for explanations of political change. Rokkan's paper, my nomination for the best of the bunch, contains some very interesting empirical data on Norwegian parties and a ukase which strikes me as the best advice in the book: "Only through . . .

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massive data-gathering and analysis can we avoid the Scylla of hasty overgeneralization and the Charybdis of myopic attention to local and national peculiarities."

The Chambers and Burnham book is an important collection of essays which is activated by developmental constructs and is the direct lineal descendant of the cross-national ruminations of the SSRC Committee on Comparative Politics. In addition to Chambers and Burnham, contributors include Frank Sorauf, Paul Goodman, Richard McCormick, Eric L. McKitrick, Samuel P. Hays, Donald Stokes, Richard E. Dawson, and Theodore Lowi. Chambers lays out the rationale for analyzing the development of American political parties in three stages: the *invention* stage (1789-1815); the *creative* stage (1828-60); and, the *derivative* stage (1865-1967). Then, in a methodological interlude, Frank Sorauf makes three points about research and writing on political parties which strike me as sensible and important. First, he contends that much more research should focus on parties as organizations, in the manner of Eldersveld's Detroit study. Second, he argues that political parties have been given an excessively pre-eminent position in much interpretation of American politics. Third, he questions the utility of functional analysis of parties, including his own earlier interpretations. There follows a very nice essay on each of the three American party systems by Goodman, McCormick, and McKitrick.

The second half of the book consists of essays on selected topics. Hays suggests interpretations of party development utilizing what he calls the "community-society dimension," and he argues in part that American political historians have given unbalanced attention to prominent national leaders, ignoring grass-roots political structures. Dawson's analysis of American states leads him to the conclusion that "socio-economic factors have been related to policy outputs over time regardless of the level of inter-party competition." Lowi discusses the "constituent function" of American parties, and Burnham, outlining five American party systems, ends on a pessimistic note.

Sandwiched between these interesting tidbits is the *pièce de résistance* —an original and imaginative essay by Donald Stokes. Using a statistical model of variance apportionment, Stokes analyzes turnout and the partisan division of the vote in legislative elections in the United States from the eighteen-seventies and, for comparative purposes, for selected elections in Britain. For the nineteen-fifties, Stokes' analysis shows that eighty-six per cent of the variance in voter turnout for congressional elections can be accounted for by national influences, while about half the variance in party voting can be attributed to constituency influences. In Britain nearly half the variance in the party

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vote is assignable to national forces in parliamentary elections. He then demonstrates the secular decline in constituency influences on turnout for congressional elections since 1870 and the corresponding increase in the influence of national forces. Further, he shows the decline in constituency influences on the party vote and the decreasing competitiveness of congressional elections. Stokes concludes by saying that "if the nationalization of political forces has carried less far in America than in Britain it seems nevertheless an outstanding aspect of our elections for Congress over the life of the modern party system."

Canada provides, it would seem, the world's ideal locale for the elaboration of Hans Daalder's dictum: "Politics is an autonomous process that certainly is affected by class factors but is not causally dependent on them." Englemann and Schwartz attempt to demonstrate and account for the sharp bifurcation of class structure and party politics in Canada. The book is framed in an impuissant typological conceptualization which handicaps the authors at the beginning and at the end, but the viscera of the book are interesting and useful, if spasmodically banal, occasionally redundant, and dotted by split infinitives. The authors' efforts to demonstrate the low level of class-party polarization in Canada by adducing secondary analysis of Canadian public opinion polls are intuitively persuasive but methodologically unconvincing. Their explanation for the virtual absence of class-based parties rests on showing powerful regional and ethnic cleavages cutting across class differences, a point already well established by the research of Robert Alford. In addition the book contains a variety of descriptive material on mass media, interest groups, elites, the electoral process, and party leadership.

These three books share one perspective in common. They all consciously deal with the interactions between political parties and their political environments. As Sorauf puts it, "a developmental analysis of political parties looks in two directions . . . it considers the development of the parties themselves," and "it considers the political party not as the dependent variable but as an independent variable—the political party as a contributor to or a cause of the political development of the entire political system." One may have difficulty thinking of a political party as a variable without missing in these three books the point that we know quite a bit about the development of parties, and rather little about their consequences for political change.

SAMUEL C. PATTERSON
University of Iowa

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A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization *by Dankwart A. Rustow. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1967.—xiv, 306 pp. $7.95.*

The large and growing literature on political modernization has been marked by much uncertainty and confusion as to what is really the identifiable heart of the matter, and, in consequence, by much controversy and the pouring forth of many words. With the aid of an advisory committee gathered under Brookings auspices, Dankwart Rustow has sought with considerable success to define the key terms and to reduce the major issues to manageable dimensions; he offers an attack upon the problem which is illuminating and provides a useful framework for further exploration. The possible approaches remain so diverse and the variables so numerous that other scholars will no doubt continue to elaborate their alternative systems.

Professor Rustow defines modernization—a term which he prefers because it is more pointed and specific—as designating "the grand transformation of society and culture that began in Europe toward the fifteenth century" and is now engulfing all mankind. When he adds that modernization denotes "rapidly widening control over nature through closer cooperation among men" and that it is "human history conceived as progress," one cannot help viewing with skepticism his later assertion that modernization is an ethically neutral term. It is impossible to disagree with his comment that at a time when the advanced West is so deeply aware of its defects and dangers, the effects of modernization are morally ambiguous, but "progress" and "widening control over nature" are surely positive rather than neutral concepts. Despite all our doubts and disaffections, how many of us are prepared to deny that modernization does embrace progress, and how many third-world leaders are prepared to forego what modernization has to offer their societies in power and material well-being? Or, a graver heresy, in a world in which values play so large a role, is it really necessary to insist that the terms and concepts we use are ethically neutral?

Professor Rustow contends that if the nation-state, which he sees as the favored political vehicle of our times, is to achieve modernization it must meet three requirements: a sense of identity which provides unity, the creation and acceptance of authority, and enough equality to encourage participation in the common affairs of the community. In addition to exploring the bearing on political modernization of each of these elements, he engages in a provocative discussion of

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the order of precedence of the three in the rounding out of nation-states.

The latter half of the book is devoted to an examination of different aspects of political leadership in the new countries, including a six-fold classification of contemporary regimes and an analysis of charisma, the trend toward military takeovers, and the ups and downs of political parties. Far from coming to dogmatic and single-track conclusions, the author sagely asserts that there is no single pattern of modernization, that the success stories of modernization reflect very different situations and processes, and that still new paths may be opened by peoples now in the early stages of moving into the modern world.

RUPERT EMERSON
Harvard University

An Economic History of Western Europe, 1945-1964 *by M. M. Postan. London, Methuen, 1967.—382 pp. $7.50.*

Michael Postan, professor emeritus of economic history in Cambridge University, first achieved scholarly distinction as a medievalist. As professor he was obliged to lecture on modern history; during World War II he was a civil servant involved in the war effort, and subsequently authored *British War Production* (London, 1952), as well as collaborating on other volumes concerned with the economic history of the British effort in that war. He is thus qualified by experience, if not by training, to write what might be called contemporary economic history.

In the present volume he has, unfortunately, forsaken his earlier training in the institutional aspects of historical experience in order to emulate, and perhaps cater to, modern economists and other social scientists. The work is divided into two parts, uninformatively labeled "Growth" and "The Changing Shape." The first is in large measure a commentary on the statistics assembled by the Economic Commission for Europe, OECD, and other such data-gathering bodies. Part Two continues this tendency somewhat, but is increasingly overlaid with amateur sociology, especially in the three final chapters (11-13, entitled respectively "The Managers," "The Managed," and "Cui Bono"). Nowhere does the reader get a clear picture of the important institutional changes in the West European economy, such as the evolution of the European Economic Community (the Treaty of Rome is dated

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1956 on page 98; the European Coal and Steel Community is incorrectly titled on page 101), the effects of the waves of nationalization after World War II (the subject is not mentioned in the discussion of increasing concentration of the steel industry on page 198), or the growing influence of trades or labor unions (not listed in the index, nor discussed in the chapter on "The Managed").

Postan's volume invites comparison with two other recent publications, Angus Maddison's *Economic Growth in the West* (New York and London, 1964), and E. F. Denison's *Why Growth Rates Differ* (Washington, 1967). The comparison, unfortunately, is vitiated by the facts that Postan had access to the draft manuscripts of the two latter whereas their authors apparently did not have access to his (not that it would have changed anything), and that the other two authors are economists whereas Postan is not. A good, straightforward account of the evolution of the West European economy since 1945 is badly needed.

RONDO CAMERON
University of Wisconsin

1940: The Fall of France *by General André Beaufre, translated from the French by Desmond Flower. Preface by Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1968.—xxi, 215, xii pp. $5.95.*

General Beaufre's title promises both more and less than his book delivers. He has not provided us with a new and detailed account of the military campaign of May-June 1940. "I am not writing history nor reminiscing," declares the author, "but trying to catch an atmosphere." The latter part of his book therefore resembles Marc Bloch's classic essay *Strange Defeat*, except that it focuses more narrowly on the atmosphere at French general headquarters. The first three-quarters of the volume, however, is not directly concerned with the 1940 campaign, but offers a kind of impressionistic autobiographical account of the General's long career in North Africa, at the War College, and as a member of the General Staff. The longest single chapter relates the story of the Franco-British military mission to Moscow in August 1939, and represents probably the fullest and most enlightening account of that mission yet to appear in print. There is also an interesting though occasionally controversial chapter on Hitler's prewar foreign policy.

General Beaufre is described in Captain Liddell Hart's introduction

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as "one of the ablest military thinkers of this era." He is a patriotic French *realpolitiker* who is appalled in retrospect (as he was at the time) by the failings of French military leadership between the wars and in the final crisis. The collapse of the French army in 1940, he believes, "is the most important event of the twentieth century," since it destroyed the balance of power in Europe, opened the way to American and Soviet hegemony, and led to the unfortunate "fashion for decolonization." The General speaks often of "destiny" and "fate," from which nations may escape only through foresight, courage, and the efforts of great men who seek to create a counterbalancing fate. One senses in all this a curious reversion to the historiographical tradition of ancient Greece.

Although General Beaufre is sometimes inclined to play fast and loose with historical facts (for example, he asserts flatly that Hitler intended to commit suicide if crossed in March 1936, and that Hitler spared the British troops at Dunkirk in hope of a compromise peace), this flaw is more than offset by the author's shrewd and pithy comments about the men and events of his time. Gamelin, as the unfortunate epitome of the high command's interwar "complacency and dogmatism," comes off particularly badly. There are provocative suggestions about the failure of French war production in 1939-40; about the confusion and collapse of morale at headquarters that preceded the major breakthrough at Sedan on May 14; and above all about the abortive negotiations with the Russians in August 1939. Besides, the book is highly readable—proving once again that France seems to specialize in producing literate generals.

GORDON WRIGHT
U.S. Embassy, Paris

The Resistance Versus Vichy: The Purge of Collaborators in Liberated France *by Peter Novick. New York, Columbia University Press, 1968.—xv, 245 pp. $7.50.*

Eighty thousand arrests, some 11,000 summary executions and 770 legal ones, nearly 40,000 prison sentences, 5,000 officers removed from the army, rather more than that number of civil servants from the administration—this is a partial accounting of the purge of collaborators that followed in the wake of France's Liberation.

Leaving aside considerations of guilt (peculiarly hard to pin down,

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as the author shows), such figures appear in better perspective when placed beside the 20,000 deportees, four out of five fated to die in Germany; the over 20,000 French men and women "legally" shot by the occupants; or even the 642 men, women, and children murdered at Oradour-sur-Glane. They can be seen in still another light by considering that the Belgians executed nearly twice as many convicted traitors relative to their population, and that all liberated countries jailed more of their collaborators. We are told that in absolute numbers the Belgians arrested almost as many persons as the French, and the Dutch half again as many. In relative terms, 94 out of every 100,000 French were sentenced for collaboration, as against 374 Danes, 419 Dutch, 596 Belgians, 633 Norwegians. By 1951 only one in ten of these French convicts remained in jail; by 1964 none.

As the term suggests, the purge was undertaken as a first step toward purifying and revivifying France. Both were called for, neither quite came about. The Provisional Government (and its successors) carried out the task, "as honestly, as conscientiously, and as well as any group of men could in the circumstances." The author's judgment is convincing; but from his other conclusions we gather that it isn't saying much. The purge satisfied no one. It applied a retroactive legislation that turned necessity into jurisprudence and tortured the latter into reason of state. It enlisted magistrates many of whom were tainted with the very activities they prosecuted or judged. It worked with inevitable unevenness and apparent unfairness. It dragged on too long. It discredited French justice. It bred (though the seeds had been there for some time) what an observer of Laval's botched-up trial recognized as "that disillusioned scepticism which finally renders a people ungovernable."

Professor Novick quotes Camus' bitter plaint that "nations bear the mark of their justice." That of their memories, too, lurching from one bloody retribution to the next. When Profesor Novick remarks that the purge "was the symbol and not the cause of the division and bitterness" in the armed services, he broaches a basic theme of contemporary French history—one which, of course, does not concern him directly. As it is, he has given us a useful book on an important and unpleasant subject. He sketches in the political and legal background of official retribution, devotes a chapter to the oft-ignored "North African Rehearsal," considers the legal and extra-legal activities of government and *Résistance* in the civil service, the armed forces, the press, parties, unions, and among the elected representatives of the people. Among his appendices one finds a judicious analysis of summary execution statistics and a detached (somewhat skeptical?) account of the arguments concerning the legitimacy of Vichy, crucial to the legality of the purge

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(and of de Gaulle's resistance). All is treated as thoroughly as the paucity of available evidence permits, and with great objectivity.

EUGEN WEBER
University of California, Los Angeles

The Americans and the French *by Crane Brinton. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1968.—xii, 305 pp. $6.75.*

The French *by François Nourissier, translated from the French by Adrienne Foulke. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1968.—vi, 312 pp. $6.95.*

In their introductions to an exceedingly complex country, François Nourissier and the late Crane Brinton emphasize the great change that has occurred in France in recent years, "a revolution," according to Brinton, "in many important respects much more complete and significant than those symbolized by Bastille Day, the July Days of 1830, and the focal dates of 1848 and 1870." France in the nineteen-sixties appeared to be confounding all generalizations—even the one about her chronic instability. Yet, true to her past performance, even this most recent and complacent generalization—generally subscribed to by Brinton and Nourissier—was swept away in the tidal wave of protest in 1968.

A key to all other changes—both those producing the advances of the early nineteen-sixties and the instability of 1968—is the sheer number of Frenchmen: a country whose population had remained stagnant at around forty millions for the past century now numbers over fifty millions. One consequence of the larger population is that the age pyramid has changed. Whereas France was the oldest country in Europe in 1938, as Nourissier notes, she has now become the youngest, with twenty million French under twenty-five. An increasing population also signifies growth and poses a challenge to society to provide the additional homes, schools, and jobs to accommodate the newcomers. In this respect, Nourissier's warning, written in 1967, is ominously prescient: "The magnitude of the problem, which could easily have been foreseen fifteen years ago, is still greater than the scope of the solutions."

Concomitant with demographic changes has been a shift in the center of gravity from small town to city, from shopkeeping to large industry and mass production, from a producer-oriented economy to one

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more consumer-oriented. "But," as Nourissier points out, "what has changed above all else is the frame of mind with which we view all this, our psychology, our disposition." In contrast to the past, the new France has embraced the values of realism, empiricism, and pragmatism.

Both authors agree on the fundamental importance of the changes and describe them with grace and humor. Nourissier, more cautiously (and correctly), also stresses their tentative nature and the new problems they create. He alludes to the tensions between the generations, pockets of unemployment, the problem of the aged, and the disadvantages suffered by workers living in a country ruled for over a decade by an authoritarian and conservative leader. He points toward the future when he suggests that "French students form a community mysteriously and perpetually on the brink of delinquency or revolt." Thus, for Nourissier, "if there is optimism now, it is new-born, still fragile and uncertain."

In order to understand both why French society underwent vast changes since World War II and why these changes were massively threatened in the spring of 1968, we need to pay close attention to the political sector, an area badly neglected by Nourissier. Brinton's close examination of French politics is marred by an excessive zeal to defend France's President. Granted that a defense of de Gaulle's foreign policy may be useful for an American audience, which finds it hard to recognize that difficulties between the two countries are not wholly due to the obstinacy of one (albeit admittedly obstinate) man. Brinton also sensibly stresses that friction between the two countries both predates de Gaulle's return to power in 1958 and even his original exercise of power in 1940-45, and can be observed ever since the close of World War I. But why does Brinton consider that violations of democratic norms by the government, such as misuse of the state-controlled television network, simply add up to "the spotted reality of democracy"? What such a breach, and the typical Gaullist disregard for democratic participation, do add up to is a regime isolated from and insensitive to popular opinion. Because Brinton adopts such an uncritical attitude toward the regime, his book does not offer much help in understanding why France was shaken to its roots in 1968. (Moreover, his account of French politics is flawed by inaccuracies about political parties and leaders.) Indeed, Brinton is at his best not delving into diplomatic and political intricacies but rather providing a fast-paced introduction to France. For example, his description of provincial France in the first chapter is an exquisite *hors d'oeuvre*.

Brinton and Nourissier provide fascinating essays on the mysterious

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French character. They are convincing in showing that that character has become somewhat less mysterious recently—although events since their books were published re-establish France's claim to inscrutability. But the social sciences, with their precise and quantitative methods (that Brinton decries as "of little use"), may need to add their austere rigor to the scintillating insights provided by gifted essayists for us to understand the complexities of French political and social life.

MARK KESSELMAN
Columbia University

The French Communist Party and the Crisis of International Communism *by François Fetjö. Cambridge, Mass., and London, The M.I.T. Press, 1967.—xi, 225 pp. $10.00.*

The early history of the French Communist party is now fairly well charted. But what of the party's more recent history? How has the PCF reacted to such events as the death of Stalin, the coming to power of Khrushchev, and the Sino-Soviet conflict? This is the question that William Griffith has put to François Fetjö, and he has answered it at length in a volume that all students of European communism will want to have on their shelves.

The death of Stalin and the events of the late fifties presented the leaders of French communism with a dilemma. Should the PCF follow the Chinese and commit itself to relentless revolution? Or should it be Italian and explore the possibility of a peaceful road to socialism within the framework of democracy? The choice was complicated by the fact that each alternative implied an attitude toward relations with other Communist parties, and particularly with the Soviet party which had traditionally played a leading role. The Chinese road led back toward the re-establishment of international centralization, even if this time under different (that is to say, Chinese) auspices. The Italian way led forward toward polycentrism, and, if polycentrism were to be meaningful, toward a certain democratization of the party organization. The PCF's problem, says Fetjö, has been that it has wanted to create an unholy combination of these two alternatives; it has wanted to be both Chinese in its adherence to international solidarity and Italian in the opportunism of its day-to-day practice. At no time was the party's determination to have the best of both worlds more evident than during the Algerian War. On the one hand, the PCF stubbornly made clear that it would sacrifice the cause of Algerian independence to electoral

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needs within France and to the requirements of Soviet foreign policy. On the other hand, the party's leaders just as stubbornly refuted the heresy of polycentrism and refused to hear of democracy within the party. All this is merely to say that the PCF wanted to continue acting as it had ever since the era of the Popular Front. But if the leaders of the French Communist party had not changed, the circumstances within which the party operated were now fundamentally different. How could one continue to be Stalinist when the leaders of the mother party had become Khrushchevist? Forced to choose between Soviet revisionism and Chinese adventurism, the PCF has moved slowly toward the reconciliation of its revolutionary theory with its reformist practice, an evolution that Fetjö feels it would now be difficult to reverse.

In the process of developing this theme Fetjö treats his readers to a number of highly interesting excursions into the history of communism in France. These scholarly detours raise the book above a mere retracing of the party's line, an exercise which even under the best of guides makes for dreary going. Why have the Soviets persistently ascribed such importance to the PCF, despite the failure of revolution in France? Why does the PCF preserve its support when the conditions that produced the party no longer exist? What does the PCF have in common with the Czechoslovakian party, and how and why does it differ from its Italian sister party? Why were André Marty and later Marcel Servin and Laurent Casanova removed from power? What are the sources and prospects of the pro-Chinese current in the party? What was Thorez' style of leadership and who are the men who now lead the PCF? How do they view Gaullism? And what might be expected of the PCF in the immediate future? These are only a few of the questions the reader will have answered, tersely, ironically, and more often than not with a historical insight rare in students of Communist parties.

ROBERT WOHL
University of California, Los Angeles

French Regional Planning *by Niles M. Hansen. Bloomington and London, Indiana University Press, 1968.—xvi, 319 pp. $12.00.*

This is a useful book on the state of the art of *aménagement du territoire,* as the French call the regional aspects of planning for growth. It does not discuss the actual techniques of regional planning; by and large there are none. There are no regional input-output tables worthy of the name, nor any clearcut technique for "regionalizing" a national

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plan, nor the contrary, aggregating for the nation a series of regional plans. Professor Hansen is a bit on the optimistic side, then, when he claims (p. 250) that his work has "shown how regional planning in France has developed from a postwar concern with decentralizing economic activity into a comprehensive framework. . . ." His book discusses the regional aspects of the Fourth and Fifth Plans, and regional policy, but it is stretching things to say that there is a comprehensive framework of regional planning.

The regional planners have a serious problem; it is never clear whether to push the fast growing regions, growing points or *pôles de croissance* as they are called in France, or to help the lagging regions to catch up. This is the familiar balanced-versus-unbalanced-growth argument in economic development, and there is no easy answer for it in theory or practice. The Fifth Plan calls for a "practical compromise" between helping laggard regions and "giving every opportunity to strong regions whose potential benefits the whole country" (pp. 251, 215, 219).

Hansen's model for regional planning is perhaps a little theoretical. He divides regions into congested (largely Paris), intermediate, and lagging. The congested regions need to be offset by other concentrations; in the French case there is planning for *métropoles d'equilibre*, eight cities arranged in a circle around Paris at a distance of more than one hundred kilometers whose growth should be fostered to stimulate the surrounding area and divert the pull of capital and workers to Paris. There is doubt whether the planners have picked the right cities, or can make such a policy effective against the overwhelming weight of Paris, since the eight metropoles together have a financial weight equal to only one-tenth that of Paris.

Intermediate regions need economic overhead capital (EOC)—roads and utilities—to undergird directly productive investment, while lagging regions require social overhead capital (SOC)—in health, education, and welfare. But the distinction cannot be made rigorously. The west and south of France, which lag, have twenty-five per cent of present industrial jobs, but need thirty-five to forty per cent of newly created jobs to hold a reasonable proportion of the workers released from agriculture by increased productivity. This means investment in SOC, EOC, and directly productive activities. And SOC may merely speed the process of out-migration which has economic advantages but social and political drawbacks.

Professor Hansen's study has one chapter (Chapter 6) on regional structure; that contains useful tables on French regions broken down not into departments, but into the modern superdepartments which

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approximate the old *pays* of France. The succeeding chapters on intermediate and lagging regions contain interesting case studies of Lacq, where the development of natural gas failed to ignite growth; of the Rhone-Alps country, regarded as intermediate; and the old developed region of the Nord, where textiles and coal have fallen on evil days and threaten the developed area, apart from agriculture, with the necessity to start over as a backward region. An interesting account is given of the failure of Lorraine steel to lead to growth, in spite of French theories of *pôles de croissance.*

This, then, is a good book. The reader who comes to it hoping for a statement of regional planning techniques will be disappointed, but it contains an interesting, stimulating, albeit rather inconclusive, statement of regional policy in the French setting.

C. P. KINDLEBERGER
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Social Geography of British Elections, 1885-1910 *by Henry Pelling. New York, London, and Toronto, St. Martin's Press, 1967.—xxxi, 455 pp. $14.00.*

Readers of Henry Pelling's and Frank Bealey's *Labour and Politics, 1900-1906* (London, 1958) will recall a tantalizing foretaste of the work now under review, in the form of a brief but shrewd discussion of religious influences upon British politics. Displaying a remarkable power of sustained research and analysis, Pelling has now subjected the local and regional political ecology of late Victorian and Edwardian Britain (excluding Ireland) to minute examination, with results of prime importance to any historian of the period.

The corpus of the work is a survey by regions (as defined by the geographer C. B. Fawcett, using the 1911 census) and within regions by groups of similarly circumstanced constituencies; these in turn are analyzed even down to the ward level wherever the evidence promises results. So dense a mass of information, with an irreducible element of repetitiousness, might seem forbidding. But there are clear summaries at every logical point, and the significant questions are never lost from view: the role of class, the importance of differing kinds of economic activity and organization and differing social and geographical mobility, the influence of deeply rooted traditions in some places and their absence in others, the effects of relations, economic or political, between a given region of Britain and other parts of the world.

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The complexity and diversity of the picture that emerges is striking. Generalizations are difficult at best, and can seldom be left unqualified. Did the Conservatives win the khaki election of 1900 on a wave of patriotic fervor? Yes, in London and the southeast, but clearly not in Wales, where pro-Boer sentiment flourished, nor in East Anglia, Yorkshire, Devon, or Cornwall, where rural voters seemed comparatively unmoved either way by the war. Home rule helped the Conservatives most in regions nearest Ireland—except for Wales. The presence of military installations or dockyards was by no means as uniformly harmful to the Liberals as one might assume. In some industries workers and management were sharply opposed politically, in others not; at Hartlepools the *Times* found that opposing Christopher Furness, M.P., head of the shipping line, was "like fighting the Pope in Rome" (p. 328).

Not surprisingly, Pelling is especially enlightening on the diverse pressures that promoted or inhibited the growth of an independent political Labour movement. In North England he finds Liberalism still "holding together tolerably well in the region with the strongest and best organized working-class electorate in Britain" (p. 345); the Durham and Northumberland miners were self-sufficient, and opposed to limiting the hours of labor by legislation. Labour's well-known weakness in such proletarian centers as London and Glasgow before 1914 is convincingly analyzed and fresh light thrown upon it; so are the subtleties of Liberal-Labour relations throughout Britain.

British voting statistics are markedly less susceptible to analysis than those of France and the United States, where electoral and census districts coincide and voting patterns within constituencies can readily be traced. Admitting this at the outset (p. 2), Pelling is undeterred, and makes the most of his opportunities. His book is fascinating in detail, and a most impressive contribution in sum.

RICHARD W. LYMAN
Stanford University

The Blast of War, 1939-1945 *by Harold Macmillan. New York and Evanston, Harper and Row, 1968.—xiii, 632 pp. $11.95.*

From the beginning of 1943 to the end of the war, Harold Macmillan was Churchill's deputy, Britain's chief political minister, in the Mediterranean area. In the setting up of a stable French government in Algiers, in obtaining the surrender and cooperation of Italy after the Allied invasion, and in bringing about the end of civil war in liberated

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Greece, he exercised a considerable authority. The man-on-the-spot, more fully aware than those back home of the Allied Command's problems both as conqueror and occupier, he often deliberately ignored or skillfully evaded instructions from London or the wishes of Washington when these conflicted with his own estimates of the local situation. That he was never severely reprimanded for his audacious diplomacy, even when he disagreed with his hero Churchill, testifies to the remarkable correctness of his judgments.

Working with the various French factions in the tragicomic chaos of Algiers, usually in close collaboration with his American counterpart Robert Murphy, Macmillan early gained the confidence of de Gaulle, a major accomplishment in itself. He became convinced that the Allies must work for a French unity based on de Gaulle's ascendancy, not on that of Roosevelt's protégé, the politically obtuse General Giraud. In Italy, given confused orders from Whitehall to push for harsh terms as a condition of armistice, Macmillan, in view of the difficulties expected when the Allies invaded southern Italy, forcefully urged and himself successfully pursued a more moderate course aimed at bringing the Italians as quickly as possible to a position of co-belligerency.

He achieved a close rapport with Eisenhower and with most of the Allied officials with whom he worked. He is generous in his praise of the Americans and regards the creation in Algeria of the foundations of a free and renascent France as the first great achievement of the Anglo-American partnership. In retrospect, however, he is more critical of American policy than he could openly have been during the war. Reviving, though not elaborately, an old controversy, he regrets that in the summer of 1944 American preoccupation with Operation Anvil, the campaign in southern France, deprived General Alexander of the opportunity to follow his strategic plan to break out of northern Italy into Austria. In his concern with the spread of communism in the Balkans and Eastern Europe, which this plan might have checked, Macmillan seems to lack his unusual perspective and entirely ignores developments in this area in the period beyond the cold war. United States suspicion of British colonialism and of the monarchist principle in Italy, and United States neutrality during the British intervention to prevent a Communist take-over in Greece, all indicate to Macmillan a certain naiveté and lack of historical sense. Roosevelt's diplomacy he finds often ill-formed and slapdash. The President's rather underhanded attempt to place Giraud in sole trusteeship in French North Africa at the time of the Casablanca Conference he considers blundering and reprehensible.

Early chapters deal with a mission to Finland, the fall of Chamber-

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lain, London during the blitz, and twenty months of hard but satisfying work at the Ministry of Supply, latterly under Lord Beaverbrook. As undersecretary at the Colonial Office for most of 1942, Macmillan chafed at secondary and undemanding duties until Churchill gave him the Mediterranean assignment. It was, as it turned out, an inspired choice.

Describing a plane crash in Algiers, a beleaguered British embassy in Athens, a victory parade in Tunisia, some labyrinthine and prolonged negotiation, or even day-to-day smaller problems like finding rations and quarters, Macmillan never writes a dull page. He appears to be blessed with total recall; excerpts from letters to his wife add immediacy and some delightful asides; and the book throughout is characterized by an uncommon candor. Of statemen's memoirs of World War II, this is certainly one of the very best.

PHILIP P. POIRIER
Ohio State University

The Working-Class Tories *by Eric A. Nordlinger. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1967.—276 pp. $8.95.*

Professor Nordlinger of Brandeis University is not the only student of politics to be concerned with the nature of working-class support for the British Conservative party. No doubt his study will be closely compared with the subsequently published book by Robert McKenzie and Allan Silver, whose preliminary findings on the same subject had appeared earlier in another form. Like McKenzie and Silver, Nordlinger uses survey data to analyze the kinds of working-class voters who have Conservative rather than Labour party preferences. There is no reason why both works should not be useful contributions to our understanding of British voting behavior. The fact that they concern primarily the same phenomenon, defined in much the same way and analyzed from the same type of data, need not decrease the significance of either study. Indeed, if we are serious about the scientific nature of our enterprise, there ought to be an advantage in at least this much parallel effort in dealing with a common research problem.

Nordlinger's data come from interviews and re-interviews, conducted by National Opinion Polls, with 447 workers in 1963 and 1964, plus supplementary intensive open-ended interviews with fifteen of these respondents. Tabulations, of course, are limited to the larger sample. The intensive interviews are used to provide suggested explanations

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for the tabulated voting preferences. These preferences (all from members of the working class) are put into three voting categories: Labour, deferential Conservative, and pragmatic Conservative. The last two are differentiated from each other by the fact that the deferentials display a strong preference for men of high status as their governmental leaders—defined particularly in terms of preferring as a prime minister a peer's son over a clerk's son and an old Etonian over a grammar school product. Thus the deferentials are tradition-oriented rather than achievement-oriented, and their reasons for voting Conservative can be distinctly different from the pragmatists, whose concern is likely to flow from their interests either as workers or as subjective middle-class identifiers.

Two findings are at odds with certain partly settled notions of voting behavior. Affluence alone, Nordlinger discovers, does not account for Conservative voting by workers. And neither do close personal relations between workers and their employer. The latter is analyzed in considerable detail.

Despite these findings, along with others of a similar kind, it is plain that Nordlinger's interest is less with highly focused analysis of particular aspects of voting behavior than with the general question of how attitudes relate to the support of a given political system. For example, he stresses that British working-class voters, including the one quarter of his sample who indicate feelings of personal political powerlessness, are not alienated from the system. And Nordlinger's most striking suggestion, to which he ties the theory of his last chapter, is that there is a characteristic British working-class acquiescence toward authority and that this acquiescence contributes crucially to a stable democracy.

LEON D. EPSTEIN
University of Wisconsin

The Italian Anti-Fascist Press (1919-1945): From the Legal Opposition Press to the Underground Newspapers of World War II *by Frank Rosengarten. Cleveland, The Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1968.—xx, 263 pp. $6.95.*

By and large the anti-Fascist resistance movement represents a high point in the moral and political history of Italy. This is the firm conviction of Professor Rosengarten and one with which this reviewer is in hearty agreement. Whatever their party affiliations, these men and women of the *Resistenza* continue to inspire us in their unselfish struggle for freedom and democracy.

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The author's obvious sympathy for the Italian anti-Fascists does not lessen the value of his book. It is a thoroughly researched and carefully constructed piece of work. Unlike most of the literature on this subject, this is an unprejudiced and well-balanced account of the contributions of all the major political currents from Communist to Catholic.

The volume begins with a brief description of the destruction of freedom of the press under fascism and a summary of the main currents of anti-Fascist journalism. The bulk of the work is devoted to the underground press during the period of armed resistance (1943-45). The principal merit of this section, one which contributes greatly to the readability of the text, is its organization around the great political debates of the *Resistenza*. Among these are the question of *attesismo* (or passive reliance on the Allies for the liberation of the country), the historical relationship of the *risorgimento* to the resistance, the nature of fascism, and the debate over the form which the Italian state and society would take in the postwar period.

In sum, this is an important and interesting book. Among its many values is Professor Rosengarten's demonstration that Italian fascism was not a mere *commedia*, as many Americans persist in believing, but a brutal dictatorship.

JOHN M. CAMMETT
John Jay College of Criminal Justice

Germany's Aims in the First World War *by Fritz Fischer, Introductions by Hajo Holborn and James Joll. New York, W. W. Norton, 1967.—xxviii, 652 pp. $15.00.*

When *Griff nach der Weltmacht*, as it is called in Germany, was first published in 1961, the late Klaus Epstein described it as "the most significant book about wartime Germany since Arthur Rosenberg's great *Birth of the German Republic* (Berlin, 1928)." Its importance, he continued, "cannot be questioned even by those who dissent from [the author's] interpretation." This is a judgment with which few historians would now quarrel. The book has been the center of scholarly discussion and controversy ever since its publication; it supplied the theme for the liveliest and most interesting session of the XIIe Congrès International des Sciences Historiques in Vienna in 1965; and it is now in its third edition in Germany. Informed discussion about the responsibility for the war of 1914-18 or about its political history is no

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longer possible without reference to Fischer's work, and this in itself makes the publication of an edition in English a welcome event.

The importance of the book lies both in the new information it supplies and in Fischer's reinterpretation of Germany's wartime ambitions. The author is the first historian to make thorough use, not only of the files of the old German Foreign Office (now at Bonn), but also of the archives in Potsdam and Merseburg, where the records of the Prussian, as distinct from the Imperial, government are housed. In addition, he has worked his way through an impressive number of other collections, including the diplomatic papers of the Bavarian and Württemberg governments and those of Germany's Austro-Hungarian ally. Many of these materials were not available to historians until 1955, and his access to them and the thoroughness of his work in other depositories give his findings an authority that earlier works could not claim.

The salient conclusion reached in his book is that Germany's war aims were at once more grandiose and—despite or because of this quality—more generally held than had been commonly supposed, and that "the traditional picture of a difference of principle ... between political and military thinking, between moderate, non-annexationist war aims and unlimited, annexationist ones is reduced in the end to divergences over the forms by which Germany's domination should be exercised" (p. 376). This Fischer proves by an exhaustive analysis of the varieties of annexationist thought and organization and their influence at every stage of the war, and by a skillful demonstration of the consistency of the German program of aggrandizement, despite the changing fortunes of war and the recurring possibilities of a settlement by negotiation. The conviction that Germany must acquire extensive territorial gains in both Eastern and Western Europe in order to secure the hegemonial position that would enable her to compete on a world scale with Great Britain, Russia, and the United States was, he points out, widely held, in political, business, and academic circles, long before 1914. During the war it acquired an intensity that made it impossible for the German government to consider a return to the *status quo ante bellum* even when military defeat stared it in the face.

The most controversial question raised by Fischer is whether the government ever tried very hard to stand against the currents that were running toward disaster, and his conclusion is that it did not. In this respect, there was, he insists, no essential difference of view between the wartime chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, and the most rabid of the annexationists. His argument here, which has caused almost as much violence in the German groves of academe as

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the student rising in Berlin, does less than justice to the complex character of the chancellor and the ambiguities of his position; and readers should consult the third volume of Gerhard Ritter's *Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk* (Munich, 1964) and Fritz Stern's essay on Bethmann in *The Responsibility of Power* (edited by Leonard Krieger and Fritz Stern, New York, 1967) before accepting all of his conclusions. Even so, here as elsewhere in his book, Fischer has destroyed a stereotype and opened the way for a reassessment.

This American edition of *Griff nach der Weltmacht* is based on the third German edition, but the text has been reduced by about a third and eight hundred references, as well as the catalogue of files used, have been omitted, for reasons of space and—we are told by the author—"to make it easier for an English-speaking audience." There is no doubt that it is convenient to have an English text, but, since the volume is unlikely to attract a general audience, these editorial arrangements are regrettable and will force the serious reader to dangle unnecessarily between this and the German one.

GORDON A. CRAIG
Stanford University

Adenauer in der Rheinlandpolitik nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg *by Karl Dietrich Erdmann. Stuttgart, Ernst Klett, 1966.—386 pp. 28 DM.*

The main purpose of this study is to clarify once and for all the role which Konrad Adenauer played in the Franco-German struggle over the Rhineland between 1918 and 1924. Legend has it that Adenauer, who was then Lord Mayor of Cologne, was a "separatist," wanting to set up an independent Rhenish state. This allegation often has been denied and disproved, but never so judiciously and conclusively as is done here. Drawing on a wealth of new material (government documents, private papers, and most important, the archives of the Lord Mayor's Office of Cologne), Professor Erdmann shows that the most Adenauer ever strove for was the creation of a Rhenish republic, not separate from but within the confines of the Reich. This Adenauer did out of deep concern for the Rhineland, especially during the Ruhr crisis of 1923, when French occupation of western Germany and French support of the genuinely "separatist" agitation by a small radical minority threatened to set the Rhineland adrift. But Adenauer also looked beyond the emergency of the moment toward a permanent

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lessening of Franco-German tension. This he hoped to achieve by making his proposed Rhenish republic into a bridge between the two nations, working at the same time for close economic integration between the industrial complexes of the Ruhr and Lorraine. Much of what came to pass under Adenauer's direction since World War II was thus conceived in those dismal days more than a generation ago. Rarely has a statesman had the satisfaction of seeing his earlier aspirations so completely vindicated.

But Professor Erdmann's book is more than merely a vindication of Adenauer. It is also a major contribution to our understanding of one of the most critical phases of Franco-German relations. French sources, compared to German ones, are still scarce. Erdmann was fortunate, however, in being able to use the papers of the French president of the Inter-Allied Rhineland Commission, Tirard, which the Germans had copied during their occupation of Paris in World War II. These provide valuable insights into France's plans for gaining lasting control over the left bank of the Rhine. Tirard's hope for an autonomous Rhenish state, however, ran into the firm opposition of Adenauer. The negotiations of the two men are among the most interesting sections of the book.

While Adenauer tried to sell his plans to the French, he also had to convert Germany's leaders to his solution of the Rhineland problem. In this he failed. Only a handful of industrialists, notably Hugo Stinnes, recognized the positive features of Adenauer's schemes for Franco-German economic collaboration. Most politicians turned a cold shoulder to his proposals. His main adversary was Gustav Stresemann, who deeply opposed the partition of Prussia, which Adenauer's plan for a Rhenish republic entailed. As the Ruhr crisis deepened, Stresemann was ready to withdraw Germany's support from the Rhineland altogether, leaving its fate in French or Allied hands. Adenauer was able to prevent this drastic solution. But he was not able to make his own long-range proposals prevail against Stresemann's own brand of Franco-German rapprochement. Stresemann's policy was successful, of course, at least in the short run. The question remains whether Adenauer's alternate scheme might not have provided a firmer basis for Franco-German friendship. Erdmann seems to think so.

The book on the whole, then, is favorable to Adenauer, though not uncritically so. The main fault Erdmann finds with him is not in his long-range aims but in the tactics he used to achieve them. A cool-headed and patient pragmatist, Adenauer would rapidly adjust to changing circumstances and personalities, thus at times becoming entangled in contradictions and raising doubts as to his ultimate motives.

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With the appearance of this important book, these doubts should be permanently laid to rest.

HANS W. GATZKE
Yale University

Empirical Social Research in Germany, 1848-1914 *by Anthony Oberschall. New York, Basic Books, and Paris and The Hague, Mouton, 1965.—viii, 153 pp. $5.75.*

This is a disappointing book. Preface (by Paul Lazarsfeld) and introduction promise a contribution to the sociology of social inquiry, an investigation into the conditions which affect the rise and acceptance of empirical research; but the main body of the book offers little systematic study of this important topic and even fails to present the information which future sociological inquiries would require. Curiously enough, the conclusion returns to the initial theme and states a number of hypotheses which would merit further investigation; nevertheless the author did not return to his story to complete the collection and organization of data in such a way that future inquiry could build on his researches to refine and test the hypotheses. Thus the book gives no quantitative data about German social research at all: the proportion of dissertations and theses which fall into one or other category, the distribution of economic resources among various kinds of academic activities, the numbers of students engaged in different kinds of study, the pattern of university professorships, social profiles of professors and/or students, the characteristics of publications in periodicals and learned journals, and the like. We are then faced with the paradoxical situation of a radically unempirical inquiry into the origins of empirical research, a circumstance made even more curious by the ingenuous value-judgments strewn throughout the book, according to which no higher praise can be given than that something "has a very modern ring to it" (p. 99).

Notwithstanding the disappointment about the major claims of the work, an interested reader will find provocative matter in this idiosyncratic historical ramble. The author reports on policy-directed social surveys conducted by the Verein für Sozialpolitik and various religious organizations, various sporadic efforts to adapt statistical refinements to the needs of social investigation, field work carried on by several professors, and a number of inquiries into the conditions of workers and of industrial work which are seen to culminate in Max Weber's

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design in 1907-11 for a study of this problem. Several characteristics give the impression of idiosyncracy. First of all, the author attempts to separate his story from the presumably familiar story of sociological theory and controversy during this period, with the result that he fades in and out of the work of Max Weber and Ferdinand Tönnies in quite an arbitrary way; the suggestion that the philosophical struggles of the time are relevant only to the extent that they absorbed energies which could have been (better) devoted to empirical social research does not appear tenable. Secondly, the author chooses to stop his account from time to time for a leisurely and quite detailed critique of methods, and these exercises give a disjointed quality to the exposition. Third, the principles of inclusion and exclusion into the story of "empirical social research" are not always clear; the major theme of quantitative research is plain enough, but this will not explain the excursus into field work at one place or into autobiographies at another (nor the quite inexplicable decision at a few places to extend the story into the nineteen-thirties). One hypothesis does save the phenomena: if the study is construed as a pre-history of the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University, and this means, above all, the intellectual biography of Paul F. Lazarsfeld, then a good deal falls into place. Then the work appears as a sort of intellectual memoir, an institutional genealogy reminiscing over favored ancestors.

The persistently critical tone of these brief comments derives from disappointment. The author repeatedly seems to bring the work around to some really important question, but he always wanders away again. Among other such tantalizing problems are the tie between the special sense of sociological "mission" and the failure to develop continuing working relationships between sociologists and statisticians or research-minded psychologists, the connections between opinion-surveying and efforts to manipulate attitudes, and the impact of moral and political concerns on the design and execution of studies—a matter frequently noted and quite simplistically censured, but never carefully examined. It is to be hoped that the companion studies of France, England, and the United States, announced in the preface, will proceed with greater care, both in empirical and in theoretical matters. Genealogy is an important activity among Mormons; youngsters spend hours in swimming pools, submitting to immersions which will retroactively baptize their forebears. Such activity probably ought not have the highest priority on the sociological agenda.

DAVID KETTLER
Ohio State University

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The Sociology of Max Weber *by Julien Freund. New York, Pantheon Books, 1968.—ix, 310 pp. $6.95.*

In the years since World War II the social sciences have witnessed a renaissance of Max Weber. Before that time his work was known only in a general way, with particular emphasis on his famous "Protestant Ethic" and his chapter on "Bureaucracy." Since 1945 a large number of his works have appeared in English translation, though a good many significant parts remain untranslated still. Meanwhile, the number of commentaries increases, and Julien Freund's contribution, originally published in French in 1966, is a welcome addition to this secondary literature. In France only a few of Weber's texts have appeared in translation, so that Freund joins earlier commentators like Weinreich, Aron, and Fleischman in making Weber's work accessible to the educated public. In the United States and England, on the other hand, a translation of Freund's work necessarily appears in a different context, with many of Weber's works in translation and a number of commentaries available already.

In the tradition of an *explication de texte* the author's purpose is to give a succinct exposition of Weber's work and in this he succeeds admirably. Given the notorious difficulties of the original it is pertinent to emphasize the lucidity of Professor Freund's presentation, which is fortunately preserved in the excellent translation by Mary Ilford. The book is divided into two sections of equal length, the first (consisting of three chapters) dealing with Weber's theoretical and methodological preoccupations, the second (consisting of one long chapter) dealing with his "special sociologies" of economics, religions, politics, law, and art. Unlike Talcott Parsons' work on Max Weber, Professor Freund has chosen to represent Weber's own ideas so that his "interpretation" is indeed a faithful rendition of the original. Accordingly, the reader will find a reasoned account of both the fundamental difference between the work of Weber and Durkheim and the principled opposition to evolutionism characteristic of Weber's work (see pp. 10-13, 133-40). Also, Professor Freund has chosen to give about equal emphasis to Weber's theoretical position and to his substantive sociological work rather than attempt to reveal the former by a sustained exposition of the latter, as I tried to do in my own work on Weber.

A few incidental points are inaccurate. On page 90 the author refers to Weber's statistical work, "using the general rules of experimentation," which is a rather misleading characterization of his study of productivity in a textile factory. On page 115 he states that Weber made

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"excellent use of the results of psychoanalytic research in his interpretive sociology," when it would be more appropriate to say that some of Weber's interpretations are compatible with psychoanalytic findings. Weber's incidental psychological insights owed clearly more to Nietzsche than to Freud, since the latter's major work became available only after Weber's death. More important, perhaps, is the dearth of specific references to Weber's work even where the author directly paraphrases Weber's text—probably an obstacle to those for whom this introduction is intended. But these are minutiae. This is an excellent introduction and a reliable guide to Weber's work, with little interpretive bywork, empirical detail, or attention to the problematic aspects of Weber's approach. At the same time it is a model of concise exposition.

REINHARD BENDIX
University of California, Berkeley

The Sociology of Marx *by Henri Lefebvre, translated from the French by Norbert Guterman. New York, Pantheon Books, 1968. —214 pp. $5.95.*

Professor Lefebvre's book shows the strengths and weaknesses to be expected in a work issuing from the controversies of the past twenty years among French intellectuals about the interpretation of Marx. It is intelligent, learned, and provocative, and in this sense an excellent introduction; yet it often seems remote from the concerns of sociologists. It falls into two almost contradictory parts. The first, much longer part, is a confident exposition of some of Marx's fundamental ideas, on *praxis*, ideology, classes, and the state, with occasional critical sorties against divergent interpretations. Professor Lefebvre begins from the position that Marx's theory is not a sociological system, since it belongs to a period before the specialization of the social sciences. Economists, historians, anthropologists, sociologists, and others have an equal right to draw upon its methods and results. But this seems to beg the question. Granted the specialization of the modern social sciences, is not Marx's thought more relevant to some of them than to others, and above all to sociology which seeks in the manner of Marxism itself to depict and analyze the general forms of social relationships? Or if this is not so, is Marxism to be conceived as a general methodology for all the social sciences? Alternatively, is the specialization of the social sciences a mistake and a handicap which Marxism can overcome? Or on the contrary, does the unspecialized character of Marx's thought

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relegate it to the position of a historical precursor, an element in Western culture which has been surpassed? Professor Lefebvre's account provokes but does not answer these questions.

On Marx's method Professor Lefebvre has many interesting things to say in his discussion of *praxis* and of the opposition between the dialectic and positivism. *Praxis*—social action—is forward-looking, inventive, and creative. The dialectical method takes account of this characteristic of social life, where positivism would construct a deterministic system. But does this now familiar contrast between the dialectic and positivism do justice to the ambivalence of Marx's own thought? What are we to make of the "law of development" of capitalist society, or of the historical succession of forms of human society? Even if we accept that Marx was not setting forth a rigorous theory of unilinear development it remains that he was suggesting law-like regularities in human history, not mere contingency. His assertion of the primacy of class relations in social change implies a fundamental determinism. Professor Lefebvre, like many others, has opted for the dialectic as a recognition of freedom and choice in social life, against the mechanical philosophy of Stalinism and its social consequences, but I do not think he has resolved the difficulty within Marx's own theory.

The second part of the book, comprising the later sections of the chapter on the state and the concluding chapter, assesses Marxism in a detached and critical way as a "starting-point," inadequate by itself to explain social life, yet vital in the search for explanations. This judgment, with which I agree, follows a little strangely, however, upon the uncritical exposition of Marx's ideas in the preceding chapters. It is very late in the day to expound Marx's theory of classes without reference to the actual changes in class structure and class consciousness in the industrial countries, to discuss Marx's concept of ideology without considering the role of Marxism as an ideology in the Socialist countries, or to treat Marx's conception of the development of modern capitalist society, and its end in socialism, without taking into account the real experiences of socialism in the twentieth century. Professor Lefebvre is certainly not indifferent to these problems, but in this book he has chosen to present Marx in the aspect of a historical monument and so to emphasize unduly what is dead rather than what is living in his thought.

T. B. BOTTOMORE
University of Sussex

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History of the International, Vol. II: 1914-1943 by Julius Braunthal, translated by John Clark. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1967.—xi, 596 pp. $17.50.

In recent years a remarkable number of specialized studies of the Communist movement have appeared. A general scholarly history of the Communist International, its Socialist origins, and its Socialist competitors would be very useful especially to non-specialists. Unfortunately, this book fails to fill this need. Braunthal surveys the subject from the impact of the First World War on the Second International to the dissolution of the Labor and Socialist International and the Communist International during the Second World War. He frequently rambles into the byways of diplomatic and national history to provide a background for his subject at the expense of a synthesis that would have made his history a coherent introduction.

Braunthal's participation in the struggles he describes—he was an editor of the Austrian social-democratic journal *Der Kampf*—illustrates that all too often men of the movement make poor historians. Braunthal is most successful in chronicling the disorganization in the ranks of social democracy brought on by the *realpolitik* of August 1914. A nostalgia for the calm era of the Second International runs through the book. Against the background of these alleged halcyon days Braunthal develops his thesis (p. 531): "If Lenin's vision [of a great revolutionary utopia] had not split the working class movement, the catastrophe which it suffered in Italy and Germany, and which ultimately became a catastrophe engulfing the greater part of mankind, would have been avoided." This simplistic notion of great men and the course of events repeatedly leads Braunthal into making naive judgments about particular struggles within the international Left. In discussing the German situation (pp. 58, 389-90), for instance, he attributes all of the SPD's difficulties in the interwar years to the split of the party during the war and to the widening of that split by the Communists thereafter. It does not occur to Braunthal that the split in the European Left and labor movement was much less a reflection of the willful policy of either Communists or Socialists than an expression of fundamental differences imbedded in the history of the movement. Attempts had been made to plaster over these profound theoretical and tactical differences during the decade before the First World War. The war itself demonstrated the futility of devising a magical consensus where none existed. It was the tensions within social democracy between nationalism and internationalism, between reform and revolution, and between a dominant craft and an emerging industrial work-

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ing class, which caused the split that both Socialists and Communists later exploited for their political ends. At times Braunthal's one-dimensional analysis deteriorates into plain partisanship. He discusses (pp. 391-402) the dogged stupidity of KPD and Comintern policy toward the German social democrats after Hitler's accession to power. He says virtually nothing, however, about the equally stupid and selfishly opportunistic policies of the SPD leadership-in-exile toward all other German Left parties and groups.

In addition to the analytical weaknesses of the book, structural and scholarly ones further reduce its value as a general history. Braunthal's extensive digressions into the general historical context (of rising fascism and the origins of the Second World War, for instance) tend to overshadow his main subject. Accordingly, we are offered only a sketchy treatment of the development of individual Socialist and Communist parties. Moreover, the main course of the power struggle in Soviet Russia and its imperative implications for the entire European Left virtually is neglected. Braunthal's history is episodic; it does not provide a synthesis of all the vital elements: the Socialist and Communist parties, the internationals, the historical context, and the influence of the USSR. Similarly, a general history ought to combine and refine the findings of the best specialized studies. Unfortunately, that is not the case here. Braunthal frequently cites authors such as Borkenau whose books are long outdated by more scholarly works. He also relies uncritically on accounts (W. Böhm's on the Hungarian Soviet Republic, Ruth Fischer's and W. G. Krivitsky's on the German October of 1923, for instance) which most students of the subject consider self-serving and refuse to take at face value. There is a mechanical attempt to update this English translation of the German edition (1963) by grafting recent monographs onto the footnotes and bibliography. This technique does little to enrich the book with the important findings and insights of W. T. Angress on the German October, R. Wohl and A. Kriegel on the French Communist party, J. M. Cammett on the Italian Communist party, and J. W. Hulse on the founding of the Comintern, to mention but a few.

Braunthal begins his preface with a disclaimer asking the reader not to expect an objective interpretation of the events described by one who has attempted to influence them. If we respect his condition, we only regret that he did not offer us more personal and much briefer reminiscences of his generation's experiences than appear in this lengthy tome.

HELMUT GRUBER
Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn

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Russian Political Thought: An Introduction *by Thornton Anderson. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1967.—xiii, 444 pp. $9.75.*

This introductory survey is intended to compensate for what the author believes has been a general neglect of the history of Russian political ideas among Western scholars. The book presents the most comprehensive treatment of Russian political thought that has appeared to date, yet it seems to this reviewer to provide few insights and little information not contained in existing Western literature on the history of Russian and Soviet political ideas and institutions.

Professor Anderson is by no means the first Western scholar to approach the Russian political tradition as a distinct body of thought, differing in fundamental respects from the tradition of Western Europe. Nor is he breaking new ground in interpreting Soviet politics from the perspective of Muscovite autocracy; a major thesis of the book is that the theory and practice of Soviet communism owe much less to Marxism, a Western product, than to a continuous tradition of centralized, autocratic government, separation of the government from the governed, discouragement of local and individual initiative, and insistence upon ideological orthodoxy.

Although ambitious in scope and thoughtfully organized, Professor Anderson's study tends to oversimplify complex problems and to present a single interpretation of controversial issues. For example, the role of the Varangians in the establishment of Kievan Rus' and their subsequent relations with the Slavic population are among the thorniest problems in Russian historiography. Yet, taking no account of this controversy, Professor Anderson explains that the Scandinavian princes, by setting themselves above the Slavic towns as a foreign and exclusive ruling class, initiated the gulf between the government and the governed which widened progressively under the tsars and the emperors—a questionable interpretation, but one that fits the author's schematic framework.

A further limitation of the study is that in emphasizing the distinctness of the Russian political tradition from that of the West, Professor Anderson tends to play down important links between the two civilizations. Neglect of the impact of Western ideas on the development of Russian political attitudes is most striking in the section on Peter the Great; here the Muscovite aspects of the first emperor's reign are discussed to the almost total exclusion of the influence upon Peter of contemporary Western political ideas and practices.

The conceptual framework of centralized autocracy and separation of the government from the governed provides a similarly inadequate

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perspective for analyzing the political experience of the Soviet period since it fails to take sufficient account of significant elements of change. It is highly misleading, for example, to equate the division between Communist party members and non-members today with the gulf that separated the tsarist ruling class from the Russian masses. And while the Soviet government did, in fact, inherit many of the political characteristics of tsarism, the Communist commitment to developing Russia economically and transforming her socially has gone far beyond anything attempted under the tsars. Consequently, it is disappointing to find relatively little attention devoted to this aspect of the Soviet experiment.

Finally, the work is hampered by occasional errors and inaccuracies. For example, the St. Petersburg Soviet of 1905 is seriously misrepresented as a "committee set up by groups of workers, on the tsar's invitation, to express their wishes." Such shortcomings, accompanied by a generally unimaginative writing style, detract substantially from the book's potential value as a full-scale treatment of Russian political thought.

JANET RABINOWITCH
Bloomington, Indiana

Planning Reforms in the Soviet Union, 1962-1966 *by Eugène Zaleski, translated by Marie-Christine MacAndrew and G. Warren Nutter. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1967.—viii, 203 pp. $6.00.*

Dr. Zaleski deserves our gratitude for this painstaking and comprehensive survey of the detailed changes in the Soviet system of economic administration that have taken place in the period indicated by the title. And the Office of Soviet Economic Research at the University of Virginia is to be congratulated for making this study available in English.

In writing this book Dr. Zaleski has combed the periodical literature, surveyed what has appeared in book form, and has collated all the information that is relevant to his theme. In doing so he has saved his colleagues a great deal of work. We can now turn to *Planning Reforms in the Soviet Union* rather than to a time-consuming and often frustrating search of the literature for the information we require. Much of the information about administrative structure has been translated into charts; most, though of the standard format, are useful nonetheless. The most novel and probably the most useful is Chart IV (pp. 25-26),

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which indicates very clearly how administrative responsibility for various planning functions has been distributed and redistributed between different government agencies in the postwar period. The presentation is clear, the information useful and normally available only in scattered sources; the book would be worth possessing if it contained nothing more. But, of course, it contains much more.

As well as providing us with an account of the changes in economic administration, Dr. Zaleski has attempted a survey of the attitudes and opinions of Soviet economists and men of affairs toward the economic reforms. He has provided an account of the various experiments in economic organization that have been tried. He has attempted to assess the likely impact of the reform on the operation of the economy and to explore the social and political constraints on further change.

A book which attempts to do so much would be unusual if it contained nothing with which one could find fault. In one respect the very wealth of information is regrettable; in trying to cover so much in so small a compass the treatment of certain topics is, unfortunately, superficial. The survey of attitudes, for instance, is reduced to a series of one-paragraph summaries or extracts which, while in total giving an impression of the diversity of opinion and the terms in which the reform is discussed, fails to do justice to the arguments of individual economists.

But the book's greatest limitation, one that makes it a work for the specialist rather than the student or layman, is probably the cause, not the consequence, of the amount of detail it contains. Space limitations prevent a detailed discussion, but the book lacks an adequate theoretical framework on which to base the discussion; there seems to be no clear model of the Soviet economy embedded in the text. Instead Dr. Zaleski relies on a series of tacit neo-classical precepts and a wealth of detail about administrative regulation; the information is there, but often the economics and politics seem to be omitted. This does not deprive the book of its value, but it does require the reader to question the assessment and implications provided and it also prevents the author from asking and answering certain questions which would provide insight into the system.

It would be unjust, however, to end on such a note of criticism; Dr. Zaleski has provided us with a detailed compendium of reform in the Soviet economy that will be of great value to all specialists and he deserves our thanks for it.

ALASTAIR N. D. MCAULEY
Princeton University

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Political Protest in the Congo: The Parti Solidaire Africain During the Independence Struggle *by Herbert F. Weiss. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967.—xxiv, 326 pp. $8.50.*

Professor Weiss' two objectives are to provide a history of the role of the two million peoples of the Kwango-Kwilu area (on which the *Parti Solidaire Africain* was based) in the struggle for the Congo's independence; and to analyze the nature of political protest among the rural masses. His thesis is that even before the emergence of political parties in the area spontaneous rural protest had been triggered by repatriated urban *jeunesse.* This protest had been harnessed by the modern elite leaders of the *PSA,* but the goals of the leaders and the masses were never really the same; the latter were revolutionary in wishing to destroy the colonial system while the elite were reformist in wishing to Africanize the existing system. Nevertheless a large degree of harmonized action occurred during the independence struggle for three reasons: Belgian policy united these two elements; the elite was able to convert the masses' mood of protest into creative action; and the masses looked up to the elite as knowing how to deal with the white man.

One element that puzzled Professor Weiss more than any other was the strength of rural radicalism in Kwango-Kwilu and in other parts of the Congo. He had been instructed by the "best writers" on the subject to accept (which, he says, has become the orthodox position in American academic circles) that the rural peasantry contributed neither the leadership nor the rank-and-file partisans of Asian and African nationalism. Although this is the general view of a number of influential writers, I would doubt that, thus boldly stated, it is the accepted view "in most of the literature on nationalism in Africa." While African nationalism has been largely controlled by the modern elite, and while it frequently originated in metropolitan areas, its populist nature must, *ipso facto,* reflect a considerable rural base of support. An analysis of the secondary level of nationalist leadership (with few exceptions) shows an important segment of rural leaders, semi-literates or non-Western literates. As for the "surprising radicalism" of the rural masses, one need only cite the militant thrust given to the United National Independence party in Zambia by the Bemba outside the Copperbelt, by the rural masses in Nyasaland to the Malawi Congress party, by the Kikuyu and Luo to the Kenya African National Union, by the pastoral Somalis in the Horn of Africa, and by the countryside of Tanganyika to the Tanganyika Africa National Union to be reminded that rural radicalism is a widespread phenomenon of African

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nationalism. The role of the modern elite in first using this radicalism against the colonial authorities and then canalizing it into its own, generally more reformist approach to change deserves more study than it has so far received. Part of the value of Professor Weiss' contribution is the light he throws on this aspect of elite leadership. Equally important is his material illustrating the schism between the metropolitan and rural elite leaderships—a relationship of great significance, yet one that is seldom analyzed.

In elaborating his hypothesis about a "protest-prone rural population," Professor Weiss suggests that there has been too great an emphasis placed on "horizontal fragmentation" (between ethnic groups of geographic regions) and too little on "vertical fragmentation" (between the leadership and the masses). He thinks it may be possible to explain the "very great collapse in party discipline"—meaning the loss in the elite's influence over the masses—since independence, by further comparative studies to test this hypothesis. But before he embarks on this he should perhaps inquire more deeply into the assumption that the elite's influence on the masses has indeed become weaker. At any rate, until he (and other workers in this field) show more awareness of the need to analyze the nature of "the modern elite" as a system, rather than merely as a single category of society or as a class, I doubt whether studies of the kind envisaged by Professor Weiss will be very helpful.

The incomparable value of this book lies in Professor Weiss' rich material and acute observation of a rapidly developing movement which adds considerably to our knowledge and understanding of the emergence and growth of nationalist politics. His analysis of the rise of ethnic self-consciousness as part of the modern political process (pp. 257-90) is especially important.

COLIN LEGUM
London, England

Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa *by Ruth Schachter Morgenthau. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1964.—xxii, 445 pp. $8.80.*

Since its publication Professor Morgenthau's book has become the standard work on the pre-independence development of political parties in former French West Africa. Her knowledge of the early history of party activity is based not only on thorough research into pub-

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lished sources but on unexcelled personal contact with many leading figures in the parties in the years immediately preceding independence.

After a review of the French colonial relationship and the place of the African deputies in the postwar French parliament, chapters are devoted to party structure and development in Senegal, Ivory Coast, Guinea, and Mali. Special attention is devoted to the changes resulting from conversion of the former Federation of French West Africa to a group of sovereign states.

The early history of party movements, encompassing as it does a constantly changing kaleidoscope of competing interests and personalities, is a prerequisite to any understanding of present-day politics in the area, the more particularly since many of the leaders of a decade or more ago are still in power. Of equal if not greater interest, however, is the short section dealing with the new problems faced by the parties at independence. The distinction which Professor Morgenthau draws between "patron" and "mass" parties became, as she points out, blurred in many countries as the new governments faced the problems of independence.

Inevitably, too, parties which rode into power on a wave of mass enthusiasm suffered, as they stayed in office, from a hardening of the political arteries. As a result communication between the masses and the leadership became more difficult. The leaders were preoccupied with the business of running the nation and increasingly took less effort to explain their policies at the popular level. Frequently ideological admonitions were substituted for the concrete results in development expected by the mass. Where genuine economic growth has been possible, as in the Ivory Coast, the substitution of governmental for party power has been accepted and the two have tended to meld into one another. In Guinea, on the other hand, where development has been seriously retarded by a combination of economic ineptitude and ideological rigidity, the party has been forced to retain control by constant emphasis on organizational structure down to the lowest level. In some degree the course of politics since independence in these two countries might have been predicted from the characteristic style of leadership which Professor Morgenthau brings out in her earlier chapters.

It would be of real value to the study of politics in Africa if the author could bring the analysis of party development up to date in a subsequent edition. She has admirably laid the ground work for this; today, however, a new generation of younger politicians is emerging for whom nationalism is no longer the predominant animating force. In the light of the earlier political history, Professor Morgenthau's

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analysis of the future directions of leadership in French-speaking Africa would be most illuminating.

L. GRAY COWAN
Columbia University

Organized Labor and the Mexican Revolution under Lázaro Cárdenas *by Joe C. Ashby. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1967.—x, 350 pp. $7.50.*

The purpose of Professor Ashby's book is, in his own words, "to examine the labor theory and to trace the development and the role of organized labor in Mexican economic policy during the Cárdenas régime . . ." (p. viii). To fulfill his objective the author presents chapters on the historical background of the Cárdenas period, the labor theory of Cárdenas and Vicente Lombardo Toledano, the structure and program of labor, labor and the National Railways, labor and the Laguna experiment, and labor and the oil expropriation.

Unfortunately, the author does not do justice to this important subject. The strongest part of the book is that which deals with the oil expropriation. This section is a workmanlike summary of the events leading up to the March 18, 1938, expropriation of the large foreign-owned oil companies and of the expropriation itself. But even these chapters are weakened by the defects which are manifest throughout the book.

One of my main concerns is that the perspective in which the author places his subject misleads the reader. He fails to place the labor movement and the Cárdenas period adequately within the context of Mexican history. He overestimates the effect of the labor movement on the Cárdenas regime, and he assumes that the *Confederación de Trabajadores de México* (CTM) and Lombardo Toledano spoke for Mexican labor as a whole (p. 48). Without denying the importance of the CTM and Lombardo Toledano, it it can be pointed out that there were significant labor groups representing well over one hundred thousand workers not affiliated with the CTM (CROM, CGT, Miners' Federation, Electricians Union), and that there were other important leaders within the CTM who did not always share Lombardo Toledano's point of view (Juan Gutiérrez, Fidel Velázquez, and Mariano Padilla). Professor Ashby alludes briefly to these facts, but by ignoring them for the most part he distorts the picture of the labor movement under Cárdenas.

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In addition, the author fails to develop and interpret many important issues. He does not clarify the evolving relationship between Cárdenas and Lombardo Toledano and their respective influence within the labor movement, the important implications of the labor-government partnership, or the splits within the CTM.

Most importantly, perhaps, the author says practically nothing about the issue of labor and nationalism. In his preface and again in his conclusion, he quotes (incorrectly) Frank Tannenbaum's statement that "the trade union has become an instrument for the reduction of the power of private industry and for making the State the arbiter of the nation's economy" (pp. vii, 285). But he never discusses how labor operated in this manner, if these ideas were reflected in labor theory, or if the statement is an accurate one. There is no reference to Lombardo Toledano's important 1936 speech ("La bandera mexicana y el proletariado") in which he attempts to monopolize the nation for the proletariat.

The manner of presentation of the material further weakens the book. There is considerable repetition including duplication, with only a word or two changed, of entire sentences (pp. 11 and 61, 215 and 280). Long quotes—most of which should have been paraphrased, referred to, or eliminated—abound (pp. 26, 45, 66, 86, 177, 180-82). The bibliography is undifferentiated, and I am surprised, since he included many general works, that the author does not include Frank Brandenburg's *The Making of Modern Mexico*, and that he apparently did not interview any of the people involved in the labor movement and the Cárdenas regime.

The labor movement during the Cárdenas regime is very important and it deserves a better book than this one.

SAMUEL L. BAILY
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Book Notes

The agonies of social policy in America today risk the respectability of liberalism, but reformist liberals will find their responses strengthened by description of efforts to extend freedom under law in *Frontiers of Civil Liberties* (New York, Pantheon Books, 1968; xxiii, 420 pp., $8.95) by Norman Dorsen. The book marshals the working papers of the author—director of the Hays Civil Liberties Program at New York University Law School—and contributions of his colleagues and students in order to illustrate concern for and activities designed to push back four constitutional and political "frontiers": the capability of our system to protect basic rights, society's toleration of dissent, fair treatment within our legal processes, and racial discrimination. This is a wide range and in some sections non-lawyers will be less than absorbed, but relevant and timely political themes are revealed to the careful reader. Particularly striking is the dependence of our system on day-to-day administering—on whether ordinary people will stick to the rules or break them, on what interpretation the people in middle management will-give to policy. Business blacklisting, military censorship, violations of academic freedom, and the like rarely result from decisions of high policy. Constitutional lawyers make it so, but then they have to go back again and again to turn a beach head for freedom into a liberated province. Each victory creates a new frontier. It is also noteworthy that civil liberty today raises the whole question of the law's relation to social class. The rights of persons to legal counsel, the treatment of juveniles and the insane, the accessibility of property and housing all bear most heavily on society's disadvantaged and repressed. While the attack on the source of difficulty here will not satisfy radical critics, it

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may be heartening to the Old Left to note that university professors and private agencies, such as the American Civil Liberties Union—pillars of today's establishment—still skirmish ahead of the rank and file of middle class America. Finally, this book offers clear evidence that the line between private and public liberty has disappeared. Perhaps it never existed, except in models constructed by political theorists. Mass media and electronic eavesdropping, to mention two disparate examples, can destroy privacy and justice, each in its own way. The American Way has permitted private organizations, like universities and broadcasting companies, to be affected by—"regulated"—but not absorbed by the public interest. We have also permitted public organizations, like the military, to exploit private groups in operating the Selective Service System. In challenging instances of television in the courtroom or capital punishment or rejection of selective conscientious objection, the assiduous civil libertarian may yet demonstrate that the American constitutional system retains the capacity for internal, incremental reform, and that the way to do this is to argue relentlessly on the side of the indivisibility of liberty. Books like this show that some people are still practicing what many of us have been preaching.—HARVEY GLICKMAN, *Haverford College.*

This monograph on South African politics—*African Opposition in South Africa: The Failure of Passive Resistance* (Stanford, The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1967; xiv, 223 pp. $7.50) by Edward Feit—deals with the two last cases of overt African opposition in South Africa organized by the African National Congress (before this organization was declared illegal). The author draws general inferences from these cases, and his analysis is guided by general reflections. His study is therefore of wide import. The first of these cases was the Western Areas Removal, in which the government terminated African residence in Sophiatown and adjacent areas in the city of Johannesburg where Africans could possess freehold rights, and moved these people to a new township where they could own their dwellings but occupy the land only on a ninety-nine-year lease. African ownership of land in what were designated as European areas contradicted the government's policy of apartheid. The second case was the institution of Bantu education, in which the government transferred all African education to the control of the central government and out of the hands of the missions, which had originated native education in South Africa and still provided much of it up to that time. On both these matters the African National Congress

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and its allies decided to organize a popular resistance—refusing to move and boycotting the schools—and in both cases they failed miserably. On the one hand, as Feit shows, there was the strength of a tough government, which thought and spoke with one voice, and which had no hesitation in threatening permanently to exclude from the schools any students who boycotted classes. On the other hand there was the organizational weakness of the ANC. Feit gives an instructive picture of a situation in which the national leaders did not know what the local facts were because the leaders of the local branches refused to transmit the necessary information. What is novel in his analysis is the conclusion that there was something more than these two factors at work. The fact is that the government was offering a material advantage that outweighed the symbolic appeal of Congress. For most Africans Sophiatown was a rack-rented and overcrowded urban ghetto. Thus Africans were signing up for new housing in the townships before the removal day. As for Bantu education—which Congress alleged would brainwash the African to accept an inferior status—no one, of course, could know that it was like before it had started. But the Africans did know that they were desperately short of space in schools (from which they did not want to risk their children's being excluded) and that the mission schools were of uneven quality. In a modest but solid way the author has pierced the ideological screen that surrounds these issues to give a realistic picture of the forces at work.—H. M. Brotz, *McMaster University*.

A minor branch of historical studies, but one of great interest to its practitioners and probably of great value for modern politics if properly used, is the analysis of the way Europeans have thought of Asia. *Sir William Jones: A Study in Eighteenth-Century British Attitudes to India* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1968; viii, 199 pp., $8.50) by S. N. Mukherjee, belongs to this genre. It has as its theme the career of the English Orientalist, who was both a great scholar and a popularizer of Indian classical culture. Before he went to India as Judge of the Supreme Court in Calcutta in 1783, he already had a European reputation for his political views as well as for his scholarship; he was a leading opponent of the government's American policies and of what he regarded as its attack on the British constitution. The role of this brilliant scholar in the creation of the alien government in Bengal at the end of the eighteenth century and his enormous services to scholarship should then be a fascinating story. A number of scholars have tried their hand at making it so, but none, including S. N. Mukherjee, have really suc-

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ceeded. Mukherjee's book is interesting, and his views are obviously based on careful research, but it is like reading a novel about a character whom the author alleges to be a great poet; one needs an example to prove the greatness. Mukherjee says that Bentham's judgment of Jones, that "he was an industrious man with no sort of genius," was unfair, but it troubles the reader who knows how highly he was regarded by his friends because at times it seems just. One suspects that the clue is here; one has to see Jones in the company of his contemporaries to get something of the meaning of Asia for the European mind at the end of the eighteenth century. This would have needed a bigger book than Mukherjee has chosen to write.—AINSLEE T. EMBREE, *Duke University*.

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

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

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